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From Disarmament and 
Development to Inclusive Peace 
and Security: Four Decades of 
IDS Research
Robin Luckham 
Abstract This introductory article surveys four decades of work on peace, 
security, and development, centring on articles published in previous issues 
of the IDS Bulletin. These articles focused initially on disarmament and its 
actual and potential contributions to development. After the end of the 
Cold War, development research engaged more and more directly with 
conflict prevention and peace-building, turning the spotlight upon security. 
IDS work has been distinctive in three respects. First, in interrogating the 
multiple meanings of security, delinking it from state and international 
security. Second, by tracing the complex links between global, national, 
local, and personal security. Third, in its insistence that security be inclusive, 
drawing upon the experience and agency of the people and groups who are 
‘developed’ and ‘secured’. 
Keywords: disarmament and development, militarisation, security, 
violent conflict, inequality, social inclusion, peace, peace-building, 
human security, security in the vernacular. 
1 Introduction1
This article introduces an IDS Bulletin Archive Collection which 
reviews four decades of  analysis and research on peace, security, and 
development. This work initially concentrated upon disarmament 
and development. Disarmament, along with reductions in military 
spending, it was argued, would release resources for development. It 
would also break the cycles of  militarisation which propelled violent 
conflicts in many parts of  the developing world. When the Cold War 
ended, however, the focus shifted to security’s troubled relationship to 
development, in a global context in which donor agencies engaged more 
and more directly with security questions. This article and the pieces 
reprinted in this Archive Collection2 trace these shifts, before concluding 
that it may be time to revisit disarmament in the present times of  
chronic insecurity and increasing violence.
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Despite these shifts in focus, certain common threads of  analysis 
have continued throughout. First, security has been treated with 
circumspection, as a hugely contested, if  vital, concept. It takes 
diverse forms, not all of  them military, and connects intricately with 
development. Violence and insecurity disrupt economic progress 
and cause massive human suffering. On the other hand, security 
itself  can impose burdens upon development. Uncaring or repressive 
governments frequently sacrifice their citizens at the altar of  national 
security. Major powers tend to pursue their geopolitical security interests 
with little regard to the poor and vulnerable people harmed or uprooted 
by their interventions. 
Second, contributors to IDS Bulletins have had a shared commitment 
to rigorous investigation of  both (a) the multiple ways global, national, 
and local institutions and actors interact to determine security and 
to shape the course of  development; and (b) the many forms of  
security (international, national, military, personal, livelihood, food, 
environmental, etc.) and how these interconnect, or indeed clash. 
Third, and most important, has been an insistence on asking the 
question ‘whose security, and whose development?’ This question has 
both analytical and political repercussions. Interrogating security and 
development ‘from below’ reframes the established agendas of  security 
and development thinking. Activating the experience and agency of  
the people and groups who are ‘developed’ and ‘secured’ is at the same 
time a profoundly political process, especially so in a world in which 
geopolitics and national security are once again on the march.
2 Disarmament and development
The theory and practice of  security, and likewise that of  development, 
was shaped within the historical matrix of  the post-Second World War 
international order. The dirty secret of  the ‘long peace’ maintained 
through nuclear deterrence during the Cold War was that the struggles 
between capitalist West and communist East played out in the warscapes 
of  the South. A series of  United Nations (UN) conferences and 
reports proposed curbs on arms races, reductions in military spending, 
and the reallocation of  the resources released by these reductions to 
development. But military spending kept rising and the peace dividend 
never materialised. The Bretton Woods institutions and aid agencies 
maintained a studied distance from the brute facts of  war and political 
violence which disfigured many parts of  the developing South. Violent 
conflicts, often aggravated by arms sales and international interventions, 
continued to increase throughout the Cold War period with devastating 
legacies, many of  which persist to this day.
IDS first began to investigate the relationship between disarmament 
and development in the 1970s (Jolly 1978). Its concern then as now was 
the safety and wellbeing of  poor and vulnerable people jeopardised by 
global as well as local insecurities. The initial focus was upon the savings 
that could be achieved by deep cuts in military spending and arms sales, 
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and upon the reallocation of  these savings to development and poverty 
reduction. But it soon became clear that it was not realistic to propose 
cuts without better understanding of  the processes which drove military 
spending, propelled global and national arms races, spread insecurity, 
and triggered armed violence (Luckham 1976, 1977; Kaldor 1978). The 
central policy challenge was how to reverse militarisation through peace 
initiatives, conflict reduction, and the conversion of  military industries 
to peaceful purposes. Whilst the broad thrust of  this analysis was global, 
the optic was also ‘from below’, in that the goal was to reduce the 
burdens of  security on poor and vulnerable people.
These were the principal themes of  a 1985 IDS Bulletin on ‘Disarmament 
and World Development: Is There a Way Forward’,3 articles from which 
begin this Archive Collection (Brandt 1985 and Luckham 1985, both 
this IDS Bulletin4). The 1985 issue contained impassioned pieces by 
Willy Brandt, Shridath Ramphal and Inga Thorsson, all three prominent 
international proponents of  disarmament and development.5 It was 
published at a fraught juncture of  the Cold War, when the United States 
was ramping up its military spending and embarking on the controversial 
Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars’) proposals, and when the global 
economy was in a precarious state.6 Not long afterwards, the Reagan 
administration pulled the United States out of  the forthcoming United 
Nations Special Conference on Disarmament and Development, 
planned for 1986, and thus ensured its cancellation.7 
3 End of the Cold War: new world order, or plus ça change?
Within four years the Cold War came to a rapid end, and this appeared 
to change almost everything. The end of  the stand-off between the two 
superpowers ushered in a period of  apparent unipolar Western and 
especially American hegemony. At last, it seemed, the elusive peace 
dividend might be achievable. To be sure, new security challenges soon 
emerged from the breakup of  the communist bloc in Eastern Europe; 
the destabilisation of  client regimes in the developing world, which had 
previously been propped up by the communist East or the capitalist 
West;8 and the proliferation of  multiple forms of  ‘non-state’ violence, 
including terrorism. The ‘new wars’ of  the post-Cold War period saw 
an unravelling of  political authority, hastened by globalisation and 
aggravated by the rise of  identity-based conflicts in many regions of  the 
developing world (Kaldor and Luckham 2001). Nevertheless, the number 
of  wars and other forms of  violence soon began to decline, according 
to most published measures, as did the numbers of  people killed and 
wounded, fleeing their homes, and suffering war-related human misery. 
The policy environment was transformed even more dramatically. 
Starting from the UN Secretary-General’s Agenda for Peace in 1992 
(UN 1992), the international community played an ever more 
assertive role in conflict prevention, peacekeeping, peace-building, and 
post-conflict reconstruction. The development community became 
increasingly oriented to humanitarian action and emergency assistance 
in conflict zones (Buchanan-Smith and Maxwell 1994). International 
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donors and non-governmental organisations cast off their previous 
reluctance to address security issues, arguing that it was sometimes 
necessary to invest in security to protect weak states from the violence 
that threatened to engulf  them, as well as to rebuild peace after conflicts.
Development analysis and policy began focusing on fragile states, 
including their failure to protect their citizens and deliver basic security 
and justice. Poorly resourced, non-accountable, and undisciplined 
military and security institutions were considered security threats in 
their own right. They subverted democratic transitions and engaged 
in cycles of  violence, interacting with the non-state armed groups they 
were supposed to keep in check (Cawthra and Luckham 2003). Donors 
began by investing in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
programmes to discourage ex-combatants from returning to violence. 
They promoted security sector reforms, to improve the effectiveness and 
democratic accountability of  military, police, and justice institutions. 
Later on, they embarked on ambitious stabilisation and state-building 
programmes in fragile and conflict-affected states such as Bosnia, 
Democratic Republic of  Congo, and Afghanistan. 
These policies were reinforced by significant discursive shifts. First, 
peace-building was realigned around the preservation of  security, and 
disarmament almost vanished from the picture. Second, the concept 
of  security was broadened to comprise human and citizen security, 
alongside but not replacing more traditional conceptions of  state and 
international security. The World Bank became an enthusiastic convert 
and its path-breaking World Development Report 2011 (World Bank 2011) 
made citizen security the starting point for its policy engagement with 
state fragility and peace-building. 
4 Securitisation, violence, and geopolitics
Nevertheless, the brute realities of  inequality and global violence did 
not vanish with the end of  the Cold War; far from it. Violent conflicts 
declined from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, but have been on the 
upturn ever since. The cuts in global military spending of  the post-
Cold War era have largely been reversed. Major powers increased 
their military interventions in the developing world, especially after 
9/11. The number of  people uprooted from their homes and displaced 
across and within national boundaries is higher than at any time since 
the Second World War. The framework of  international cooperation 
continues to stutter in the face of  these and other global challenges, 
including that of  climate change. And although real progress has been 
made in reducing poverty, the gains are unevenly spread, globally and in 
each national context. 
Moreover, as critical analysts have observed, the liberal or democratic 
peace was never all it seemed. It was underpinned by an ideological vision 
in which political freedoms marched hand in hand with free market 
economics. Behind its façade lurked many of  the same forces which had 
propelled militarisation in the North and violence and underdevelopment 
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in the South during the Cold War. It seemed that security had taken 
development hostage step by step. Simultaneously, development was being 
rewritten according to a neoliberal, free-market script. 
Duffield (1994) argued in an IDS Bulletin published not long after 
the end of  the Cold War that international interventions in complex 
political emergencies had begun to transform the development industry 
and to realign North–South relations; what he was later to term 
the ‘securitisation’ of  development (Duffield 2001). Humanitarian 
interventions to fulfil the international community’s ‘Responsibility 
to Protect’ (ICISS 2001) vulnerable people exposed to genocide and 
extreme violence were increasingly intertwined with international 
security concerns. Even human security became compromised, when 
used to put a human face on these interventions or to justify donor 
support for state-building and market-based development. These 
critiques gained added traction after 9/11, when the ‘war on terror’ 
was initiated and a spate of  international military interventions were 
launched, some under humanitarian or peace-building cover, others 
supposed to preserve international security, but almost all shaped around 
the geopolitical concerns of  the major world and regional powers.
Willett (2001, this IDS Bulletin) spelled out the dangers of  such ‘security 
first’ approaches to conflict prevention and peace-building. She 
argued that they can at best patch over violent conflicts driven by 
impoverishment, inequality, and social exclusion. Rather it is globalisation, 
along with market deregulation imposed by donors on weak governments 
and their poorly performing economies, which has sown the seeds of  
discontent, fuelling the violence. It follows that tackling globalisation 
and inequality may be the best peace-building strategy. The major 
international players and development institutions must put their own 
houses in order, and tackle the inequities generated by global capitalism, 
before imposing their liberalisation and peace-building agendas on others. 
5 Tackling insecurities in an unequal world 
Fundamental asymmetries characterise how global shocks are perceived 
and acted upon. According to the world view of  many Northern 
decision makers, human insecurities, including violent conflicts, are 
largely confined to the South. Yet they intrude upon the North as well. 
First, through terrorism and transnational crime, seen in the media age 
as symbolic disturbances in the established order of  things. Second, 
through the increasing flow of  people displaced by violence and 
poverty across the borders of  Europe and North America, generating 
increasingly hostile public perceptions. Third, through the political 
and social ruptures brought about by economic liberalisation, rapid 
technological change, and inequality in Northern countries themselves. 
International security policy, humanitarian action and, increasingly, 
development policy are being reframed in an increasingly divisive 
political context which shifts the blame and the responsibility for 
dealing with spreading insecurity to the South. These largely Northern 
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perceptions disregard the brutal reality that it is countries, communities, 
and people in the South which suffer most from global shocks; which 
bear the traumas of  most of  the violence; and which shelter and feed 
the vast majority of  refugees. 
How is it possible to challenge these perceptions and to reframe the 
dominant discourse around more inclusive and yet realistic conceptions 
of  security? This IDS Bulletin Archive Collection draws attention to a 
variety of  analytical and policy approaches. None fits neatly under a 
traditional ‘security’ moniker. Most draw upon conceptions of  human 
or citizen security, but go further in requiring deeper, more differentiated 
understandings of  how poor and vulnerable people respond to and 
negotiate their insecurity (for more detailed discussion see Luckham 
2015 and Lind and Luckham 2017). At the same time, they insist upon 
rigorous investigation of  the determinants – local, national, and global – 
of  insecurity, and of  how these determinants interconnect. 
A path-breaking example is Davies and Leach’s (1991, this IDS Bulletin) 
exploration of  the relationships between food security and protection 
of  the natural environment. Their departure point is the livelihood 
strategies of  poor rural producers, who do not in general distinguish 
sharply between their food security and the multiple ways they draw 
upon natural resources. In their day-to-day struggles to survive, these 
rural producers find themselves situated at many removes from the 
concerns of  national and international policymakers. 
Significant North–South discrepancies exist, Davies and Leach argue, 
in how food security and environmental sustainability are thought 
about and prioritised. The global policy discourse of  environmental 
protection emphasises global interdependence as well as cooperation to 
tackle shared threats to the natural environment. Yet this fails to address 
the underlying North–South inequalities in access to technology and 
resources, and risks privileging environmental concerns over people. 
Analysis and policy should identify and negotiate the trade-offs and 
synergies between environmental sustainability and food security. At the 
same time, they should take full account of  the wide gaps between the 
household, village, national, and global levels – above all by listening to 
and respecting the day-to-day concerns of  those who are most directly 
affected by environmental change and by food insecurity. 
Hossain (2009, this IDS Bulletin) reports on a study investigating the 
impacts of  the post-2008 global food, fuel, and financial shocks upon 
social cohesion and crime in ten local communities in Bangladesh, 
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, and Zambia. None faced threat of  
large-scale violence; yet in all, economic shocks increased insecurity, 
including growth of  semi-legal and criminal livelihoods, organised 
crime, and the criminalisation of  the police and other public agencies. 
The social networks on which poor and vulnerable people depended 
were weakened. And trust in public institutions and in their capacity to 
protect their citizens was undermined.
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Richards and Bah (2005, this IDS Bulletin) argue that African civil wars 
have often arisen out of, deepened, and in turn challenged agrarian 
exploitation, which has deep historical and social roots in the colonial 
and pre-colonial past. Much of  the analysis and policy emanating from 
international development bodies has discounted the grievances arising 
from exploitation and social injustice, and has misinterpreted resistance, 
including violent resistance, to this exploitation. Durable peace, 
Richards and Bah argue, can only be assured through comprehensive 
agrarian reforms which explicitly bring in previously marginalised social 
groups, including women and youths. 
De Waal (1993, this IDS Bulletin) offers a powerful critique of  the 
weaponisation of  famine in Africa to win wars, to control populations, 
and to seize control over land and productive assets; an analysis which 
still rings true more than two decades after it was written – notably in 
countries such as South Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Syria. Then as 
now famine is not simply an African problem, it is complexly linked 
both to global shocks and to violent conflicts. Efforts to reduce it tend 
all too often to be compromised by the securitisation of  humanitarian 
assistance, as well as the bureaucratic politics of  the aid industry.
6 Uncovering silenced voices
The difficulties and opportunities of  navigating research in dangerous 
and politically contested conflict zones are explored by contributors 
to this IDS Bulletin (see also Rivas and Browne 2018). During the past 
two or three decades, research on violence and the different forms of  
insecurity has increased in both volume and quality. Researchers have 
adopted a wide spread of  methodological prisms, including historical 
analysis, ethnographic fieldwork, participant observation, action 
research, and quantitative techniques. Justino, Leavy and Valli (2009, 
this IDS Bulletin) explore the potential of  quantitative techniques of  
inquiry, notably their use in micro-level research on violence, arguing 
that they complement rather than replace qualitative methods. 
Hume’s (2009, this IDS Bulletin) account of  the gendered silences of  
violence in El Salvador highlights the disempowerment of  women and 
the challenges this poses for researchers investigating the multiple ways 
in which they are silenced.9 She provides a trenchant analysis of  how 
violence and the fear of  violence in El Salvador have been normalised 
by both police and criminals to silence women and stifle dissent.
De Mel (2009, this IDS Bulletin) provides a trenchant picture of  the 
militarised masculinity of  Sri Lanka’s military and security institutions, 
supposed to protect all citizens, including women, from violence. Her 
portrayal of  the interactions between Sri Lanka’s ‘military boys’ and its 
‘garment girls’ suggests how the militarised masculinity of  the former 
reinforces the gendered insecurity of  the latter, which in turn stems from 
the feminised exploitation of  labour in the country’s transnational Free 
Trade Zones. 
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How to uncover silenced voices is as much a political as a 
methodological task, as both Hume and de Mel suggest. Abello Colak 
and Pearce (2009, this IDS Bulletin) investigate ‘security from below’ 
through case studies of  community-led responses to violence and 
peace-building in Guatemala and Colombia (see also McGee 2017, who 
links the silencing of  people in the Colombian Pacific to the invisible as 
well as visible power of  elites and violent groups). Action research and 
community-led peace-building, Abello Colak and Pearce argue, provide 
better empirical understanding of  the insecurities faced by vulnerable 
people and groups. In addition they offer credible, popularly supported 
alternatives to the perverse, forcibly imposed forms of  order which 
sometimes pass for security in violent situations.
7 Inclusive citizenship, legitimate public authority, and the social contract
Citizen participation is essential to legitimate public authority as well 
as inclusive security. However, Kabeer’s (2002) insightful analysis of  the 
multiple dimensions of  citizenship points out that certain forms and 
experiences of  citizenship can reinforce exclusion as well as inclusion. 
Political authority is diminished when particular categories of  citizen – 
marginalised minorities, submerged classes, women, etc. – are deprived 
of  some or all of  the entitlements of  citizenship, including protection 
from violence. Diminished citizenship along with the unravelling 
of  authority connect complexly to insecurity and violence, both as 
frequent causes and as frequent outcomes of  violence (Kaldor and 
Luckham 2001). 
Leonard (2013, this IDS Bulletin) focuses upon the making and 
unmaking of  the social contract between states and citizens in sub-
Saharan Africa. Much of  the political turbulence in the region has 
arisen from the unstable bargains made between and within African 
political elites, security apparatuses, and regimes, upon which much of  
the analysis of  conflict and insecurity has concentrated (World Bank 
2017).10 Yet equally if  not more fundamental has been the failure of  
elites and governments to fulfil their social contracts with citizens, and in 
particular their inability or unwillingness to deliver basic physical safety 
along with other public goods. 
In the absence of  the state, alternative ‘hybrid’ forms of  security 
provision have emerged, in which an eclectic range of  non-state actors 
(traditional institutions, elders, religious authorities, community groups, 
and even warlords and criminal mafias) offer protection and various 
forms of  justice (Bagayoko and M’Cormack 2012; Bagayoko, Hutchful 
and Luckham 2016). Based on research in Côte d’Ivoire, Allouche and 
Zadi Zadi (2013) suggest that civilian groups interacting with the state 
can play a vital role in containing violence and maintaining ‘zones of  
peace’ in situations of  acute conflict. 
Behind the analysis and practice of  security again lurks the fundamental 
question raised at the beginning of  this article and which is implicit in 
the social contract: exactly whose security and whose development are 
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we talking about? People whose lives are thrown into turmoil by violence 
and insecurity almost invariably see their insecurity differently from 
how it is seen by national governments, international peacekeepers, and 
others charged with delivering peace and security. They speak security 
‘from below’ in many vernaculars, reflecting significant variations in 
history, culture, and social milieu (see Lind and Luckham 2017, which 
introduces a special issue of  Peacebuilding around these themes based on 
recent IDS research). Their insecurity invariably intertwines with other 
forms of  human suffering and social exclusion; that is, freedom from 
violence and from the fear of  violence necessarily belongs within a wider 
consideration of  other dimensions of  human security. 
Table 1 The complex landscapes of risk and (in)security
The multiple layers of 
(in)security
Violence and threats of 
violence
Economic dislocations Sustainability risks
Local, community, and 
individual 
Gender, identity-based, 
criminal, and vigilante violences
Proliferation of non-state 
armed groups 
Localised or subcontracted 
state violence
Inequality, poverty, and fragile 
livelihoods
Uneven impacts of 
development 
Spatialised inequalities at the 
margins
Famine, epidemics, child 
mortality, and displacement
Unequal distribution of risks 
between rich and poor 




governance structures and 
practices
Hollowing or capture of 
democracy by violent elites
Weak states unable to 
manage ‘adjusted’, dependent 
economies
Widening vertical and 
horizontal inequalities 
States as capitalist enforcers 
Corruption cartels and bandit 
states
State failure to deliver public 
goods, respond to emergencies, 
or maintain safety nets
Government disinterest or 
hostility towards environmental 
protections 
Neglect of infrastructures 





Rising powers and new forms 
of hegemony 
Regionally interconnected 
violence and insecurity 
Insecurity ‘blowback’ towards 
the North
Varying regional capacities to 
weather economic shocks 
Brunt of adjustments imposed 
on poorest countries and 
people
Regional competition over 
water, land, and resources
Mass population displacements, 
refugees, and migration 
Global Networked violence: terrorism, 
drugs, and crime 
New technologies of war and 
surveillance








Health pandemics (HIV, 
Ebola, etc.)
Spreading food and water 
insecurities
Source Author’s own, adapted from Luckham (2015).
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8 Mapping (in)security from below
How can ‘security from below’, and ‘security in the vernacular’ both 
activate vulnerable and insecure people and groups themselves, and 
make a tangible difference to analysis, research, and policy? Even 
if  one’s starting point is an appraisal of  the risks which press most 
heavily upon the day-to-day lives of  vulnerable people, these risks 
must be appraised in their national, regional, and global context. 
Table 1 presents a schematic landscape of  insecurities and risks, along 
with the different levels, from local to global, at which they tend to be 
most pressing. 
The forms of  violence and insecurity which most directly affect poor 
and vulnerable people are summarised at the head of  Table 1. Placing 
them in a wider context and tracing the determinants, direct and 
indirect, of  their (in)security is of  course enormously challenging. Local 
and community insecurities are deeply shaped by remote national, 
regional, and global dynamics, which local people scarcely understand 
and have very little ability to control. Global risks such as climate 
change, economic shocks, and transnational violence cascade through 
to regional, national and local levels, but how they do so is poorly 
understood, as well as difficult for those most affected to grasp. 
Conversely, seemingly local or national insecurities too have major 
global reverberations: for instance, the networking across international 
boundaries of  localised Islamist insurgencies in the Arabian Peninsula, 
the Horn of  Africa, and the Sahel; or the political and military 
upheavals propelling large numbers of  people fleeing repression 
and violence in Africa and the Middle East to seek refuge across the 
Mediterranean; and the worldwide panics set off by pandemics, such as 
the Ebola epidemic. 
Researchers struggle as best they can to map these interconnections, to 
expose them to empirical scrutiny, and to draw informed conclusions 
for policy and political action. It is an undertaking simultaneously of  
deepening and of  broadening (see Luckham 2015 for a panoptic view). 
It demands rigorous analysis rather than speculative conjecture about 
the drivers of  global change and their attendant risks. 
How, for instance, do the diverse insecurities (violence, famine, disease, 
displacement, etc.) faced by people and groups at the margins (top 
of  Table 1) interconnect and reinforce each other? How do they link 
vertically to impoverishment and global capital accumulation? How 
can those most directly at risk mobilise locally and globally, in order 
to confront the massive inequalities that determine their fate? How 
do geopolitics, rampant capitalism, fossil fuel extraction and climate 
change interconnect, and where are the entry points to break these 
interconnections? Where are global market dislocations, shifts between 
old and rising powers, and deepening inequalities now taking us; are 
they now beyond regulation; and what forms of  subaltern protest or 
resistance do they encourage? 
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These are enormous questions, and asking them has dangers. Mixing 
a smorgasbord of  global, national, and local problems on the same 
analytical dish can reduce focus and clarity. It can foster the securitisation 
of  all forms of  risk, by opening the door to the reframing of  global 
poverty, pandemics, climate change and so forth through the lenses of  
national and international security policy – potentially harnessing them 
to the interests of  powerful governments and corporations. However, 
such dangers are best averted by spelling out, rather than obscuring, the 
interconnections and by opening them to empirical analysis. 
At the same time, most risks tend to be politically and socially 
constructed and be mediated by states and other political authorities. 
These risks reflect and reproduce current distributions of  power, 
bureaucratic authority and knowledge, none more so than security 
threats. The discourse of  threats evokes a narrow narrative of  violent 
contestation, in which the bodies of  citizens become as one with the 
body politic of  the state. This allows powerful actors and institutions to 
close analysis and policy around particular framings of  risk, especially 
those which emphasise stability and control. Current analyses of  
‘fragile states’ tend to focus upon challenges to the state’s monopoly 
of  violence and the unravelling of  political authority, especially in 
‘ungoverned’ peripheries. But equally if  not more problematic has been 
the emergence of  new forms of  authoritarianism, often dressed up in 
democratic drag, which crowd out or obliterate democratic challenges, 
such as those which extinguished the Arab Springs. 
This makes it even more vital to rethink security ‘from below’, keeping the 
people and groups at grass roots whose burdens of  risk are the greatest 
firmly in view (see Abello Colak and Pearce 2009, this IDS Bulletin; 
Luckham 2009; Lind and Luckham 2017). It is their silenced voices which 
must be attended to. It is their resilience and agency that coping strategies 
depend upon. It is they who have most reason to challenge the dominant 
framings of  security. It is they who can benefit most by mobilising around 
demands for change. And it is their experiences and perceptions of  risk 
which should be the starting point for analysis and action. 
9 Towards inclusive security: what follows from listening to the voices 
of those who are most excluded and insecure? 
What does listening to and giving precedence to the people and 
groups who are excluded from current framings of  security and 
development imply for development analysis, research, and policy? 
First it provides a necessary corrective to the tendency of  development 
researchers and practitioners to take for granted that they act on 
behalf  of  poor, vulnerable, and excluded people. Sometimes they do, 
but this cannot be assumed, especially when tackling the problems 
of  people living in insecure and violent places. More reflection is 
needed upon positionality: where researchers and policymakers sit 
within the prevailing hierarchies of  power and knowledge (Rivas and 
Browne 2018); precisely who is doing the securing and for whom; and 
whether the people ‘secured’ or ‘developed’ see policy interventions as 
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supporting their concerns rather than being indifferent, or indeed as 
indistinguishable from the structures of  domination and exploitation 
that trap them in poverty and violence. 
Second, uncovering silenced voices requires social inquiry that 
engages constructively with these voices, at the same time as being 
methodologically rigorous. This has been a particular strength of  
participatory and action research at IDS. But for action research to bring 
tangible improvements in the security of  poor and vulnerable people, it 
must also rise to the challenges posed by the wider national and global 
structures of  power and inequality which reinforce the different forms of  
human misery and throw up many obstacles to tackling them. 
Third, there should be due caution about general conclusions and 
generic policy prescriptions. Both understanding insecurity and tackling 
it must be rooted in deep knowledge of  regional, national, and local 
contexts. As Selby and Tadros (2016) argue in relation to the Middle 
East, analysis of  security questions tends to be clouded by unexamined 
myths and preconceptions, which bias policymaking and may tangibly 
worsen the safety and welfare of  people at the sharp end of  violence and 
insecurity. Collaboration with researchers from countries in the global 
South is just one way to guard against these biases; even if  the difficulties, 
political and other, of  such collaboration should not be underestimated.11 
For all these reasons, critical self-reflection upon the development 
industry’s own policies and programmes must be a priority. First, so as 
to identify and grapple with the inconsistencies between policy goals 
and how these bear upon development practice (Davies and Leach’s 
(1991, this IDS Bulletin) analysis of  the tensions between environmental 
and food security is exemplary). Second, to tease out the potential 
contradictions arising from the foreign policy and security imperatives 
of  governments and donors, and to address the political dangers they 
create for development and humanitarian action. Third, to spell out the 
potentially perverse or negative impacts of  both security policies and 
development programmes, particularly upon those who find themselves 
vulnerable and excluded. IDS has much to contribute to this process of  
critical self-reflection, because of  its long track record of  research on 
poverty, its commitment to participatory research, and its advocacy for 
those left behind by development. 
10 Back to the future: the question of military spending and 
disarmament
Finally, it may now be time to revive analysis and debate about global 
disarmament and its place in building more inclusive and sustainable 
security. The threat of  nuclear escalation did not vanish after the 
end of  the Cold War, and still hangs over the relationships between 
rising as well as established powers. Military spending underwrites the 
geopolitical projects and repressive practices of  states in all regions 
of  the world. Access to weapons and military assistance with minimal 
democratic accountability to those who pay for them through taxes 
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reinforces the power of  military and authoritarian elites. The flow 
of  weapons and other strategic goods and services across national 
boundaries on the one hand sustains repressive states, and on the other 
hand arms insurgents and terrorist networks. Recent events in Yemen, 
Syria and elsewhere remind us that international arms transfers still 
oil the mechanisms of  war and military intervention, supplying the 
weapons systems that visit destruction upon the social infrastructures on 
which large numbers of  poor and vulnerable people depend. 
By themselves, of  course, neither military cuts nor curbs on arms 
transfers would halt violent conflicts; although they might help. 
Nevertheless, high (and currently increasing) military and arms 
spending are a matter of  great policy as well as political concern. They 
represent a massive diversion of  resources from other public purposes. 
They are inseparable from the inequalities in power, wealth, and access 
to the fruits of  technological progress which ensure that the targets of  
armed violence are mostly to be found in the more peripheral regions 
of  the developing South.12 Disarmament is a tangible policy goal. It 
pinpoints the nexus between weapons systems, big capital, and military 
power. And it can open diagnostic windows through which to identify 
and mobilise against the structures of  domination and exclusion that 
uphold global and national inequalities.
Notes
1 My deep thanks to Melissa Leach, Director of  the Institute of  
Development Studies, for asking me to put together this IDS Bulletin 
Archive Collection, as well as to Dylan Hendrickson and Jeremy Lind 
for very insightful comments. My thanks also to Beth Richard for her 
careful editorial comments and corrections to this article. 
2 Along with the other IDS Bulletin articles referred to in this 
introductory article, but not republished here.
3 Subsequent IDS Bulletins tackling aspects of  the security and 
development relationship have included the following: ‘Food Security 
and the Environment’, IDS Bulletin 22.3 (1991); ‘New Approaches to 
Famine’, IDS Bulletin 24.4 (1993); ‘Linking Relief  and Development’, 
IDS Bulletin 25.4 (1994); ‘War and Rural Development in Africa’, 
IDS Bulletin 27.3 (1996); ‘Structural Conflict in the New Global 
Disorder’, IDS Bulletin 32.2 (2001); ‘Transforming Security and 
Development in an Unequal World’, IDS Bulletin 40.2 (2009); 
‘Violence, Social Action and Research’, IDS Bulletin 40.3 (2009); 
‘Hybrid Security Orders in Sub-Saharan Africa’, IDS Bulletin 43.4 
(2012); ‘Piecing it Together: Post-Conflict Security in an Africa 
of  Networked Multilevel Governance’, IDS Bulletin 44.1 (2013); 
‘Undressing Patriarchy: Men and Structural Violence’, IDS Bulletin 
45.1 (2014); ‘Ruptures and Ripple Effects in the Middle East and 
Beyond’, IDS Bulletin 47.3 (2016).
4 The latter was written to be read with a companion piece, not 
published in this collection (Luckham 1985), which spelled out 
various scenarios for global change. Three of  these arguably have 
some relevance today. First, a ‘militarist–monetarist scenario’, which 
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traced the interconnections between monetarist economics, big 
capital, and military realpolitik. Second, a ‘Brandt–Palme scenario’, 
summarising the proposals of  the Brandt and Palme Commissions 
(Independent Commission on International Development Issues 
1980; Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security 
Issues 1982) which floated many of  the ideas that were to shape the 
liberal consensus on global governance after the end of  the Cold 
War. Third, a ‘global transformation scenario’, proposing a mix of  
structural change in the North, delinking from the Cold War, and 
more self-reliant development in the South. 
5 The former Chancellor of  West Germany, Willy Brandt, chaired 
the Independent Commission on International Development Issues 
(1980). Inga Thorsson was a Swedish politician, diplomat and 
disarmament expert, who coordinated major international reports on 
disarmament and on the conversion of  military to civilian industries. 
Shridath Ramphal was the current, well-respected Secretary-General 
of  the Commonwealth. 
6 Analysed in a preceding issue of  the IDS Bulletin: ‘Showdown or 
Crisis? Restructuring in the 1980s’, IDS Bulletin 16.1 (1985).
7 I co-authored one of  the two main discussion documents for the 
conference, which was heavily cut and pasted by the UN, but never 
published by it. The editing process was an instructive lesson in Cold 
War and UN politics. 
8 Such as the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia, or the Mobutu regime in 
Zaire, both of  which were highly dependent on their international 
patrons, and both of  which disintegrated soon after the end of  the 
Cold War.
9 See Byrne (1996) for an influential early discussion of  the potential 
of  gender analysis in the study of  violent conflicts.
10 Recent analysis by the World Bank (2017) focuses largely on the elite 
bargains and institutional restraints required to end conflict. In this 
respect, it is a step back from the Bank’s earlier focus (World Bank 
2011) on citizen security and ‘inclusive enough’ political settlements. 
11 Some of  the IDS Bulletins from which contributions to this Archive 
Collection are drawn were products of  collaboration with developing 
country partners, and most included pieces by Southern contributors. 
Contributors to the 2009 IDS Bulletin on ‘Transforming Security 
and Development in an Unequal World’ (the majority from the 
developing South) were members of  the Global Consortium on 
Security Transformation, a South–North network which eventually 
foundered due to political difficulties faced by its Southern lead 
organisations. 
12 Terrorism is the apparent exception, which proves the rule. The 
numbers of  people killed or maimed by acts of  terrorism in the North 
are miniscule compared with the casualties of  terrorist violence, still 
less state violence, in conflict zones in the developing world. 
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Peace and Development
Willy Brandt
The thought has passed through my mind that there is
really no need for another analysis of the state of the
world; of the growing number of problems; of the
immense dangers; of the continuing incapacity to turn
our affairs to the better. There are a great number of
proposals and recipes, in almost all areas. They range
from economics to armaments; from money and
finance to hunger; from drought and deforestation to
the rapid growth of the world's population. There is a
wide choice for everyone willing to choose. The
supermarket of world problems and their solutions
offers a complete inventory. There is hardly a gap on
the shelves.
However, demand is not very strong. And this is so in
spite of the fact that one must grant that most of those
who carry responsibility for their people and nations
genuinely would like to solve the world's problems. I
do not want to paper anything over. Of course, there
are those who are unable to do anything even if they
wanted to. And there are those who are the authors
and victims of ideological presumptions, including the
nice but hardly effective preachers of a world without
force.
Yet exciting contradictions are a sign of our times. The
technical capacity to solve most problems has
increased almost as much as the ability to destroy
everything. Science and technology have empowered
mankind in both respects, and beyond all earlier
expectations. Scientific and technical insights grow at
seemingly unlimited speed. We realise new dangers as
much as new problems. But it seems as if mankind is
helpless in the face of the irrespressible flood of new
discoveries - still being unable to master the
opportunities which have become available.
Here one cannot but remember the genius of Albert
Einstein, who had the gift of reducing highly complex
processes to a simple formula. I am referring to his
statement that the atomic bomb has changed
everything except the thinking of people. Homo
1/) , I95. 4. 1 I)s
sapiens has developed the technical, and in a narrower
sense the economic, capabilities of his brain much
faster than his political and community building
capacity. Or one could also say that the formation of
character and of moral values has not kept pace with
the rapid progress of technology. Yet these are the
qualities needed to live and to deal with oneself, with
others, with one's neighbours - among nations as
much as among people. The economy is oriented
towards output and profit, today no less than 2,000
years ago. Weapons are geared towards easier
handling, greater distance and higher accuracy in the
same way as for the past 2,000 years. And the conflicts
between people and nations, including the criteria by
which they are evaluated - sovereignty, prestige.
power, dominance, hatred vis-a-vis the enemy -
unfortunately all these too have not changed much.
There is one exception, however. It seems to have been
dawning slowly that we must no longer behave as we
used to behave some 100 or even 50 years ago if we all
want to survive. The fear of human history coming to
an end could be a reason for hope. But normally fear is
not a reliable guide. Where then are we to find the
strength for a rethinking, and according to what
criteria?
1f survial is the top priority then the preservation of
world peace is the most important objective,
dominating all others. To sharpen the point: there is
no need to worry about cooperation and mutual
interests if we fail to avoid a nuclear holocaust, or to
prevent continent-wide famine. Only if we avoid self-
destruction will we be able to continue quarrelling
about our different ideas, about the best way to
achieve happiness for all. In global terms this means
that there is no alternative to common security (as
elaborated three years ago in the report of the
Independent Commission on International Security
and Disarmament Issues under the chairmanship of
Olof Palme, the Swedish Prime Minister).
Il
The world can afford the coexistence of peoples and
nations with the multiplicity of their ideas regarding
the way towards welfare or happiness. Peoples and
states may even turn their backs on each other as long
as they do not dispute each other's right to exist. This
holds globally; but it also applies regionally. The
world might even be able to afford regionally limited
conflicts, terrible as they may be. The Gulf War, for
instance, is a frightening example of how a military
conflict of this kind can start with arms supplied by
both superpowers, who are nevertheless incapable of
controlling what is happening.
At the same time, interdependencies are increasing
and the need for cooperation is growing. The debt
crisis and high US interest rates are a threat not only to
the nations of Latin America but also for many of the
poorer developing countries. Drought and large-scale
starvation in Africa do not stop at national borders.
The energy-crisis - which is far from over and which
is not just an oil crisis; the threat of a drinking water
crisis; the various ecological threats which have been
so much neglected in the past - all these problems
extend across borders between nations and political
systems. My own country, for example, the Federal
Republic of Germany, suffers from acid rain and
dying forests no less than its neighbours, the German
Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and
Switzerland.
In sum, many of our problems are of a global nature,
they are system-bridging, and their number is
growing. Reason calls for the adoption of global rules
far beyond the traditional forms, and it calls for
mechanisms which guarantee the observation of such
rules.
Yet, egoism and narrow-mindedness have so far
prevented progress in areas where the East-West
conflict and North-South issues interact. It shows a
considerable degree of stubborness if people still
refuse to admit that rising world-wide military
expenditures are not only politically damaging but do
a lot of harm economically. Those 1,000 bn US dollars
or more which the world will spend on military
purposes this year amount to a death sentence for
millions of human beings, who are deprived of the
resources which they would need for a living.
But there is another obstacle to our ability to see
ourselves as partners in common security, namely the
lust for power. Nobody can deny that the desire for
power in individuals as in nations is a strong
motivation which we cannot explain away. One could
even see our history as a process in which unrestricted
force has had to give way step by step and in spite of
many setbacks - to the rule of law. Each treaty
voluntarily agreed to is another step in this direction.
12
Celebrating its 40th anniversary this year the United
Nations stands as a symbol of the steps we have taken
forward - and of the unavoidable difficulties
associated with them. The mechanisms of the Security
Council and the veto may be taken as evidence of the
cool realism of its founders who knew that it would
have been too much to expect the world organisation
to overcome real power by schematic majority rule.
But one might also say that joint decisions, agreed
rules and comprehensive arrangements within the
United Nations as well as elsewhere demand the
cooperation of the powerful, especially of the
superpowers.
Here we have witnessed a development since 1945
which in the context with which I am concerned
nobody has expressed better than President Raul
Alfonsin of Argentina, who belongs to the group of six
heads of state and government from five continents
who got together last year to voice their own and many
other people's concern over the lack of progress in
regard to arms control. In January this year at their
meeting in New Delhi the President of Argentina
stressed the legitimate interests of big powers, and
superpowers in particular, regarding their security
from each other and thus their ability to defend
themselves. But he called attention to the undeniable
fact that their military forces and their weapons
arsenals have grown far beyond their defensive
requirements. They have acquired the capability -
only the two superpowers have it and nobody else to
eradicate all life from this planet. Thus their power has
become a threat to all people. The decision to use those
weapons is exclusively theirs. This implies that a few
individuals and their advisors, small elites, hold the
power to destroy the basic right of all people, their
right to live. It is unacceptable to the five billion people
and to the 160 nation-states to which they belong that
they should have to trust in the wisdom and restrint
of a small group of people in one or two capitals not to
abuse their power and not to make that one
irreversible mistake. The preservation of world peace
is too fundamental a human right and a right of
nations to be left to the leadership of superpowers
alone.
From that right to life all those of us with less power
derive our right to put pressure on the two
superpowers to limit their power and to agree on
common rules of conduct in the interest of
maintaining world peace. This would not take away
their power and I do not suggest that one can neglect
political differences. But the global rule of preserving
world peace must become effective, especially for
those capable of its destruction. When the President of
the United States and the leader of the Soviet Union
meet in the near future the world does not necessarily
expect them to become friends. Or that they would do
away by magic with their differences. We do expect,
however, that they take steps to end the threat of an
all-destroying world conflict. This would mean at least
an interruption of the arms race while negotiations
continue. It implies negotiations about critical regions
of the world as much as about destabilising military
programmes. It also means facing up to the linkages
between the arms race and development, between
hunger and weapons, making this issue part of the
agenda.
To me the aim of such an urgently needed summit
should be nothing short of an agreement which rules
out a third World War. Peoples and states must
demand such an agreement since otherwise security
will not be established, neither in East-West relations
nor in North-South problems. On the basis of such an
agreement many issues would be easier to handle, and
the export of East-West controversies into the Third
World could probably be reduced. A halt to further
arms build-ups would become plausible. And the ever
increasing accumulation of destructive machinery
would come to be seen as even more perverse.
Next year when the United Nations hold their special
Conference on Disarmament and Development, once
more drawing on the work of the group of experts
chaired by Inga Thorsson, it will be necessary to limit
the presentation of boring propaganda slogans on the
one hand and the discussion of abstract theories on the
other. We should also not be held back by self-
declared realists who accompany their lack of
initiative with nice rhetoric about the fact that
disarmament and development are each important
objectives in their own right - so that therefore there
need be no linkage between them.
Now, with regard to North-South problems let me
recall some of the proposals - ranging from
emergency measures to proposals for structural
reform - presented by the Independent Commission
which I chaired. Most of our findings remain valid
today. It would have been better if one could actually
claim that some problems had been solved in a positive
sense. Unfortunately this is predominantly not the
case, and many issues today present themselves in still
more serious terms. Many of the same questions came
up again when the representatives of non-aligned
countries formulated their suggestions for a compre-
hensive dialogue and also when the late Indira Gandhi
raised the possibility of organising another North-
South summit in the second half of 1985. Instead of
these proposals being implemented, however, in the
area of money and finance we see considerable skills
being applied to patch up holes, whereas the required
reforms are being avoided. The same goes for
international trade and other areas well known to all
of us.
No approach is yet in sight which might set in motion
what has come to a halt in such a frustrating way. Jam
referring now to the intended 'global' discussion under
the roof of the United Nations about those issues
which are important for a re-ordering of world-wide
economic relations. The responsibility for their
complete failure has to be borne by different
addresses. But one thing is quite clear: a general
deadlock would not have occurred if important
countries had been willing to move.
I underscore the paramount responsibility of the
superpowers. At the same time, J want to warn the big
countries not to allow the destruction of multilateralism
and its institutions, unsatisfactory as they may
sometimes be. Europe should realise that it has to play
a role in counteracting negative developments. There
is no reason why Europe should always wait for
others. And much less should it jump on band wagons
which may be big but moving in the wrong direction.
Speaking about mililateralism I want to add that there
remains more room for it in a peace preserving
function, more than many people believe. This would
require a better equipment of the peace preserving
facilities of the United Nations. And a fresh look
should be taken at the mediating competence of both
the Security Council and the Secretary General.
At the same time it is of elementary importance that
we others who have neither bomb nor veto power no
longer lose sight of the linkages between crises of
security, world economy and environment. An
independent clearing office for 'Peace and Develop-
ment' could bring together concrete ideas from all
over the world and in this way help with the
constructive linking of East-West and North-South
issues.
I have come close to making proposals of the kind
whose practical value J questioned at the beginning of
this article. Presumably it has become evident where,
in my view, the key lies in seeking the solution to our
most pressing problems. Pressures will lead nowhere
as long as they are about isolated issues like
indebtedness, commodities, food, birth rates, soil
erosion, deforestation or other environmental degra-
dations. Or, for that matter, about military budgets
and the absurdity of allocating funds for armaments
that are lacking for education or health care. The key
to a solution not of all but of many problems is in the
hands of the superpowers. The question is whether
they succeed in limiting their fruitless conflict and
their power to destroy the world, at least to the extent
of agreeing on rules which make World War III
impossible.
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This cannot mean that the rest of us should hide includes the application of all possible pressure and
behind the responsibility of the nuclear giants. We telling the powerful of this world what they owe
must do what our own responsibility calls for. This mankind.
14
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Editorial: Disarmament and Development - the International Context
Robin Luckham
'A Klee painting named 'Angelus Novus' shows an
angel looking as though he is about to move away
from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes
are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread.
This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face
is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain
of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps
piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of
his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead,
and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm
is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings
with such violence that the angel can no longer close
them. This storm irresistably propels him into the
future to which his back is turned, while the pile of
debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what
we call progress.' Walter Benjamin, Illuminations,
Schocken Paperbacks, New York, 1969.
'A world in which politics is replaced by arsenals and
economy by finance is simply a world in danger.' Raul
Alfonsin, President of Argentina, quoted in SIPRI,
1985: 445.
Like the angel of history we all wish we could stretch
back to repair the past. Still more, we would like to
turn our heads forward to avert the catastrophes of the
future. Five years ago, when introducing the Report of
the Independent Commission on International
Development Issues, North-South: a Programme for
Survival, Willy Brandt had this to say to the
international community:
We see a world in which poverty and hunger still
prevail in many huge regions; in which resources
are squandered without consideration of their
renewal; and where a destructive capacity has been
accumulated to blow up our planet several times
over. [Hence this]. . . globalisation of dangers and
challenges - war, chaos, self-destruction - calls
for a domestic policy which goes much beyond
parochial or even national items. Yet this is
happening at a snail's pace. A rather defensive
pragmatism still prevails, when what we need are
IDS Bu/hijo, 1985, vol 1600 4. lxstitute of Deselopment Studies. Sussex
new perspectives and bold leadership . . . The
'international community' is still too cut off from
the experience of ordinary people and vice versa.
In spite of these warnings and many others like it, the
snail's pace has become disorderly retreat. At the start
of the 1980s the world economy slid into a new phase
of recession, from which recovery is still uncertain.
Furthermore, this deterioration and its effects on the
developing countries could probably have been
avoided, being 'explained in part by past policy
choices as well as underlying economic and social
conditions. In an interdependent world economy,
growth in the developing countries is significantly
affected by what happens in industrial countries'
[World Bank 1984: 12].
Table ¡
NATO Military Expenditure, 1950-84
1950 t955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1984
At 1980 prices and exchange-rates.
Source: SIPRI [1985: 229]
Recession has coincided with a marked acceleration in
the global arms race. After a period of decline (both in
constant price values and relative to GNP) the military
spending of the major Western powers, especially the
United States, has increased sharply (Table 1). Trends
in the socialist bloc are less easy to discern because of'
the absence of reliable official figures, though most
sources are in agreement that steady increases have
occurred in the Soviet Union [SIPRI 1985: 2511
contrasting with the more cyclical behaviour of the
United States. The deployment in Europe of Soviet
SS2O and American Cruise and Pershing missiles has
gone ahead. Having broken down altogether at the
end of 1983, negotiations concerning nuclear weapons
have (since January 1985) resumed; though for the
present they remain little more than 'talks about
talks', being stalled over the United States' Strategic
Defence Initiative for defence against ballistic missiles
('Star Wars'). Meanwhile there has been no sign of a
resumption of the talks between the two superpowers
concerning the limitation of conventional arms
transfers to developing countries or of those about
military restraints in the Indian Ocean, broken off in
the late 1970s.
Instead, the major military powers (France and the
UK as well as the superpowers) have built up their
intervention forces, increased global naval deploy-
ments and negotiated new military facilities in the
Third World, incorporating new areas within the
strategic terrain of the new Cold War. The possibility
of horizontal escalation between war theatres in
Europe and the Third World is often discussed by
strategic analysts. The 1978 fictional simulation of the
Third World War by General Sir John Hackett and a
team of military experts [Hackett 19781 describes how
a nuclear confrontation between the powers in Europe
in 1985 is precipitated by conflicts in the Middle East
and Southern Africa, along with unrest in Poland and
a Soviet invasion of Yugoslavia - a reconstruction
that was supplemented in 1982 to cover events in
Central Atherica and the Far East [Hackett 1983].
Such scenarios are by no means confined to works of
fiction. They are widely used by Northern governments
and military planners to argue for closer involvement
in Third World security questions. Conversely it is
often argued that it is precisely the transfer of East-
West tensions to the South that establishes a deadly
connection between Third World conflict and global
insecurity [see for example, Nincic 1985 and Tamas
Szentes' article in this issue of the IDS Bulletin].
These developments have reinforced a widening
disparity between global power relations and trends in
the international economy. The long run decline of the
US economy relative to Europe, Japan and the NICs
[analysed in more detail in two recent issues of the IDS
Bulletin: IDS l985a and b], led to the breakdown of the
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Bretton Woods system and ushered in a multipolar
and altogether more anarchic international economic
regime. In contrast, however, control over strategic
relationships remains where it has been since the late
1940s - firmly in the hands of the superpowers.
Indeed this control has been further consolidated by
the Cold War. It is epitomised in the current Geneva
'umbrella' negotiations between the USA and the
Soviet Union. One interpretation of the Strategic
Defence Initiative is that it is as much aimed at
reasserting the US's global power as at changing the
strategic relationship with the Soviet Union.
This disparity between a bipolar military order and a
multipolar economic order has reinforced the
superpowers' determination to maintain their strategic
duopoly. In both the USA and the Soviet Union an
interdependence has been established between the
military and the non-military sectors of the economy
through the respective mechanisms of a market and of
a centrally-planned economy. In both, the military
and military-related industries are almost the only
lines of production in which they have managed to
maintain a clear competitive edge. The temptation to
sell arms and to use force directly in the Third World is
arguably all the stronger.
In turn the transfer of East-West military rivalries to
the Third World has affected North-South economic
relationships. One place where this is visible is in the
aid programmes of the major world powers. The
previous trend from bilateral to multilateral assistance
has been decisively reversed. The allocation of aid has
been increasingly harnessed to economic and military
purposes. A recent review of US assistance carried out
for the Secretary of State (the first major overall
review of US aid policy since 1970) concluded that
economic and military assistance must be closely
integrated.
Economic growth and rising standards of living are
vital to internal stability and external defense.
Threats to stability impede economic development
and prosperity. Thus . . . the future effectiveness of
the mutual assistance program rests on the concept
that security and growth are mutually reinforcing
and that both are fundamental to the advancement
of US interests [Commission on Security and
Economic Assistance 1983: 2-3].
As for the developing countries themselves, their
military spending (see Table 2) has increased more or
less continuously over the post-independence era,
faster on the whole than that of the industrial North,
although the increases tailed off in the early 1980s,
when the full impact of the second and more severe
phase of the recession made itself felt. The opportunity
costs of military spending in terms of development and
Table 2
World Military Expenditure, 1975-84'
At 1980 prices and exchange rates.
Source: SIPRI [1985: 270]
even more of social welfare expenditures are high. Yet
the fact is that many governments in the South place
more emphasis upon national defence than upon
development, arguing indeed that the latter is
meaningless without the former.
Most developing countries are unable to meet their
needs for military equipment from local production,
thus being forced into the international arms market
where they pay both dearly and frequently for
successive generations of weapons systems. The Third
World's imports of major weapons approximately
doubled in constant price values during the 1960s and
quadrupled in the 1970s, before levelling off and then
declining in the early 1980s (Table 3). At the same
time, most suppliers have reduced their military grants
and insist on payment on commercial terms. Thus in
the great majority of cases arms imports have had to
be paid for in scarce foreign exchange. The need to
earn the latter has far-reaching implications for the
structure and management of domestic economies: for
example increasing their vulnerability to unstable or
declining terms of trade, encouraging short-sighted
policies towards non-renewable resources and adding
to their international debt burdens. According to the
Stockholm Peace Research Institute's estimates,
during the period 1972-82 foreign borrowing by non-
oil developing countries could have been approxi-
mately 20 per cent less each year and their
accumulated debts at the end of the period some 15 per
cent smaller, had they made no foreign purchases of
arms (Table 4).
Table 3
Trends in Export of Major Weapons to Third World,
1965-84
US$ million'
At constant (1975) prices.
Source: SIPRI [1985: 370-371]
Whilst the industrial North faces the prospect of a
potential nuclear holocaust, much of the developing
South is already engulfed in violence: both the direct
violence of armed conflict, and the structural violence
of repression and underdevelopment. Some of the
3





Industrial market economies 257,534 252,529 260,073 265,584 270,652 280,052 290,278 307,827 324,230 348,697 53.7
Non-market economies [171,972] [175,263] [176,551] [183,312] [197,798] [189,842] [185,448] [189,7571 [191,671] [196,133] 30.2
Major oil-exporting countries 33,352 37,450 [36,185] 38,107 38,941 41.712 [45,143] [48,598] [44,874] [44,988] 6.9
Rest of the world 43,452 47,509 49,215 49,205 51,357 51,168 54,238 [61,8621 [60,018] [57,419] 8.8
With 1982 per capita GNP:
<US$440 6,651 7,241 6,997 7,715 8,306 8,284 8,944 9,712 10,045 9,985 1.5
US$440-1,679 8,979 9,323 10,193 8,547 8,541 8,101 8,493 9,385 9,415 8,635 1.3
>US$1.680 27,822 30,945 32,025 32,943 34,510 34,783 36,801 42,765 40,558 38,799 6.0

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All other oit importers
North African oil importers2
The Horn and Southern Africa'
Oil exporters
I ' I I
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 982
wars fought in the South have been as destructive as
any fought on this planet. Their casualties (since
World War II) number in the tens of millions, not to
mention those who have been wounded, fled the war
zones or become victims of hunger and disease. Two
things have greatly increased the devastation. First,
the social character of many conflicts, the fact that
they are not merely conventional wars between states
but are rooted in much broader social upheavals - as
in Central America, Southern Africa, the Lebanon or
Afghanistan. And secondly, the fact that advances in
military technology have introduced ever more
powerful ways of killing, maiming and destroying.
Chemical weapons and other ways of modifying the
natural environment have already been used in
conflicts in the Third World - by the US, for example,
in Vietnam, by Iraq against Iran and perhaps by the
USSR in Afghanistan. At the same time the
conventional munitions developed by the arms
manufacturers - cluster and fragmentation bombs,
fuel-air explosives etc - and increasingly utilised in
the Third World, have become so destructive that they
are calling in question the established boundaries
between nuclear and conventional warfare.
Thus it is no longer possible (if it ever was) to make
sharp moral and empirical distinctions between the
risk of nuclear mass destruction in the North and the
appalling realities of warfare and underdevelopment
in the developing South. Any inventory one might
make of those - including children - who are most at
risk from poverty, disease and natural disaster would
overlap with those most at risk from military violence.
The target-groups of poverty-focused development
assistance have too frequently also been the targets of
weapons. There are direct and indirect causal
relationships between armed conflict, economic
deterioration and even natural disasters (like the
droughts in the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa).
It is difficult to generalise about such interconnections,
since they vary so much from situation to situation.
Nevertheless, they deserve more serious scrutiny by
development researchers and practitioners than they
usually receive.
Glimmers of hope can be extracted from the
resumption of arms talks and the impending Reagan-
Gorbachev Summit. In the longer run the relative
economic decline of the superpowers and the
disagreement developing between the USA and
Western Europe over issues such as the Strategic
Defence Initiative, economic relations with Eastern
Europe, industrial protection and intervention in the
Third World could open up opportunities for change
as well as give rise to fresh dangers.
As for the developing countries themselves, their
military expenditures have never (in spite of rapid
growth) constituted more than a small fraction of the
global total (see Table 2). Some comfort can be
extracted from the fact that they have now ceased to
rise. In any case, there has always been much diversity,
with some countries (many of them oil exporters)
devoting large shares of government revenue and
GNP to military purposes and others relatively little.
The bulk of arms purchases have been heavily
concentrated among a relatively small number of
Third World recipients, many of them in the Middle
East (Table 3). The determinants of arms transfers are
too complex to be explained purely in terms of East-
West relations or the 'pushing' of arms by the
suppliers (even though both are crucial).
Table 5
African imports of major weapons, 1970-83: by
economic and geographical groups
At constant (1975) prices.
2 Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia.
The Horn includes Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan.
Southern Africa includes South Africa, Angola, Botswana,
Mozambique, Tanzania. Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Algeria. Congo, Gabon, Libya and Nigeria.
Source: SIPRI [1985: 3011
An illustration of this complexity is provided in
Table 5 which demonstrates how at different times
since 1970 the major factors influencing the transfer of
arms to Africa have varied, including the recycling of
5
oil revenues by African members of OPEC; the
conflicts in the Horn and Southern Africa; and the
recent conclusion by the United States of agreements
with strategically placed countries in North Africa and
the Horn under which arms have been supplied in
exchange for military facilities for the rapid
deployment force (US Central Command). Another
factor which the Table does not, however, bring out is
the fact that the Soviet Union was the continent's
major supplier for much of the 1970s [see Luckham
1985a].
The flow of arms to the Third World contracted
sharply in the first part of the 1980s and there is little
evidence that it is likely to resume its previous rapid
growth. It is sometimes argued that this is because the
arms market is now saturated after a period in which
several developing countries simultaneously re-
plenished their armouries with new generations of
sophisticated weapons. More important, however, is
the impact of recession and international debt. Many
oil exporters have exhausted the surplus funds they
used to buy arms; and some are no longer even
considered credit-worthy borrowers. Other developing
countries (excepting some NICs) are even less able to
find the hard currency for weapons purchases. This is
only partly offset by thé fact that the superpowers are
tending more frequently than in the recent past to offer
arms on concessional terms. But there is little evidence
that such reductions have facilitated either the
cessation of armed conflict or a reduction in military
participation in government - with the possible
exception of the current process of demilitarisation in
Latin America [see Mario Carranza's article in this
Bulletin].
Against this sombre background the contributors to
this issue of the IDS Bulletin were asked to reassess the
Reports of the Brandt' and Palme Commissions
(Reports of the Independent Commission on
Internatioñal Development Issues, 1980 and 1983;
Report of the Independent Commission on Dis-
armament and Security Issues, 1982) and of the United
Nations Study on the Relationship between Disarmament
and Development (the Thorsson Report: United
Nations 1981). All four studies were made during a
period of transition in the global economy and the
Cold War (1979-83). Despite differences of emphasis
they all advocate an integrated global approach to
world economic and military problems, the restruc-
turing of North-South economic relationships,
strengthening of detente and reductions in the
allocation of resources for military purposes. They
have sometimes been criticised for not taking their
analysis far enough or for lack of political realism [see
for example IDS 1981, Luckham 1985b and Holm
below). But it cannot be disputed that the reports
represented a crucial series of initiatives by influential
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groups operating inside the international policy-
making community, at a critical juncture in history.
Why, then, have they had so little impact on policy and
still less on the march of events? Is it because of
inconsistencies in the arguments of the reports
themselves? Did they give enough attention to the
political changes that might be required - such as
dismantling the system of blocs, reorganising the UN
or establishing a political constituency for dis-
armament in the Third World as well as in Europe and
North America? Why has international discussion
tended to isolate the economic from the strategic/
political dimensions of the present global crisis? Why
do policy-makers in the North seem to show so little
interest in disarmament and development? Is there a
legitimate basis for Third World suspicion of
Northern proposals to limit arms transfers and
military spending in the South? Or is the lack of
progress merely one consequence among many of the
overall deterioration in the international situation?
Our contributors were also asked to address
themselves to how disarmament and development
could be put back on the international agenda. Should
each issue be dealt with separately on its own merits,
or is a coordinated approach required? What can be
learnt from the successes and failures of earlier
proposals? What role can Third World countries play?
How might their demands be linked to European
proposals for dealignment from the blocs? Do the new
negotiations between the superpowers create the space
for other initiatives to reduce international tension?
How might the forthcoming UN Special Conference
on Disarmament and Development be used to launch
a new series of initiatives?
Willy Brandt and Inga Thorsson argue strongly that
most of the findings of their respective reports remain
valid today. Failing to implement them - and instead
applying 'considerable skills . . . to patch up holes 'as
Brandt put it - is the fault of the superpowers. A
similar analysis is made by Shridath Ramphal, a
member of both the Brandt and the Palme
Commissions, who adds that the winds of history were
already turning against detente and the construction
of a New International Economic Order when the
reports were put before the public. All three, however,
believe that the superpowers can still be iniluenced by
political pressures and by appeals to their enlightened
self interest. They support a multilateral approach,
calling for a strengthening of the decision-making and
peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. And
they argue that both disarmament and development
remain very much on the UN agenda, pointing out
that the debate over their relationship will continue
- though perhaps in a lower key - at the 1986 UN
Special Conference.
Next we come to two outside assessments. The first, by
Hans-Henrik Holm is a useful summary of the reports
and a biting critique. The reports are faulted on two
major grounds. First, for their tendency to assume
that the world's major problems could be solved by
transfers of resources from rich countries to poor and
from military to non-military uses, without adequate
empirical demonstration of the intervening links.
Second, for their lack of political realism: their failure
to translate multilateral measures based on long term
common interests into policies for change that
national governments, especially those of the major
military powers, could implement. In this he
reinforces some of the criticisms made of the Brandt
Report in a previous issue of the Bulletin, 'Britain on
Brandt' [IDS 1981, especially the article by Vaitsos]:
that the practical procedures for implementing its
proposals were not well enough specified in technical
terms, were at variance with established global power
relations and assumed a mutuality of interest between
North and South which the mere fact of their
interdependence did not necessarily create.
Some readers might think these criticisms rather
harsh. The difficulties of moving from analysis to
policy and from policy to practice are notorious.
Unlike the angel of history, the angel of policy sets his
face so resolutely forward that he does not see the
storms catching him from behind. The angel of politics
(if there is one) is so busy trimming his wings to the
winds that he cares not where they take him until he
falls.
There is, however, no lack of concrete proposals in the
reports which, after all, were the work of men and
women who possess between them vast collective
experience in the making of policy. In his article Willy
Brandt suggests that Europe should play a more active
role in bringing the superpowers to the negotiating
table and in reactivating proposals for a 'global
discussion' of international economic issues. Shridath
Ramphal argues that the non-nuclear countries can
ensure that alternative voices are heard on disarmament
through a variety of international channels, including
the Commonwealth. Inga Thorsson emphasises the
importance of domestic and international political
processes, since governments tend not to take action
unless obliged to by their citizens. She also extracts
some encouragement from the economic difficulties
facing the industrial North: that this could force a
reassessment of the costs of the arms race by
governments in both major military blocs.
But, these are piecemeal suggestions. They do not
directly address the deep structures of the arms race;
nor (except Thorsson) do they give enough attention
to political processes through which it could be
reversed. A good starting point for understanding the
latter is provided by Chris Smith and Mac Graham,
who argue that the disarmament and development
debate is itself the outcome of a distinct political
process played out within the inherent limitations of
the UN system. It first emerged in the 1960s as a direct
reaction to the manner in which the superpowers
pushed disarmament to the sidelines in favour of arms
control based on bilateral negotiations (or in a few
instances talks among a limited circle of nuclear-
armed states). It acquíred its own political con-
stituencies among the neutral countries in Europe and
the non-aligned countries in the Third World. It
gathered momentum during the period of detente,
climaxing at the 1978 and 1982 UN Special Sessions on
Disarmament. But like detente it was undermined by
the renewal of the arms race.
The arms race in turn has been driven by the sectoral
momentum of the military product cycle combined
with shifts in international power politics. One might
almost talk of a political trade cycle, clearly visible in
the movements of US military spending depicted in
Table 1. New generations of weapons systems have
been developed and brought into service. This has
encouraged the major military powers to extend the
frontiers of the Cold War into space and into the Third
World. It has also brought even bilateral talks to a
virtual halt.
Such arguments are taken still further in a sweeping
critique by Ferenc Miszlivetz of the way disarmament
has been subverted by the bipolar logic of the arms
race. There has developed a symmetry between civil
society and the military sector, cemented by a
promiscuous network of military interests and
alliances and legitimised by the concept of security: a
characterisation he regards as being equally (but
differently) valid for the socialist countries of the East
as for the capitalist countries of the West. It is in this
context that he suggests that military technology may
be the most crucial legacy of the North to the South,
almost inevitably shaping the process of development.
The way East-West conflicts have been extended to the
South, contributing to the latter's militarisation, is
also takenup by Tamas Szentes. His perspective is
perhaps less Manichean, and he argues that the
distinctions between North and South, East and West
are simplifications that sometimes get in the way of
our understanding of the underlying relationships.
What is particularly striking is his argument that the
Cold War has encouraged the transfer of inappropriate
socialist as well as capitalist development models: the
former failing, indeed, to reflect crucial changes in
economic management that have taken place in
Eastern Europe since the earlier Cold War period.
The danger, however, with arguments that the Cold
War and inequalities between North and South are so
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deeply entrenched in the international system that
they will not respond to policy reforms such as those
proposed in the Brandt, Palme and Thorsson reports,
is that they can easily induce apathy: roll on the
holocaust! Or they can lead, full circle, to a cynical
conservatism: power politics is all that counts and the
devil take the hindmost ! Any strategy for change must
be able to identify the fault-lines as well as the
structures, the virtuous as well as the vicious circles.
This in turn, requires a better understanding of
empirical relationships. Does military spending in fact
entrench underdevelopment? How easily can resources
be transferred from military to non-military uses? To
what extent and through what mechanisms is
militarisation in the South linked to the arms race in
the North? Will the resources released by cuts in
military spending be used for productive purposes
rather than conspicuous consumption? Is there an
adequate political case for linking disarmament to
development; or is connecting them likely to obstruct
progress on both?
A major obstacle to establishing the empirical
connections is the absence of reliable data on the
military sector. This situation is examined by Nicole
Ball, who proposes a number of ways in which it could
be remedied, including the use of national military
budgets to supplement the information available in
the standard international statistical sources. Both in
the industrial and the developing countries govern-
ments tend to conceal their security expenditures from
public scrutiny. The data are seldom disaggregated in
a manner that enables researchers to analyse the most
crucial variables, for example the foreign exchange
component of military spending. As Dudley Seers
once pointed out, this is a difficulty with which
development researchers are already familiar. Many
of the standard macroeconomic indicators - national
accounts, government budgets, balance of payments
- presuppose a Keynesian model of advanced
industrial economies and are of less use in
understanding the dynamics of developing economies
[Seers 1983].
Deger and Smith also argue for more careful analysis
of the variety of channels through which military
spending can affect the development process. Their
own econometric studies (some of which are cited in
the UN report) suggest that defence spending reduces
growth through its adverse effects on saving,
investment and foreign exchange, as well as on human
capital and absorbtive capacity. These more than
compensate for the positive effects in terms of the
mobilisation of resources and possible technological
spin-offs.
A warning note is, however, sounded by David Evans
who used more recent evidence based on the World
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Bank's 1983 World Development Report, to demon-
strate that the positive effects of military spending may
(in the 1970s) have outweighed their diversion of
surpluses from productive investment. The title of his
article, 'Back to Benoit?', referring to the original
studies by Emile Benoit which had uncovered positive
relationships between military spending and growth,
is perhaps misleading. For the real message is that
more specific analysis is required, with regard to time-
periods, regions and above all the particular models of
development being implemented and their political
conditions. Strong government and high military
spending (though the two do not necessarily go
together) could well facilitate certain types of
externally-oriented capitalist development [Luckham
1977]. The same could well be true of some models of
socialist development, at least if the frequency of left-
wing military regimes ('garrison socialism') is
anything to go by.
This line of argument is reinforced by Eboe Hutchful
in regard to Africa, and by John Ohiorhenuan in his
case study of Nigeria. They both suggest that
structural adjustment programmes of the type
proposed by the Berg Report in Africa (discussed in
IDS 1983) frequently impose heavy social costs and
result in political instability. Authoritarian govern-
ment is a necessary condition for the particular type of
'crisis management' undertaken under the supervision
of the IMF and World Bank. Ohiorhenuan argues that
this helps explain the heavily repressive policies of the
recently deposed Nigerian military government;
although even the latter never concluded a formal
agreement with the IMF, because it believed the
political costs of devaluation to be too high.
So can it still be argued that disarmament and the
reallocation of resources from military purposes are in
Third World interests? The response to this question
falls into two parts, depending on whether one is
referring to disarmament in the industrial North or in
the Third World. The latter, as Eboe Hutchful shows,
is problematic to say the least. African countries are
still on the whole lightly armed by global standards, in
spite of two decades of rapid growth in their military
spending and arms purchases. Their governments
have legitimate security concerns, including aggression
from South Africa and repeated military intervention
by external powers. Even if there were to be major
resource transfers from the industrial North these
would not by themselves overcome underdevelop-
ment. Development and the removal of the basic
injustices which cause conflict are the first priorities on
the African agenda; and disarmament is only relevant
to the extent that it can be demonstrated - and not
simply assumed - that it advances them.
Mario Carranza is less doubtful of the relevance of
demilitarisation to Latin America. A number of South
American countries have recently transferred power
from military to civilian hands, as well as cut their
military spending. The so-called 'Brazilian miracle' no
longer looks like such a good advertisement for
military rule as it did some years ago; still less does the
catastrophic economic situation presided over by the
Chilean and the former Argentinian juntas. In Central
America, armed conflict and US intervention are
unequivocally the main causes both of military
expenditure increases and economic deterioration.
There is little here to support the argument that there
is any fixed relationship between strong government
and development, even along market-oriented World
Bank/IMF lines [see Diaz Alejandro 1983, who
introduces a similar note of scepticism].
One reason for divergence between Carranza and
Hutchful may be the latter's somewhat narrow
definition of disarmament in terms of nuclear arms
control in the North and cuts in military budgets in the
South: a combination which has admittedly tended to
result in social transformation in the South becoming
mortgaged to the preservation of the nuclear balance
between East and West. A broader conceptualisation
of disarmament in terms of transformations in the
social and economic relationships which underpin
both the arms race and the international division of
labour would not be open to the same objections
- although it might become correspondingly more
difficult to specify empirically.
Nevertheless, Hutchful believes a good case can be
made for a 'nuclear free zone' Africa. He doubts,
however, whether African countries could negotiate
- still less enforce - such a zone in the present
situation of confrontation between the superpowers.
Carranza reviews Latin America's rather more
extensive experience of regional arms limitation,
including the 1967 Treaty of Tlateloco declaring Latin
America a nuclear-weapons-free zone, and the 1974
Ayacucho Declaration on regional conflict-resolution
and arms limitation. The former, however, has been
undermined by the proliferation of 'civilian' nuclear
technology; and the latter has had relatively little
effect on regional arms races. Nevertheless such
agreements have symbolic importance, illustrated by
the conclusion of a five country agreement to declare
the Pacific a nuclear-free zone, in August 1985 (shortly
after the sabotage of the Rainbow Warrior).
Regional security and arms limitation agreements
such as these were a major recommendation of the
Palme Report. But Third World countries are bound
to have reservations about limitating their own
armament whilst the superpowers still regard
themselves as entitled to use force in the Third World
and preserve their monopoly over negotiations
concerning the central strategic balance. Similarly the
inability of the major world powers to restrain nuclear
competition among themselves has emerged as one of
the major obstacles to agreement about nuclear non-
proliferation, as at the 1985 NPT Review Conference.
So can governments in the North be persuaded it is in
their interest too, to curb military spending and
disengage from the arms race? As Inga Thorsson
points out, if the linkages between military spending
and economic stagnation can be empirically demon-
strated, this strengthens the political case for
disarmament. It also suggests the case for limiting
arms sales, to the extent that the latter are necessary
for the maintenance of prevailing specialisations in
military production. Deger and Smith's analysis of
military spending in the developing countries follows
up earlier studies by Smith (1977) which suggest that in
the advanced capitalist countries of the OECD
military expenditure in the post World War II period
has been negatively related to investment and, through
investment, to growth. The economies with the highest
military spending relative to national product (the
USA, the UK and France) have invested less and have
grown slower than those with historically lower
military burdens (notably West Germany and Japan).
Raphael Kaplinsky examines the longer term factors
that account for this uneven pattern of industrial
accumulation, suggesting that military spending
(contrary to what is popularly assumed) has had a net
negative effect on technological progress, both in the
USA and in the UK.
But do these considerations still hold good in a period
of recession, when military cuts could bring loss of
jobs and adverse multiplier effects? The large military
increases of the early 1980s, it is sometimes
maintained, have helped restore growth in the US
economy. Whether the recovery is sustainable is still
not clear. Perhaps alternative strategies for economic
recovery, based on civilian investment would have
lower opportunity costs and create more employment.
Yet as in the 1930s [see Kalecki 1943] military
spending has been a politically more attractive option
during a period of gathering domestic and inter-
national tension; all the more so when full
employment has ceased to be the touchstone of
economic policy.
Nevertheless, if alternative options are to be put
forward, realistic strategies for the conversion of
military resources to civilian uses are essential. As
regards the UK, Kaplinsky points out successful large
scale resource transfers have been achieved on at least
three occasions since World War II, both from and
(over the past six years) to the military sector. The
most systematic attempt to date to spell out a strategy
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for conversion in an advanced industrial economy is
lnga Thorsson's report to the Swedish government, In
Pursuit of Disarmament IGovernment of Sweden
1984], reviewed in this Bulletin by Sue Willett. The
special structural characteristics of the military
industries - their orientation toward product rather
than process innovation ('gold-plating'), cost
escalation, their cosy relationship with the defence
establishment - create technical problems which
Thorsson nevertheless argues are soluble. Less
amenable to technical solutions, as Willett points out,
are the political issues: to elaborate a programme of
military reductions for the UK could be construed as a
challenge to NATO. 1f conversion implies less reliance
on arms sales, cuts in naval and 'rapid deployment'
forces and reduced military commitments 'outside the
NATO area', it also requires changed relationships
with the Third World. In a world in which the costs of
economic recovery have all too frequently been passed
on to the Third World - through high interest rates,
aid cuts, the economic and political conditionalities
built into aid programmes and interventionist foreign
policies - this may present the greatest challenge of
all.
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agendas risks ignoring crucial trade-offs with food
security objectives.
At the global level, food security and environmental
concerns are experienced quite differently by north
and south. Not surprisingly, global discussions of the
two issues are couched in contrasting terms. Food
insecurity is overwhelmingly a problem of poor
nations and an issue with which developed countries
are rarely directly concerned. North/south relations
tend to be characterised by dependence of the south on
the north for food aid and other resources, often in
emergencies, and by northern instruction and policy
prescription. In contrast, global environmental
concerns are often discussed in terms of inter-
dependence and the need for north/south cooperation
to resolve common threats [WCED 1987]. In extreme
cases, such as the much vaunted destruction of
Brazilian rain forests, the north experiences dependence
on the south for its survival [Myers 1984], in ways that
are ironically reminiscent of the Latin American
dependency theorists [see Frank 1969].
Nevertheless, the imposition of northern agendas
dominates north/south environmental relations. The
sense of dependence, coupled with increasing
resources being made available within aid budgets to
protect the environment, has stimulated a re-
emergence of policies of what Adams [1990] has called
'ecological managerialism' imposed on developing
countries. A characteristic of this approach is putting
environmental concerns above people. And since food
insecurity is not an issue which directly affects the
populations of the north, except in extreme
circumstances of war or natural disasters, environ-
mentalists' concerns do not need to take account of
people's food security.
This article first discusses these separate approaches to
food security and environmental protection in recent
historical context. While contemporary local level
approaches now recognise that the concerns are
shared, separatism still characterises national and
international policy agendas. Some linkages between
food security and the environment at international
and national levels are then examined, showing that
the agendas and needs are quite different from those at
local level. The gap between vulnerability to food
insecurity or environmental degradation and the
responsibility to decide policy, characterises north/
lBS Bul/ci,n, 1991. vol 22 no3, Institute of Development Studies, Susses
Introduction
Perceptions of the trade-offs between the pursuit of
food security and environmental protection at the
household or village level differ widely from those at
national and global levels. Many poor rural producers
exploit natural resources to achieve food security, and
they do not distinguish between environmental and
food security objectives. Their livelihood strategies are
characterised by a continuous process of balancing
immediate and longer-term needs. In stark contrast, at
higher levels, institutional, political and economic
distinctions are made between food security and
environmental protection. Policy and planning
options to integrate what are seen to be conflicting
objectives are elusive. This paper examines how the
globalist perspective has come about; looks at some of
the ways in which it operates; explores how it might be
brought closer to a villagist approach and the
problems associated with bridging the gap.
Where a convergence of food security and environ-
mental interests exists, it has come about through a
focus on vulnerable groups and their access to food,
and the realisation that conservation cannot be
achieved by ignoring the people who are dependent on
natural resources for their livelihoods. But links
between the environment and food security occur at
national and international levels, as well as at local
ones. Moreover, interactions between levels are of
crucial importance to the overall picture.
Current debates tend to deflect attention from these
linkages, although they have been examined in the
context of sustainable agriculture by Conway and
Barbier [1990]. The environmental problems which
poor people face, and the conflicts which arise from
disputes about control over natural resources, are
almost invariably highly localised. Conversely, the
burgeoning international environmental agenda is
dominated by concern with 'global environmental
change'. Issues such as climatic change, tropical
deforestation, bio diversity and transboundary
pollution are discussed in terms which have little direct
bearing on local livelihoods. This gap between
'globalism' and 'villagism' on environmental policy
This article is based on a longer paper, Davies, S., Leach, M. and
David, R., 1991, 'Food security and the environment: conflict or
complementarity?' IDS Discussion Paper No. 285, IDS, Brighton.
south relations as well as those between government
and vulnerable groups within developing countries. At
the national level, resource, timing and planning
constraints often faced by developing country
governments compound this problem. The resulting
policy trade-offs are often made at the expense of local
livelihood securities.
Parallel Planning and Policy-making
The rise and fall of environmental and food security
concerns in the south has been something of an
historical see-saw. It is only in recent years that they
have shared a prominent position at the top of
development agendas.
In the aftermath of the famines in 1972/73, the World
Food Conference [in 1974] restated the case for
greater food production. At more or less the same time
[1972], the idea of 'sustainable development' was first
adopted at the Stockholm Conference on Human
Environment, in an attempt to combine the dual
policy objectives of economic development and
environmental conservation and/or regeneration. No
explicit link was made between food security and the
environment in either instance. Policy formulation has
continued along parallel tracks since the early l970s.
This process has been mirrored at the national level in
developing countries, where much energy has been put
into the elaboration of national food strategies, in an
attempt to tackle the production, exchange and
consumption dimensions of food insecurity in
comprehensive national food plans [see e.g. Lipton
and Heald 1984]. Little attention was paid to
environmental issues in the elaboration of these
documents. Many of the policy instruments promoted
have few direct environmental consequences, parti-
cularly those which focus on storage, exchange and
nutrition. But the central theme of needing to increase
food production and to diversify exploitation of
natural resources, often in increasingly marginal
areas, clearly does have implications for the
environment, which are not addressed. This failure to
consider environmental issues has been borne out by a
parallel planning exercise in the elaboration of
national environmental plans. Equally, these rarely
addressed food security issues directly.
The famines in Africa of the mid-l980s, triggered in
part by successive years of drought, shifted food
security planners' attention away from medium-term
strategies towards short-term response. This took the
form of emergency food aid. As a response to famine,
international food aid (and the literature about it)2
took no account of the environment at all. Indeed, for
the recipient developing countries, there was no
environmental impact. For the food aid donors
2 See, for example, Thomas et aI 1989, for a review of the literature
concerning food aid to sub-Saharan Africa.
(principally the US and to a lesser extent, the EEC and
Canada), environmental costs were neither acknow-
ledged nor measured in this context.
Nevertheless, environmental concerns and policies
returned to the development agenda after a post-
colonial lull. The preoccupations of northern environ-
mentalism were increasingly exported to the south,
stimulated by the globalism which had gained ground
since the 1964 International Biological Programme
and 1970 Man and the Biosphere Programme. In the
north, the search for solutions (either technical or
fiscal) was informed by the perception of the polluter
as someone who could either afford to pay (be taxed or
fined) or switch to an alternative activity [Pearce et al
1989]. Transported to developing countries, the
polluter pays philosophy found disquieting resonance
with the view of rural people as taxable, excludable
resource degraders which underlay the colonial legacy
of preservationist environmental policies [Beinart
1989, Wilson 1989]. When the 'polluter' is always poor
and hungry, this philosophy conflicts with the pursuit
of individual food security.
Shared Concerns
Since the late l980s, the idea that conservation (or
regeneration) of the natural resource base is an
essential prerequisite for future development of poor
countries has gained currency [WCED 1987]. This has
been informed to a large extent by the fact that since
the mid-l970s, drought has been a major contributory
factor to food insecurity and natural resource
degradation [Downing et al 1989, Wilhite et al 1987,
Watts 1987]. From the food security side, the
recurrence of famine in Africa in the l970s and l980s
has lent impetus to attempts to look beyond crisis-
driven food security towards longer-term policies
which promote sustainable food production and
which do not degrade the environment. Interestingly,
there is greater pressure from northern governments
on poor farmers in developing countries to pursue
sustainable agriculture, than there is on northern
farmers to do so.
On the environmental side, the mid-1980s saw
growing acceptance of the costs of preservatïonist
approaches to conservation for local people, and the
emergence of new perspectives on the relationship
between environmental protection and economic
growth. The World Conservation Strategy [IUCN
1987] emphasised that environmental protection, if it
was to succeed, had to take account of those people
who depended directly on the environment for their
livelihoods. The problem was no longer seen to be
simply one of wilful degradation, but rather as one of
degradation by subsistence. Shifts at the conceptual
level have not, however, been pursued with much
vigour on the ground.
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The idea of 'sustainable development' gained wide
currency with the publication of the report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development
[WCED 1987]. Though seemingly self-evident, the
concept has proved ambiguous and controversial and
has attracted much discussion [Chambers 1988,
Redclift 1987]. The 'sustainable development' debate
has, however, engendered some partial re-evaluations
within policy-influencing agencies. Within the con-
servation movement, organisations such as the
International Union for the Conservation of Nature
[IUCN] now claim to take account of the needs of
local people. Yet as Adams [1990] points out, this is a
modification, not a transformation, of historically-
rooted environmentalist perspectives. At the planning
level, conservation agencies still tend to favour
northern environmental interests (e.g. in the preser-
vation of rare bird species) over local needs, when they
conflict.
There has been some reappraisal within international
agencies such as the World Bank and FAO. Agencies
and departments concerned with environment have
tentatively begun to consider the poverty/food
security angle, while those dealing with food security
have been forced to address environmental concerns,4
and some linking initiatives have been established (for
example the FAO/SIDA Forests, Trees and People
Programme). However, these re-evaluations too often
remain at the level of rhetoric rather than of practical
application.
There have also been changes within those parts of the
northern 'Green Movement' with a more explicitly
political profile. Organisations such as Friends of the
Earth and Greenpeace have begun to lobby on Third
World environmental issues, both by addressing
problems which are of major concern to developing
countries (e.g. biomass fuel scarcities) and by pointing
out differences in how northern and developing
countries experience 'global commons' issues such as
tropical deforestation. However, their campaigns
rarely address the question of food security directly.
The concept of sustainable livelihood securities, which
has emerged within the sustainable development
debate, represents the most explicit attempt to link
food security and environmental concerns. It focuses
on local people's ability to act in an environmentally-
sustainable way, and on removing the constraints
which prevent them from taking the long-term view in
conserving their resource base in which, it is argued,
they have a vested interest for food security and other
reasons [Chambers 1988]. This approach is, however,
firmly grounded in local-level concerns; parallel
concepts dealing with national and international level
issues have not emerged. The concept of sustainable
livelihood securities has been justifiably criticised for
See also Adams, 1990, Bartelmus. 1986, Dixon and FaIlon, 1989.
See WFC. 1988a, 1988b, Jagannathan. 1989.
45
failing to take account of the importance of the
influence of the wider national and international
political economy on local livelihood securities
[Redclift 1987].
Differing Agendas and Needs
The International Level
Despite the fact that global environmental concerns
are principally aired by certain northern industrial
countries, it is developing countries which are likely to
experience the dramatic effects of global environmental
change most severely. In many instances, these effects
will directly reduce their ability to produce food.
Three areas of conflict and/or complementarity
arising from global environmental problems and food
security in developing countries illustrate the different
concerns of north and south.
¡ Global Warning and Food Production
The case of global warming provides a good
illustration of possible linkages between global
environmental change and food security. Despite a
lack of scientific understanding of precisely what it
will mean for agricultural production and the
distribution of costs and benefits between countries
and geographical regions,5 productive capacities in
some developing countries, already vulnerable to food
insecurity, are likely to decline. Two examples
illustrate possible effects.
Firstly, if temperatures rise by the projected two
degrees (with concomitant declines in rainfall), many
parts of the Sahel - already at the margin for millet
cultivation - will no longer be able to produce food
crops. Conversely, the wheat belt will move north,
enabling higher production in temperate zones. There
are, however, numerous complicating factors
including: the unsuitability of some northern soils for
cereal cultivation; greater variation between dry and
rainy seasons in the Sahel; and changes in the
movements of parasites harmful to crops [Monier
1990]. Secondly, if sea levels rise, low-lying countries
such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia and Thailand
are amongst those at risk of losing large areas of crop
land.
Even if global food production increases as a result of
global warming,6 the geographical distribution of
production increases will be concentrated in developed
countries and will not automatically compensate food
insecure countries. This is because, firstly, the cost of
imports will not necessarily decline as production rises
if, for example, northern governments employ price
There isa growing literature on this subject: see, for example, IPCC.
1990. Parry el aI 1988.
Some projections show an average increase in world production of
10 per cent for some crops [Monier 1990].
support policies or if adapting to new conditions
increases the costs of production. Secondly, if
production of cash and food crops in developing
countries also declines, their food deficits will
increase, whilst the ability to pay for imports declines.
Thirdly, technology developed in the north to deal
with climatic change will not necessarily be relevant to
the south and affected poor countries are unlikely to
have independent technology developing capacities.
ii Trees for Food Exchanges?
There are converse arguments to be made regarding
the penalisation of developing countries by the effects
of global warming, particularly those which are
custodians of the world's remaining tropical rain-
forests. Global warming could conceivably offer new
opportunities for these countries to exploit natural
comparative advantages, by producing carbon
dioxide absorbing vegetation to reduce greenhouse
gases. Replanting 700 million hectares of forest has
been suggested to balance carbon emissions, coming
mainly from the north [Marland 1988]. Such
suggestions understandably anger Third World
governments. Yet carbon-fixing could indirectly assist
food security. 'Trees for food' exchanges between
differently affected regions could be envisaged as a
logical outcome of global warming.7 Although
perhaps appealing at the level of global abstraction,
the distributional problems arising from this -
admittedly hypothetical - scenario are enormous,
particularly for national governments in developing
countries and their food insecure populations.
iii Environmentally-conscious Aid Flows
A principal influence of environmental concerns on
food security in developing countries originates with
the growing preoccupation of international aid
agencies with environmental issues. Under pressure
from their northern funders, they have attempted to
'green' their international image since the mid-l980s.
In this respect, the lack of clarity about linkages
between environmental protection measures and food
security carries dangerous implications for developing
countries. A major concern is that environmental
objectives will be pursued with real costs to other
international aid flows; notably those directed
towards poverty alleviation and, by extension,
improved food security, with negative effects at
national and local levels.
Environmentally-inspired northern legislation may
also alter the quantity and composition of aid flows to
the south. As over-production and the development of
new technologies have altered biotic resources,
An environmentally-conscious coal burning power station in the
United States recently tendered a carbon sequestration project
which was won by CARE to implement an agroforestry project in
Guatemala, with a supposed range of (food security enhancing)
benefits for the local population.
increasing pressure is being put on northern
governments to legislate against the intensive use of
chemicals and fertilisers in agricultural production.
This could prove to be a double-edged sword for
developing nations. On the one hand, increasing
production costs of imported staples could severely
jeopardise national food security in developing
countries which have become reliant on food imports
from the north. On the other hand, agricultural
exporting developing countries may be prevented
from selling their produce to richer nations because
they fail to reach environmentally acceptable
standards [Runge and Nolan 1990].
The costs of improving environmental practices for
global benefit tend to be accounted for in aggregate
terms. Although it is increasingly realised that
developing countries require some form of incentive
or even compensation for reducing environmental de-
gradation, the distribution of costs borne within those
countries is rarely considered by global planners. This
cannot be dismissed as a purely internal or national
level problem: much of the decision-making about
internal distribution of costs will be made on the basis
of aid availability and donor/government negotiations
about its use.
This situation is exacerbated by parallel planning and
execution structures within the international agencies
concerned. Typically, environmental programmes
originate in environmental departments. Meanwhile,
food security issues are discussed within agricultural,
food policy and health departments. There is often
remarkably little coordination between these depart-
ments and this, coupled with the fact that they work
through different national ministries, inhibits con-
sideration of the mutual implications of food and
environmental policies.
The National Level
In seeking to pursue policies which protect the
environment and which promote - or do not
compromise - food security, national governments in
developing countries face resource, planning and
political constraints. Four aspects of the environmental
and food security trade-offs which may be faced by
such national governments are considered here.
j Cash Crops
The promotion of export crop production to fuel
economic growth (of either the centre or the
periphery) has been a central plank of economic policy
in many developing countries since colonial times.
Cash crops have been seen as a means of enhancing
food security by exploiting natural comparative
advantages: at a national level to earn foreign
exchange, and at a household level, to produce a
surplus for sale.
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Cash crops are often argued to have a negative effect
on food security by displacing food crops, exploiting
scarce resources (fertile land, inputs, investment in
agriculture) and perpetrating dependence on the north
(e.g. when the terms of trade between cash crop
exports and food crop imports decline). However
criticisms of these arguments from a food security
angle [see Maxwell and Fernando 1989] emphasise
that it is not export crops per se, but the particular
relations of production under which they are
sometimes grown, that can undermine national and
household food security.
Cash crops have also been criticised from an
environmental point of view [Hines and Dinham 1984,
Redclift 1989, Vanegas 1986]. There might therefore
be trade-offs in terms of the depletion of the natural
resource base for a government which pursues an
export crop development policy, at least in part to
assure food security. There is, however, a dearth of
hard data to substantiate the overall environmental
effects of cash crops and little consensus has been
reached. Repetto [1988] and Barbier [1987], amongst
others, argue that traditional export crops (e.g. oil
palms, coffee, cocoa) tend to have, if anything, less
deleterious effects than basic food crops (e.g. maize,
sorghum, millet) because of their greater ground
coverage. Again, it is important to consider not only
the direct environmental effects of export crops, but
also the policy contexts and relations under which they
are grown. For example, if national strategies
encourage men to grow cash crops so that women's
seasonal food crops are marginalised on to easily
erodible land, the (indirect) negative environmental
consequences can be serious.
ii Green Conditionality
Both food security and environmental policies in
many developing countries are dependent, in part at
least, upon aid flows for their execution. This is
particularly true of many of the most food insecure
countries. National governments are forced to
respond and adapt to changes in developed countries'
objectives. Policy formulation will in turn be strongly
influenced by changing attitudes towards aid. As
environmental concerns become increasingly
important determinants of aid expenditures, there
may be serious consequences for the pursuit of food
security. 'Green conditionality' could develop,
manifesting itself in several forms. Firstly, it could
emerge in the context of food production and
development of rural areas more generally, placing -
at its most extreme - environmental concerns above
those of improved food security.
A second manifestation of green conditionality might
be an overall decline in aid flows to all sectors in some
countries. This could either be as a result of
discriminating against developing country govern-
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ments which do not pursue environmental protection
policies, or by creating a two-tier aid beneficiary
community. Countries which have what are perceived
in global terms to be natural resources of key global
significance (e.g. Brazil), might be rewarded for
conservation, whereas those which do not (including
many of the most food insecure countries) could be
excluded from a tranche of the aid budget.
Thirdly, indirect green conditionality may arise if
project aid flows are diverted away from food security
(either at national or sub-national level), towards
environmental spending. In an attempt to attract the
international 'green dollar', implementing agencies at
national level are already tempted to highlight the
environmental components of their projects, and to
use environmental concerns as the basis for project
identification and impact evaluation. From here, it is a
short step to projects which protect and conserve the
environment at the expense of local people and their
food security [cf. Greeley infra.].
iii Resource, Timing and Planning Constraints
Planning and other internal constraints to national
governments' elaboration of national food security
and environmental policies, and the (hidden) trade-
offs implied, must be considered against this backdrop
of a changing aid climate.
The disjuncture between food security and environ-
mental planning amongst donors tends to be mirrored
within developing country governments. Whereas
attempts have been made to link other development
concerns to good environmental behaviour - notably
through 'debt for nature' swaps - food security and
the environment tend not to be linked explicitly either
by the donor community or by the beneficiary
governments. The linkages tend, therefore, to be
indirect consequences of wider policy initiatives or
aims. Similarly, conflicts arising from pursuit of
policies in one or other domain tend to be unforeseen
or ignored.
Governments are rightly concerned with the long-
term implications of natural resource degradation notjust for the sake of food security, but also for
development more generally. These concerns are
reflected in all national environmental strategies or
plans. But many developing country governments are
unable to invest in the long-term when short-term
priorities are themselves often constrained by
insufficient resources. Short-term crisis management
of food crises forces longer-term strategic food
security planning off the agenda. In contrast, despite
the language of environmentalists, most of the
environmental problems identified are not of a crisis
nature in the sense of requiring immediate attention
(unlike famine). Environmental degradation rarely,
for example, threatens to destabilise governments in
the way that urban food riots can. The time
preferences of national governments forcibly and
inevitably conspire against the pursuit of long-term
environmental practices [WCED 1987] and make the
pursuit of policies which seek to integrate food
security and environmental concerns difficult to
execute.
To compound the resource and timing constraints,
many developing country governments are faced with
weak planning capacities, which can only become
more stressed by policies seeking to integrate
environmental and food security concerns. The
difficulties associated with integrated rural develop-
ment projects, attempting a multi-sectoral approach,
are well known. Equally, the problems of implementing
national food security plans are manifold. Adding a
further dimension to this planning process would
involve fundamental institutional changes which are
rarely taken into account, either on the food security
or the environmental side. The problem is further
exacerbated by the power of taxation vested in many
Ministries of Natural Resources, which is unlikely to
be yielded willingly.
iv Environmentalism as a Political Tool
For all the constraints facing developing country
governments, the environment can also provide them
with a useful justification for pursuing certain policy
aims at the expense of others. For example,
governments are under pressure to improve the food
security of their people, but are often reluctant to
adopt policies which genuinely target the poorest. The
environmental dimension to rural development is a
potentially useful tool in this process, not least because
of its apparent political neutrality. A stated policy of
environmental protection can provide the justification
for persuing a range of other objectives. An obvious
example is the acquisition of revenue through the levy
of fines for resource degradation. Others include
forced resettlement, sedentarisation of nomadic
groups, banning of open access to key resources or
destruction of indigenous management systems on the
basis that they do not comply with environmental
aims. Donors are often unwitting partners in such
processes.
At the extreme, pursuit of environmental objectives by
national governments seeking to raise revenue
extraction from rural areas may actually create the
conditions under which environmental degradation
increases. The more poor people are fined, taxed or
made to divert labour from subsistence production
towards protection of the environment, the more food
insecure they will become, and the more they will need
to degrade natural resources to survive. Although
such vicious circles may be interpreted as the result of
conspiracy by national governments, they are also
almost inevitable 'accidental' consequences of
separating environmental and food security objectives
at the planning level.
An associated problem is the tendency for many of the
most food insecure nations to be weak states in the
sense that they are vulnerable to internal threats to
their exercise of power [Buzan 19911. This threat often
increases as food insecurity rises, most obviously in
times of famine, but also if urban food prices rise or
wages fall. The environmental conditionality which
looms from the north takes no account of the potential
political costs of conservation, particularly if it entails
heigthened food insecurity. Whereas strong states in
the north (which tend, coincidentally, to be those
setting environmental agendas) can focus on economic
costings of environmental protection, for many food
insecure developing countries, it may entail direct
threats to the political status quo.
Conclusions
The importance of the linkages between food security
and the environment at international and national
levels lies not only in the policy trade-offs which may
be made at these levels, but also in the interactions
between them. Complying with international environ-
mental agendas for tropical rain forest conservation
may, for example, compromise national food security
in a country heavily dependent on timber export
revenues to purchase food imports. International and
national level issues also interact with the local level.
Government forestry policies aimed at preserving
such timber reserves for future use (and meeting
northern donors' conservation interests) can threaten
local environmental sustainability and access to food
by pushing food cropping and collection activities out
of 'reserves' on to ecologically marginal land.
As well as these negative interactions, there is scope
for policy interventions which improve food security
and environmental sustainability at more than one
level. For example, investments in rural areas which
simultaneously enhance local access to food and
increase food supply to urban areas are likely to be
more attractive to governments than micro-level
interventions with no national level spin-offs. Current
research on ways of enhancing local environmental
management practices which fix large amounts of
carbon offers policy potential for exploiting the
complementarity between local livelihood concerns
and international concern about global warming.8
While the gap between globalism and villagism in food
security and environmental debates persists, these
interactions will be missed. The wider political
economy which affects local livelihood concerns,
hinted at in several of the case studies in this Bulletin,
will remain unanalysed in terms of its relevance for
policy trade-offs.
Leach, G. personal communication.
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The problem-focused approach used in this article can
help in the eventual identification of such trade-offs,
but these can only infer policy guidelines. A clearer
picture of causalities is needed to inform policy
prescription. But until more research has been
conducted, it is unlikely that incontrovertible causal
links will be found to clarify the complementarities
and conflicts under discussion.
There are already some local case studies which
examine the trade-offs between food security on the
one hand, and conservation of natural resources on
the other9 and the papers in this Bulletin have
contributed some interesting further examples. There
is a much greater lack of research at national and
international levels. The emergent recognition of the
need to incorporate food security considerations into
the pursuit of environmental objectives, in which
respect the World Commission on Environment and
Development [WCED 1987] is of note, is helping to fill
this gap at a global level. Research on global
environmental change may be beginning to pay more
attention to food security concerns at all levels,
although it is notable that 'sustainable livelihood
securities' still have no voice in most discussions of
international agendas.
At the national level, and additionally when
considering links between national and other levels,
there is remarkably little documentation. National
governments in developing countries are in some
senses caught between the pincers of local and
national food insecurity and northern-defined environ-
mental concerns, whilst at the same time recognising
that for long-term development objectives to succeed,
the natural resource base must be protected. Although
most national environmental strategies stress the
importance of conservation for overall sustainable
development, precision about policies which protect
the environment without compromising present food
security needs is generally given little attention. The
same could be said for national food plans and their
treatment of environmental issues.
As yet, there is little indication that the trade-offs
which will inevitably have to be made between long-
term goals and short-term expediency are part of the
national policy-making process, and little indication
of emerging research which can inform them. This
should be a priority, to complement our growing
understanding of local level linkages between food
security and the environment. In the meantime,
existing evidence makes it clear that any compte-
mentarity between the objectives of food security and
environmental protection will not just happen: it
needs to be actively sought. If it is not, the potential for
conflict is great.
Some of which are reviewed in David 1991.
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WAR AND FAMINE IN AFRICA
Alex de Waal
In much of Africa, war has become synonymous
with famine. The glib commonplace, 'war plus
drought equals famine' grossly understates the com-
plexity and intimacy of the links between the two.
Some writers are content to enumerate the physical
destruction caused by war, the resources potentially
diverted from 'development', and the obstruction to
international relief efforts, to explain the links. While
containing some truth, this is no more sophisticated
nor comprehensive.
This article attempts a more wide-ranging, though
still preliminary, analysis. War creates famine es-
sentially for three reasons. The first is the consump-
tion of armies and the destruction of battle. The
second is that war is often designed to create famine;
certain siege tactics and counterinsurgency strate-
gies can have no other consequence when pursued
in Africa. The most severe famines in modern Africa
have been caused in this manner. Finally, we are
seeing the rapid development of political economies
based upon militarized asset-stripping. Though
analytically separate from war, this sort of predation
is often a facet of war, and is violent, hence it is
included here. Somalia is the most salient example.
This violence may have been silent at an earlier
moment in Africa's history, now it is very noisy.
Throughout, a small selection of examples is pre-
sented to illustrate the main points made. These
examples should not be seen in any sense as exhaus-
tive; there are numerous instances from all parts of
Africa and elsewhere which could also be adduced.
1 ARMIES AS CONSUMERS AND THE
DAMAGE OF BATTLE
The nineteenth century Emperor of Ethïopia,Teodros,
was once confronted with a complaint brought
against a peasant farmer who had killer a soldier
who was helping himself to the farmer's granary.
The Emperor responded tersely: 'Soldiers eat, peas-
ants provide' (Crummey 1986: 142).
The most direct and obvious ways in which war
creates famine can be simply dealt with. Even
former President Mengistu Haue Mariam of Ethio-
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pia was compelled at one point to admit that his
annual 'defence' budget could construct four major
universities or ten hospitals (Mengistu 1988). Some
of what has passed for an analysis of the origins of
famine in Mozambique is little more than a cata-
logue of Renamo vandalism.
There is a long history of armies creating famine by
requisitioning grain and other foodstuffs. This can
take the form of forcible requisitioning or billeting
soldiers on households. The fear of the impositions
of troops may cause households to conceal or even
destroy their food and possessions, or to abandon
their homes and hide in inaccessible areas. In Mo-
zambique, Renamo's practice of living off the land
has meant that food is scarce, and rural people have
gone hungry. During 1991 and 1992, much of
Renamo's strategy consisted of trying to maintain
control over productive rural populations, so as to
keep its fighters fed. As the burden of exactions
increased, more rural people began to try to flee
Renamo-controlled areas, while Renamo tried to
increase the size of the territory it controlled, particu-
larly in the more fertile areas of the country (Africa
Watch 1992: 126-30).
In recent times, armies have found that international
food aid, donated for the relief of hungry peasants,
is extremely accessible for requisitioning. In 1986,
the US General Accounting Office found that in
some places as little as 12 per cent of the international
food aid destined for refugees in Somalia was find-
ing its way to its intended recipients; much of the
remainder was being taken by the Somali army and
associated militias. Similar phenomena are familiar
from the famine in northern Ethiopia in the 1980s,
Mozambique, southern Sudan and elsewhere.
Armies are also prone to loot and pillage, in order to
sustain themselves, or for profit or booty. The
systematic raiding by Baggara Arab militias in Su-
dan of Dinka areas during 1985-8 was largely re-
sponsible for the catastrophic famine that overtook
parts of southwest Sudan at that time. The raiders
stole cattle and other livestock and household pos-
sessions, burned fields and villages, cut down trees,
poisoned wells, killed tens of thousands of men,
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women and children, and often took slaves as well
(Africa Watch 1990: 81-91). A similar extremity of
looting occurred on several occasions during 1991
and 1992 in Rahanweyn areas of southwest Somalia,
when local farmers were dispossessed of most of
their possessions by a succession of invading clan
militias. The last and most brutal looting was carried
out by forces loyal to the former dictator Siad Barre
in March and April 1992, and directly precipitated
the extremely severe famine that followed (Vaux
1992).
The conscription of large numbers of adult men may
contribute to labour shortages, and measures taken
by these young men to evade conscription, such as
hiding themselves or running away, may also make
it difficult for normal productive activities to progress.
As Mengistu Haue Mariam stepped up his efforts to
repulse rebel offensives in 1990 and 1991, the forcible
press-ganging of young men for military service
took on huge proportions; over 100,000 were seized
for the army in under a year. This seriously dis-
rupted productive activities in many southern parts
of Ethiopia. Women may also be conscripted to
serve as cooks, domestic servants, and prostitutes
for soldiers. This was common in many parts of
Ethiopia during the longwars foughtby the Mengistu
regime (Africa Watch 1991: 300-2).
At a national level, military budgets consume vast
amounts of resources that would otherwise be avail-
able for services or development. This has been the
case in Angola, where 'defence' expenditure ran at
approximately $1 billion per annum during the
1980s, compared with a gross domestic product of
under $5 billion (IISS 1989: 120). Alternatively,
military expenditure bankrupts governments, bring-
ing on economic and political crises. This was the
case in Ethiopia and Somalia, and threatens to be the
same in Sudan.
Armies also serve as disease vectors. Diseases such
as AIDS are closely associated with the progress of
armies. Some of the main epicentres of AIDS cases
in Africa coincide with areas where armies have
campaigned a few years previously. The Tanzanian
occupation of southwest Uganda in 1979 may well
be a case in point.
Battle itself can wreak enormous amounts of de-
struction, particularly if fought in economically im-
portant areas such as cities. There is the direct
destruction of houses, crops, foodstores, livestock,
and essential infrastructure such as roads, bridges,
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
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port and airport infrastructure, dams, irrigation chan-
nels, clinics, schools, etc. Instances of this type of
damage to cities include the battle for Massawa in
Eritrea in February 1990, the battles in Monrovia,
Liberia, in late 1990, the fighting in Mogadishu,
Somalia, in January 1991 and between November
1991 and February 1992, and the battles in Juba,
Sudan, between June and September 1992. In rural
areas, major mechanized battles around Keren,
Eritrea, in 1978 and Cuito Cuanvale, Angola, on
several occasions in the 1980s, notably 1987-8, have
rendered useless important agricultural areas.
There is also the loss of land to mines and military
infrastructure such as trenches and encampments.
The trench warfare that was characteristic of Eritrea
during the 1980s meant that many areas of impor-
tance for local herders and cultivators were out of
bounds.
Land mines are a particular problem, as without
systematic clearance efforts they continue to remain
in the ground after the conflict has finished. In
northern Somalia, large amounts of pasture remain
unused due to the land mines planted by the Somali
army during its 1988 campaign against the rebel
Somali National Movement. Mines were planted
around strategic military and economic locations,
along most main roads, inside the city of Hargeisa,
around wells and reservoirs, and were scattered in
large numbers over fields and pastures. Even areas
that are not in fact mined remain unused by the local
population, because of the fear of mines. Angola is
another example of a country, this time with enor-
mous agricultural potential, where the widespread
and often random dissemination of anti-personnel
mines makes it impossible to carry out productive
activities in many areas (Africa Watch 1993).
In the immediate vicinity of battle, normal economic
activities are disrupted; farming and trade are usu-
ally impossible.
Battle can also cause extensive environmental dam-
age. Trees can be knocked down by tanks or set
ablaze by sheilfire or bombing (particularly if
incendaries or defoliants are used). Attacks on
munitions dumps or oil tanks can cause severe local
pollution. The destruction of forests by soldiers to
build trenches and emplacements, for firewood, or
to create clear sight lines can also be extremely
damaging. In Eritrea, much deforestation has been
caused by the former Ethiopian army, for each of
these reasons.
Sometimes, wholesale destruction can be a deliber-
ate military strategy. For example, the retreating
Soviet army in 1942 practised scorched earth tactics
in the face of the invading Germans. Anything that
could possibly have been of any economic or mili-
tary value to the invader was removed eastwards or
destroyed, including large amounts of food. Partly
as a result of this, the Ukraine suffered severe famine
during the following three years (Moskoff 1990: 22-
9).
In Mozambique, the rebel Renamo forces practised
a policy of 'conspicuous destruction', destroying
bridges, railway tracks, clinics, schools and almost
any form of infrastructure that existed except
churches. The aim was to advertise the presence and
strength of the rebels, cow the local population, and
terrorize supporters of the government. The prac-
tice of mutilating victims by cutting off lips, noses,
ears or sexual organs, and committing other spec-
tacular atrocities, was a logical development of this
strategy (Africa Watch 1992).
2 FAMINE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF WAR
The most severe famines in recent history have all
been caused when famine was used, usually deliber-
ately, as an instrument of war. War, fought in
particular ways, not only destroys 'objects indispen-
sable to the survival of the civilian population' (in
the words of the Additional Protocols of the Geneva
Conventions (ICRC 1977)), but systematically pre-
vents people from following coping strategies. It
may rapidly also precipitate social collapse. The
result is that frank starvation, possibly unknown in
modem peacetime famines, has become familiar
from war famines in Africa (de Waal 1990).
2.1 Sieges
During recorded history, armies have sought to use
hunger as a weapon to force their enemies to submit.
The classic instances of this occur during sieges.
Probably the most severe siege famine of the twen-
tieth century was the siege of Leningrad of 1941-4, in
which somewhere between 600,000 and one million
people died from the combined effects of hunger,
exposure and disease (Moskoff 1990: 185-206). The
surrounding German forces tried to starve the city
into submission by firebombing food warehouses
and, as far as possible, preventing supplies from
reaching the city. Simultaneously, the Allied pow-
ers maintained a strict blockade of German-occu-
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pied areas of the continent. This contributed to a
severe famine in Greece during 1942-3, which was
the occasion for the founding of the Oxford Commit-
tee for Famine Relief, later to become Oxfam (Black
1992).
Sieges have been widely used in civil conflicts in
Africa. In the Nigerian civil war of 1967-70, the
Federal Army's first response was to blockade the
area controlled by the Biafran secessionists (Stremlau
1977). This involved shelling ships (twice in June
1967) and attempting to shoot down aircraft. The
blockade extended to relief flights, and one aero-
plane operated by the International Committee of
the Red Cross was shot down in June 1969. The
Federal Government refused to let relief agencies
obtain free access to Biafra, arguing that relief flights
were used as cover for arms shipments. This claim
had an element of truth, as the main Biafran airstrip
at Uli was fitted out by relief agencies, and relief and
military flights arrived at the same time (by night)
and used the same facilities. In addition, there is
evidence that the relief food was used to feed the
Biafran army and bureaucracy.
The siege of Juba in southern Sudan is the longest-
running siege in contemporary Africa, having been
first imposed by the Sudan People's Liberation Army
(SPLA) in late-1984. Throughout the intervening
eight years, the SPLA has regularly blocked food
supplies to Juba. Commercial supplies were largely
prevented by encircling the city and blocking move-
ment, and by a ring of land mines on roads and
paths. Relief supplies have also been blocked; road
convoys have been attacked (on four occasions in
1987-8) and relief aircraft shot at (four occasions in
1986-8). On at least six other occasions, most re-
cently in 1992, the SPLA has declared its intention to
fire at any aeroplane, military or civilian, flying to
the town.
An important and often neglected element in the
way in which sieges create famine is the complicity
of the besieged army or government. In the USSR
during World War II, the Soviet government made
inadequate preparations to preserve stockpiles of
food in the months immediately before the siege,
failed to take all possible measures to mitigate the
impact of the siege, and concealed the true extent of
the suffering from the rest of the Soviet population
and the outside world. The Biafran secessionist
government also used the fact that it was besieged to
its military advantage, often at the expense of the
civilian population. For example, it made it impos-
-
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sible for relief and military flights to be separately
identified, thereby facilitating its arms supply but
making relief deliveries more difficult.
Juba is perhaps the most extreme example of the
complicity of the besieged forces. The example of
Juba differs from Leningrad and Biafra in that the
civilian population of the besieged town is seen by
the occupying army as actually or potentially hos-
tile, and sympathetic to the SPLA. The northern-
commanded army does little to protect the southern
civilians - on the contrary, it engages in frequent
sweeps to arrest, detain and execute residents. Army
officers have also worked closely together with north-
ern merchants to create and maintain artificial
scarcities of items such as fuel, sugar and staple
foods. This has been achieved by making overland
convoys infrequent (during 1985-8), deliberately
mixing relief, commercial and military supplies in
these convoys so that food cannot be made immune
from attack (and on one occasion in 1992, using an
aeroplane with UN insignia to fly in arms and
ammunition), blocking relief deliveries (for example
soldiers fired at a relief aircraft in 1988), and prevent-
ing residents leaving the city to obtain food from
outside (using patrols and land mines). Food prices
have remained high; merchant-officer partnerships
have made fortunes, while the residents of Juba have
gone hungry. Other garrison towns in southern
Sudan have similar stories.
2.2 Counterinsurgency
More insidious than sieges, but equally effective at
creating famine, are the use of modem counterinsur-
gency strategies, intended to impose maximum con-
trol over a potentially hostile population. Mao Tse
Tung famously described a guerrilla among the
people as like a fish in water, leading to the descrip-
lion of counter-guerrilla warfare as 'draining the sea
to catch the fish'.
The most systematic exponent of such counterinsur-
gency theories has been the French military. One of
the first theoreticians was General Lyautey, who
commanded the forces responsible for the pacifica-
tion of Morocco during 1912-25. Lyautey's pred-
ecessors discovered that conventional military en-
gagements could not hope to defeat an irregular
army, such as those fielded by the tribes of the
Moroccan interior. Instead, Lyautey developed what
he called the policy of the smile'. He argued 'the
pirate [guerrilla] is a plant which grows only in
certain ground ... the most efficient method is to
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render the ground unsuitable to him.' (Gottman
1944:242). Lyautey characterized his army as '[civil]
organization on the march'.
In the context of the French conquest of Morocco,
Lyautey's policy meant establishing the centres of
French control as centres of attraction, compared to
the surrounding areas of anarchic rule. These cen-
tres then spread like an 'oil spot' throughout the
countryside. Establishing personal security for ordi-
nary people and expanding local commerce were
central to Lyautey's overall plan, and as such, it
promoted protection from famine.
Most modern counterinsurgency takes place in a
very different context. The society is already subject
to administration by governmental structures, and
these structures themselves are among the reasons
for the insurgency. In the following quotation, from
a French military advisor during the Algerian war,
'making the ground unsuitable' for the guerrilla
carries very different implications.
Anything that could facilitate the existence of the
guerillas in any way, or which could conceivably
be used by them - depots, shelters, caches, food
crops, houses, etc. - must be systematically de-
stroyed or brought in. All inhabitants and live-
stock must be evacuated from the [guerrillas']
refuge area. When they leave, the intervention
troops must not only have destroyed the [guer-
rilla] bands, but must leave behind them an area
empty of all resources and absolutely uninhabit-
able.
(Trinquier 1964: 85)
Some modern counterinsurgency campaigns have
been closer to the spirit of Lyautey, stressing the
need for the controlling forces to be subject to the law
(and seen to be so) and ensuring the provision of
compensatory assistance to the controlled popula-
tion. An example of this was the British campaign in
Malaya in the 1950s (Thompson 1966). However,
these have remained exceptions. More commonly,
military commanders have stressed the need to en-
gage and destroy the guerrilla forces, and have
treated the local population as though they were
actual enemies rather than potential allies. Rather
than winning the local population over from sup-
porting rebel forces, campaigns have been more akin
to meting out punishment.
In this context, counterinsurgency warfare in a poor
area is tantamount to creating famine. Three main
components of counterinsurgency are particularly
relevant. They are:
1 Population displacement to 'protected villages'
and related controls of the population;
2 Control of trade, especially in foodstuffs;
3 Control of movement of people.
The relocation of the civilian population to protected
villages or secure zones is one of the commonest
strategies used by counterinsurgency strategists. The
rationale is that the population can then be kept
under surveillance, so that guerrillas cannot infil-
trate or obtain recruits and supplies. The imposition
of counterinsurgency villagization is usually com-
bined with curfews, perimeter patrols, mining of
entrances, and other restrictions. Sometimes,
scorched earth is practised to compel people to come
to the villages.
This tactic has been common in Africa since the Boer
War, when the concentration camp was invented. It
was used by colonial armies fighting independence
movements in Algeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Zim-
babwe and elsewhere. Outside Africa, it is familiar
from Vietnam and Guatemala, to name only two
examples. On many occasions it has contributed to
famine.
Eritrea is one example. In 1967, the Imperial govern-
ment conducted a series of large military offensives
in Entrea, during which it burned over 300 villages,
relocating the people to fortified villages (Africa
Watch 1991: 42-6). Onerous restrictions were then
imposed in these villages. This effectively prevented
the inhabitants from carrying out the range of eco-
nomic activities that had previously sustained them.
Because of the curfew, many trading activities be-
came impossible. Far fields had to be abandoned,
and foraging for grass, wood and edible fruits in the
bush became very limited. Animal herding was
most difficult of all. Transhumance became impos-
sible, the grazing of village-based animals was lim-
ited to the distance which the animals could travel
during a few hours, and the long-established prac-
tice of grazing livestock at night (when it is cooler)
had to be abandoned altogether. By these means, the
viability of much of the lowland Eritrean economy
was undermined, leaving it vulnerable to famine.
More recently, villagization was implemented as a
counterinsurgency measure in western and eastern
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Ethiopia during 1984-8 (Africa Watch 1991: 231-6).
The rationale and consequences were very similar to
the earlier programme in Eritrea. The villagization
programme mounted by the Mozambican govern-
ment in Zambezia province in 1986-7, ostensibly for
the protection of rural people from Renamo attacks,
also contributed to the creation of a severe famine in
that area that was otherwise capable of producing
surpluses (Africa Watch 1992: 78-83, 115-16).
Control of trade was instrumental in creating famine
in Ethiopia in the 1980s. This has often been over-
looked, because of the (misleading) paradigm of the
self-provisioning peasant. In fact, no such peasants
exist; all are dependent to a greater or lesser extent on
exchanges with neighbours and neighbouring dis-
tricts. Intended or not, preventing those exchanges
proved an effective method of creating famine, largely
invisible to outside observers.
Government restrictions on private trade, particu-
larly trade in grain, were imposed throughout the
country. In the centre and south, this was ostensibly
for reasons of socialist transformation. Thousands
of lorry grain traders had their licences revoked, and
part-time pack-animal traders were subject to a be-
wildering range of requirements and taxes, to the
extent that 'it is unclear whether small scale grain
trade [wasi illegal or not' (Lirenso 1987: 52). In
insurgent areas, the roadblocks were more numer-
ous, and the latitude given to soldiers to confiscate
grain or animals was greater. Traders who were
unable to convince the soldiers that they were not
taking food to the rebels could also face arbitrary
imprisonment and fines. The result was that the
intra-regional food trade was choked off. The pock-
ets of deficit - that always existed - could not make
good their shortfalls, while in food surplus areas, the
harvests could not be transported out. The price of
grain in parts of northern Ethiopia rose to famine
levels as early as 1982; the famine arrived earlier and
struck harder because of these policies (Africa Watch
1991: 150-2). Meanwhile, in rebel-held areas, the air
force carried out a policy of systematically bombing
marketplaces. This forced markets to be held at
night, and greatly restricted trade.
Complementary to the restrictions on the grain trade,
the then-Ethiopian government exercised strict con-
trol of movement. All people had to have travel
permits before they were allowed to move outside
their villages, or they could be arrested as a rebel
suspect. This made labour migration, petty trade
and mutual assistance networks almost impossible,
-
ids bulletin vol 24 no 4 1993
and was also instrumental in creating the famine
(Africa Watch 1991: 152-4).
In Sudan, restrictions on trade, movement and eco-
nomic activities were the final straw which precipi-
tated exceptionally severe famine among the Dinka
migrants in southern Kordofan in 1988. These peo-
ple, driven from their homes by the rapaciousness of
the Baggara Arab militias, were forced to seek sanc-
tuary in small towns controlled by those very mili-
tias. There, they were in effect kept in confinement,
denied opportunities to help themselves (by work-
ing for money, gathering wild foods or seeking
charity), denied access to the market on fair terms
(they could not buy food, and could only sell posses-
sions at extremely low prices), and denied the op-
portunity to escape. Death rates reached the unprec-
edented levels of one per cent per day in several
camps during the summer of 1988 as a result (Africa
Watch 1990: 128-30).
Counterinsurgency famines come about essentially
because the levels of restriction imposed upon the
population makes it impossible for that population
to remain self-provisioning. The population is then
reduced to a state of dependence. This can either
lead to starvation, or total control by the force con-
trolling the food supply. One particularly insidious
element in the strategy can be the use of international
relief.
By their nature, relief agencies search for destitute
and dependent populations in need of assistance.
Several African governments have realized that peo-
ple displaced by counterinsurgency operations fit
these criteria, especially if the agencies can be per-
suaded that the cause of the displacement is 'drought'
or 'bandits'. The assistance provided by the relief
agencies removes from the government the obliga-
tion and burden of supplying compensatory aid to
the people it has displaced. This can allow it to
maintain, extend or intensify a counterinsurgency
campaign in ways that might not otherwise have
been possible. It also gives a gloss of legitimacy to
such a campaign. What is for a military commander
a protected zone, may be for an inmate a concentra-
tion camp, but may appear to a relief agency (and
hence the international media) to be a feeding shel-
ter. Particularly striking examples of this come from
Ethiopia and Mozambique.
3 STATES OF WAR
In recent years, states have emerged in Africa based
upon the systematic asset-stripping of less powerful
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people. This is usually militarized and hence vio-
lent, though not always. Often, but by no means
always, militarized asset-stripping occurs in the con-
text of civil war. Including this form of political-
economic predation as a category of war famine is
therefore somewhat analytically misleading. How-
ever, because the most extreme and well-known
examples, such as Somalia, are normally presented
as war famines, and are indeed extremely violent,
this must be excused.
One of the first examples of systematic asset-strip-
ping was Zaire, whose rulers have been character-
ized as a 'kleptocracy'. Throughout the country and
at all levels, government officials and military offic-
ers sustain and enrich themselves through stealing
assets, increasingly often assets essential for the
survival or rural people (such as cattle), often using
force. For the most part, Zaire's abundance of food
has prevented decline into outright famine.
Sudan is another example in which the state and
those associated with it have sustained themselves
by transfers of assets. Partnerships between army
officers, militiamen (many of them cattle herders)
and businessmen have meant that, for some, war has
been extremely profitable. The raiding of Dinka
cattle by the Arab militia, with military, commercial
and political support, is one example; the creation of
artificial scarcities in southern garrison towns is
another. Outside the war zones, the expropriation of
large swathes of land used by smaliholders and
pastoralists to create commercial farms is also rap-
idly creating a very poor and vulnerable class of
labourers, who suffer famine in years such as 1990-
1 when the price of food soars beyond their reach.
This expropriation is carried out without outright
violence (though the implicit threat of violence is
always there), but is part of the same process.
-
In Somalia, these processes have gone a stage fur-
ther. During the 1980s, under Siad Barre, a group of
people with access to the state and foreign currency
were able to enrich themselves through seizing as-
sets and establishing monopolistic control of lucra-
tive businesses. Using the provisions of the land
reform act of 1975, those with connections in govern-
ment were able to acquire title to land, over which
others had customary rights. Commercial farms,
registered as cooperatives, were established. In the
Juba valley and adjoining areas, the beneficiaries
were mainly the Marehan, members of the same clan
as the President, and the losers were the Rahanweyn,
the relatively deprived clan of farmers indigenous to
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the area. Meanwhile, the most profitable businesses,
which included both normal commercial activities
and illegal activities such as arms dealing, cattle
rustling, the transit of ivory and smuggled gems,
and the diversion of foreign aid, were controlled by
a mafia-like network, also with connections to gov-
ernment.
As armed opposition to the regime intensified from
1988 onwards, trade (especially in cattle) and the
plantation-commercial farming economy became
increasingly militarized, initially for self-protection,
and then as a way of acquiring more trade goods and
assets. Cattle rustling merged into cattle raiding.
Commercial food traders kept competition at bay
with armed roadblocks demanding extortionate
payments, and other violent deterrents. The power-
ful businessmen and politicians were able to acquire
weaponry for themselves and their clansmen. The
Rahanweyn, Digil and Bantu as the most politically
marginal groups in the country, were unable to
acquire armaments to match their neighbours, and
were less well organized. As farmers, they were also
easy prey for the mobile pastoralists.
This process of the militarization and commerciali-
zation of government continued after Siad Barre was
driven from Mogadishu in January 1991. The fact
that Somalia no longer had a recognized sovereign
government closed off some avenues for wealth
acquisition - for instance, former government offi-
cials could no longer demand kickbacks for award-
ing contracts, and the Ministry of Finance could no
longer print money. However, the essentials of the
process continued unchanged, even heightened.
All the parties, including Siad's Somali National
Front (SNF), the two factions of the United Somali
Congress now occupying different parts of
Mogadishu, and other factions in the south, engaged
in an orgy of looting. This was a highly organized
orgy, financed by traders with international connec-
tions. In the cities, electrical goods, furniture and
household fittings, industrial equipment, copper
wiring - in fact, anything with a resale value - was
liable for looting and export to Kenya, Sudan or
Arabia. In the rural areas, looting started with
livestock, diesel pumps and household valuables
such as jewelry, but as the base of easily resaleable
assets diminished, the looters turned to ordinary
household items, clothes, and food. Some of this
was freelance looting by disaffected young men
with guns, but much of it was carried out by the
militia armies of Siad Barre and the other factions.
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Much of the time, these armies were not paid, and
sustained themselves through looting. When they
were paid, it was by commercial financiers with
specific interests, often in acquiring cattle or other
tradeable commodities.
The final, most systematic and most brutal round of
rural looting was carried out by the SNF in
Rahanweyn areas in March-April 1992, as the SNF
forces faced military defeat by the USC and flight to
Kenya. Large areas of Rahanweyn countryside were
stripped of everything that could be taken. The area
immediately descended into a famine of almost
unequalled severity.
During the Siad Barre years, the diversion of foreign
aid was a major source of income for the government
and those associated with it. The refugees in the
country received only a small part of what the
international community donated for them. After
Siad fell, most of the aid flows dried up, but insofar
as relief programmes continued, they were often
exploited by the merchant-politicians. The most
important way in which this occurred was through
protection rackets. Because of the low level of
personal security, relief agencies were obliged to
hire armed guards to protect themselves. They
usually hired guards from the very same factions
that were responsible for the political turmoil in the
country, thereby helping to enrich them. This be-
came a major factor in the second half of 1992, when
many more aid agencies rushed to the country to
start programmes, in the wake of the belated media
attention. The factions also ensured that, when
possible, relief was provided first to members of the
relevant clan, thereby ensuring that less accessible
and powerful clans, such as the Rahanweyn, were
last in the line. There was also looting of relief
shipments, though not on the scale often claimed by
the media and some of the less responsible relief
agencies.
The victims of the 1992 Somali famine were very
largely the Rahanweyn, and to a slightly lesser extent
Digil and Bantu. Those displaced by the fighting
also suffered severely. The pastoral clans for the
most part escaped severe hunger. The gradation of
suffering faithfully reflected the relative political
and military power of different groups, established
over the years.
The Somali famine is therefore a war famine, but
with important differences from the conventional
and guerrilla wars discussed earlier. The famine is
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not created by specific military strategies as such,
but instead by the military and predatory nature of
the political-economic structures in the country. The
famine is created, not by the way in which the
contending militias fight each other, but by the way
they sustain themselves as political and economic
forces. This type of war famine therefore falls into a
new category in the typology of war-created famine.
4 CONCLUSION
War is and will continue to be the major cause of
famine in Africa. Compared to other contributory
causes such as drought, environmental degradation,
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Introduction
Of all the requisites necessary for sustainable
development, peace is without doubt the most
fundamental. In its absence it would be illusive to
expect an improvement in the human condition.
Currently, however, the developing world is replete
with civil conflicts and political instability
According to the records of the International
Institute of Strategic Studies there are some thirty
major armed conflicts around the world, the vast
majority taking place in the developing world (IISS
2000). Armed conflict interrupts the process of
development (Fitzgerald 1999; Stewart and
O'Sullivan 1999; Tansey et al. 1993); it destroys
infrastructure and communities, disrupts economic
activity, uproots populations, undermines social
capital and leads to the impoverishment and
marginalisation of its victims. Confounded in their
efforts to promote development and deliver
humanitarian assistance, donor agencies have
begun tentatively to address the complex
relationship between conflict, security and
development (DFID 2000; Annan 1998; OECD
DAC 1998).
The growing consensus on the need to address
security as a development issue was reflected in,
and reinforced by, the adoption of the Security First
initiative in Mali. In 1994 a United Nations
Advisory Mission to Mali concluded that the lack of
capacity of the police, gendarmerie, national guard
and border guards to control smuggling and
banditry was blocking both the implementation of
the peace accord and economic and social
development. The Mission proposed a 'Security
First' approach under which aid for development
and the re-integration of ex-combatants was
integrated with assistance to improve policing and
border controls. The initial success of the Mali
experiment stimulated the adoption of other
initiatives modelled on the 'security first'
philosophy, such as the Programme for
Coordination and Assistance for Security and
Cooperation in West Africa (PCASED). So far,
however, 'security first' programmes have only met
with limited success in terms of enhancing security
and stability in conflict-burdened regions.
The 'security first' approach represents an
important step in mainstreaming security in
development, but it fails to address the deeper
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structural problems that lie at the heart of conflicts
in the developing world. Theories of how and why
violent protracted conflict occurs generally
distinguish between structural factors on the one
hand and accelerating, or triggering factors on the
other (Azar 1990; Azar 1999; Galtung 1976).
Structural factors, which must be viewed as long
term, include interconnected political, social and
economic elements, such as the failure to meet basic
human needs, population pressure, distributional
injustice, the depletion of natural resources,
environmental degradation and ethnic tensions.
Accelerating or triggering factors, on the other
hand, operate in the context of the above adverse
structural factors, but involve specific events,
attitudes or decisions, which provoke or encourage
violence. Such factors may include the abuse of
political and military power, the proliferation of
small arms, ideological conflict and struggles to
exert control over natural resources.
Currently much of the international donor
communities' efforts at conflict resolution and
peacekeeping focus on policies that prioritise
mediation between adversaries, ceasefires, micro-
disarmament, demobilisation, the reintegration of
ex-combatants, security sector reform and the
overseeing of free and fair elections. While these are
important elements to any programme that is
tasked with establishing peace and stability, they
tend to focus on the triggering rather than
structural causes of conflict.
This article argues that one of the major structural
causes of current patterns of violence and conflict is
to be found in the general failure of neoliberal
policies underpinning the current phase of
globalisation, to deliver more equitable patterns of
development to large parts of the world. While
globalisation has enhanced the wealth of the already
rich and powerful (both states and people), it has
simultaneously impoverished and marginalised
many economies and peoples on the periphery of
the global economy Widening socio-economic
polarisation exacerbates social, political, cultural
and ethnic tensions and contributes to growing
levels of social unrest and conflict, particularly in
the least developed countries (LDCs).
In many situations where the inclusion in formal
economic activity has been closed off - either
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because of economic collapse, debt crises,
economic marginalisation or social disarticulation -
there has been a notable emergence of cultures of
violence predicated on patterns of primitive
accumulation, reflected in the rise of organised
crime andlor non-state military actors intent on
controlling natural resources (Berdal and Malone
2000). Analysts such as Collier (2000) argue that
greed primarily motivates the warlords and criminal
elements that utilise violence and undermine
security in many parts of the developing world and
transition economies of the former Soviet Union,
but, as this article attempts to argue, social,
economic and political marginalisation represent
equally strong motives for taking up arms.
In elaborating upon these issues the first section of
this article briefly explores the changing global
order and the role that neoliberal policies have
played in global restructuring. The second part
explores the relationship between globalisation and
economic insecurity, with particular reference to
sub-Saharan Africa, where the majority of conflicts
in the developing world occur. The third section
explores the relationship between debt and poverty
The fourth discusses the relationship between
poverty and conflict. The fifth section looks at the
new forms of conflict and how they are structured,
influenced and incorporated by the forces of
globalisation, and the final section proposes an
alternative approach to enhance security and
development.
2 The Global Order/Disorder
The end of bipolar confrontation encouraged the
global spread of capitalism as the former
Communist economies were 'opened up' and
integrated into the global economy In Washington,
renewed zeal for neoliberal policies dictated that
market liberalisation and deregulation underpinned
the global economy A new ideology, 'liberal
internationalism', inspired by Fukuyama's End of
History (1992) thesis, advocated the notion of a
'democratic peace', which maintained that the
global spread of capitalism would induce global
stability and peace. This proposition was based on
two assumptions; one that globalisation, in the form
of free trade and the deregulation of markets
encourages economic growth resulting in an
improvement in the standards of living of the
world poor, thereby reducing tensions and conflict
about the distribution of resources (World Bank
1997). The second assumption is that economic
interdependence brought about by globalisation
would render war unprofitable, because if a
country main markets are likely to be destroyed
through conflict a disincentive is created to initiate
war for reasons of vested interests (Gilpin 1992). In
this sense globalisation was thought to reduce the
previous altruism of the dominant nation-states,
encouraging greater cooperative behaviour on a
global scale through a process of collective self-
interest (Beinen 1992).
These ideas coalesced within the powerful
multilateral institutions of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to form the
'Washington Consensus', which set the terms of
debate on the development strategies of the
transition economies of the former communist
world and for the rest of the developing world
(Manzo 1998). Orthodox macro-economic
strategies based on trade liberalisation, the
opening up of domestic markets to foreign
investment and competition, the privatisation of
state assets and the deregulation of markets were
applied with renewed vigour via IMF structural
adjustment programmes and World Bank
development aid. At the same time, new forms of
political conditionality were introduced into IMF
and World Bank policies to encourage
democratisation, good governance, greater
transparency and accountability, and compliance
with human rights norms. The neoliberal model of
development has all but replaced the
developmental model that was widely favoured
and promoted in the 1960s and 1970s.
The shift in preference for neoliberal policies is
ideologically motivated, rather than being
determined by the efficacy of one model of
development over another. Ideological fervour,
spurred on by the triumphalism associated with the
end of the Cold War, has in effect blinkered the
dominant global institutions to the actual and
prolonged effects of neoliberal reform on the
economic performance and security situation in the
poorer parts of the world.
The mood of optimism about world peace and the
benign spread of capitalism was short-lived,
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however. The transitional problems experienced by
the newly democratising states in Central Europe
and Central Asia led to a rise in nationalism and
inter-ethnic rivalry, which in turn acted to
undermine the sovereignty of states. Europe
witnessed the return of genocide with the war in
Yugoslavia. The US peace enforcement operation in
Somalia ended ignominiously with the loss of
eighteen US Rangers' lives. The debacle of Somalia
proved a turning-point in the international
communities' commitment to peacekeeping operat-
ions in the Third World.
Against this background, the perception of a 'new
world order' fast disintegrated into the notion of a
'new world disorder'. Liberal internationalists,
severely shaken by these events, have chosen to
explain such conflicts as the 'collapse of civilisation'
and a return to anarchy - a Hobbesian state of
nature in which order and rationality are suspended
(Kaplan 1994). Rarely, if ever, has there been
introspection, in which the fallibilities and
mythologies of the dominant liberal discourse
about peace and stability have been subjected to
rigorous scrutiny, let alone a recognition that shock
therapy, rapid market liberalisation and onerous
structural adjustment programmes might be part of
the security problem rather than the solution.
3 Globalisation and Economic
Insecurity
The neoliberal policies of trade liberalisation,
deregulation and privatisation have without doubt
contributed to a growth in world output and
increased global volumes of trade and capital
mobility; but mounting evidence also suggests that
globalisation has resulted in increased economic
volatïlity that undermines the basic economic
security of many millions of people and contributes
to a severe fissure between the 'winners and the
losers' in unfettered global markets (UNCTAD
2000; UNDP 1999).
The losers include some 1.3 billion people in eighty-
nine developing countries who are worse of now
than they were ten to fifteen years ago. The neoliberal
idea that somehow the benefits of global economic
growth will 'trickle down' to the world poor, has
been challenged by the stark reality of the experience
in the world poorest societies. Some sobering
UNDP figures summarised the balance of poverty, at
the end of the twentieth century (UNDP 1997):
More than a quarter of the developing world
peoples still live in poverty as measured by the
UNDP human poverty index (HPI). About a
third of total global population, 1.3 billion, live
on incomes of less than $1 a day
Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of
people in poverty Some 220 million people, half
the population of the continent, live in poverty,
and the proportion is rising.
Eastern Europe and the countries of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CTS)
have seen the greatest deterioration in their
living standards in the past decade. Poverty has
spread from a small proportion of the
population to about a third. There, 120 million
people live on less than $4 a day
Certain groups of people are particularly
vulnerable to poverty; these include children,
women and the aged. An estimated 160 million
children are moderately or severely mal-
nourished, and some 110 million receive no
education. Women are disproportionately poor
and often disempowered. Their lack of access to
land, credit and better employment opport-
unities inhibits their ability to be able to improve
their economic circumstances. The aged often
live their final years in acute poverty and
neglect.
While the ratio of trade to gross domestic product
for the world has been rising over the past decade,
in the fourty-four LDCs' whose populations total
more than a billion people, the ratio of trade to
economic output has in fact deteriorated since the
beginning of the 1990s (UNCTAD 2000). Between
1997 and 1999 the combined annual index of free
market prices for primary commodities, which
represent 80 per cent of Africa export earnings, fell
by 25 per cent. Despite rapidly rising export
volumes in the 1990s, the purchasing power of
exports remains significantly below the levels
attained in the early 1980s. At the same time, rapid
trade liberalisation has not been matched by
increased market access in developed countries.
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The LDCs' economic future looks bleak. Those
countries whose real GDP per capita income has
been in decline or was stagnant during the period
1990-98, 'can be expected to become caught in a
situation in which economic regress, social stress and
political instability interact in a vicious circle'
(UNCTAD 2000). Even for those LDCs whose
economies are growing, there will be an ever-present
danger that external shocks, natural disasters or
negative spillover effects from neighbouring LDCs
will disrupt economic activity, throw their fragile
growth trajectories and cast them into a spiral of
economic decline, instability and conflict.
4 Debt and the Poverty Trap
The protracted deterioration in terms of trade
experienced by the majority of low-income
countries has led to foreign currency deficits and
high levels of indebtedness. Por instance, at the
beginning of 1998 the total external debt of sub-
Saharan Africa was estimated to be $328.9 billion,
of which approximately 45 per cent was owed to
official bilateral sources, 30 per cent to official
multilateral sources, and 25 per cent to commercial
lenders. To service this debt fully, African countries
would have to pay more than 60 per cent or $86.3
billion of the $142.3 billion in revenues generated
from their exports. In fact African countries as a
whole paid more than 17 per cent of their total
export earnings to donors and commercial lenders,
leaving a total of $60.9 billion in unpaid
accumulated arrears.
For almost two decades unsustainable debt has
undermined human development in many of the
world poorest countries. It remains a profound
threat to the efforts of heavily ïndebted poor
countries (HIPCs) to achieve the international
development targets set for the year 2015. Moreover,
as Kofi Annan has noted, the failure to meet basic
needs due to the debt burden in no small measure
contributes to the level of tension and conflict on the
African continent (Annan 1998, Section 93).
While Africa cannot avoid its share of responsibility
for the present debt predicament, the international
community needs to acknowledge its own role in
creating and perpetuating the debt problem. More
precisely, it needs to recognise the ways in which
the current macro-economic stabilisation
programmes used by the international community
to address the debt crises undermine human
development and contribute to the growing levels
of human insecurity and conflict on the African
continent.
The international community deals with
indebtedness through the IMF's enhanced structural
adjustment facility (ESAF). Under the terms of IMP
conditionality, indebted countries must undergo a
package of economic reforms, which invariably
involve the following elements:
A reduction in government expenditure, by
making public-sector redundancies, freezing
salaries, instituting cuts in health, education and
social welfare services;
The privatisation of state-run industries, often
resulting in large-scale lay-offs and the loss of
services to remote or poor areas;
Currency devaluation and export promotion,
leading to the soaring cost of imports, land use
changed for cash crops, and reliance on
international commodity markets;
Raising interest rates to tackle inflation, which
often has the effect of putting small companies
out of business;
The removal of price controls, leading to rapid
price rises for basic goods and services.
Faced with severe balance of payments problems,
indebted countries have few choices - they are
either obliged to implement IMF policies, even
when they are ill-suited to their economic and
social circumstances, or risk economic isolation.
Most governments are prepared to sacrifice their
economic sovereignty rather than face isolation and
economic sanctions. As a consequence, the IMF in
its role as lender of last resort' finds itself managing
the economies of a growing number of countries
around the world. It currently dictates the macro-
economic policies of some eighty developing
countries, affecting the lives of over two billion
people, or one third of the global population.
Two thirds of all ESAF programmes are located in
sub-Saharan Africa. Many of these countries have
been subjected to IMP-imposed reforms for a
decade or more, yet the overall performance of
these economies remains remarkably poor, despite
considerable progress on liberalisation and
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deregulation. The average annual growth of real
GDP in Sub-Saharan Africa fell from 2.5 per cent
between 1985-89 to 1.9 per cent between
1990-97. During the 1990s, financial direct
investment (FDI) flows to sub-Saharan Africa
economies were negligible, despite considerable
efforts by LDCs at economic reform and trade
liberalisation. Overseas development assistance
continues to be the main source of financial flow,
but remains at a pitiful level; that is, too low to
generate any sort of development gains for the
majority of LDCs (UNCTAD 2000).
During the 1990s, per capita income has also
declined in most of Africa LDCs. According to the
World Bank, the minimum requirement for a basic
standard of living is an annual income of $370. In
1997 average per capita income in low income
countries in sub-Saharan Africa was $350 per
annum, life expectancy at birth was fifty-nine years,
infant mortality was seventy-eight per 1,000 live
births and illiteracy was 47 per cent of the
population over the age of fifteen (World Bank
1998).
Public expenditure cuts have meant that social
spending in ESAF countries has deteriorated
significantly Per capita education spending has
fallen by an average of 0.2 per cent per annum, with
the result that the number of children attending
school is on the decline. On present trends,
approximately 80 per cent of ESAP countries will
miss their target of achieving universal primary
education by the year 2015. Health spending has
been another casualty of IMF-imposed economic
public expenditure cuts, with the effect of an
increase in child mortality within ESAF countries.
The ESAF countries are unlikely to reach the target
of reducing child mortality by two thirds by the
year 2015 (Oxfam 1999).
In the majority of LDCs, levels of debt continue to
be unsustainable, despite prolonged exposure to
IMF-imposed economic reforms. The HIPC
initiative introduced by the World Bank and IMF to
deal with unsustainable debt has so far provided
little, if any, genuine debt relief. Acceptance for debt
relief, under the HIPC initiative, has proved
onerous and has generated concerted criticisms
from NGOs and some of the more enlightened
donor countries for radical reform of the HIPC
initiative to ensure a genuine commitment to debt
relief that is compatible with international targets
for poverty reduction. So far, however, the reforms
suggested by the G7 at its Cologne meeting that
propose to develop mechanisms for strengthening
the linkage between debt relief and poverty
reduction are at best weakly integrated into
strategies for achieving the internationally agreed
human development goals set for 2015. If the
linkage between debt relief and poverty reduction is
to be strengthened, ESAF must be integrated into a
broader, longer-term strategy for human
development. With regard to eligibility for HIPC,
debt relief should be provided at the earliest
possible stage to governments demonstrating -
through a Debt-for-Development plan - a capacity
to absorb savings into national poverty reduction
strategies (UNICEF/Oxfam 2000).
5 Poverty, Instability and Conflict
Globalisation, far from being benign, is now widely
recognised to have a dichotomous nature, which
simultaneously, includes and excludes, integrates
and fragments the global community (Rogers 2000;
Kofman and Youngs 1996; Cox and Sinclair 1996).
While certain states and their economies have been
strengthened via the process of economic
integration, many states in the periphery - exposed
to the twin forces of globalisation, namely the ITC
revolution and market liberalisation - have been
weakened and marginalised. Weakened states,
stripped of their sovereignty in economic affairs, are
no longer able to operate in their national interest
(Cerney 1996; Strange 1996). In a growing number
of cases the state has been so undermined that its
ability to provide basic public goods such as welfare
and security to its citizens has been all but nullified.
When governments fail to provide social welfare,
health, education and security to their citizens they
lose their legitimacy in the eyes of their citizens.
One of the only channels left open for citizens is to
demonstrate against hardship and injustice. As
Woodruff and Ellis-Jones (2000) have recorded,
civil unrest, demonstrations, strikes and violence
opposing the effects of structural adjustment are on
the rise. These should indicate to the Bretton
Woods institutions and bilateral donors that their
policies are not only excluding the poor, but are
contributing to social unrest and political instability
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The IMP and World Bank tend to distance
themselves completely from their failed prog-
rammes, blaming inadequate political will or
corrupt governance. Of course it would be im-
proper to overlook the role that irresponsible and
corrupt governments have played in the impover-
ishment and mismanagement of their economies.
But it is equally inappropriate to overlook the role
that external agencies have played in exacerbating
poverty, tensions and conflict in these vulnerable
and weak economies.
Conflict theorists have for some time been at pains
to point out that poverty, the unequal distribution
of wealth and the failure to meet basic human needs
constitute a source of structural violence that lies at
the heart of many conflicts (Azar 1990; Rogers
2000; Suhrke 1999; Tansey et al. 1993). Nowhere is
this more apparent than in sub-Saharan Africa,
where the spiral of poverty, indebtedness and
conflict is most visible. An examination of the
development statistics of sub-Saharan countries
engaged in conflict, or recently emerged from
conflict, reveals a startling pattern of low per capita
income, low life expectancy, low levels of FOI, low
levels of overseas development assistance (ODA)
and high levels of indebtedness (see Table 1).
It can be argued that the statistics in Table 1 reveal
the effects of conflict on development, but for many
of these countries economic collapse preceded the
outbreak of violence. Moreover, most of these
countries have been subjected to prolonged periods
of IMF-imposed structural adjustment programmes
which have done little to stimulate growth but
much to intensify social tensions and unrest.
6 Globalisation and the New
Forms of Conflict
The simultaneous rise in debt, loss of economic
sovereignty, weakening of the state, unequal terms
of trade and growing levels of poverty have resulted
in the emergence of what the French writer Alain
Mine call les zones grises - grey areas (Mmc 1993).
These are regions in which state legitimacy and the
rule of law have all but broken down. They are on
the increase especially in sub-Saharan Africa and
the former Soviet Union. In these regions, authority
is increasingly divided between what is left of
formal institutions, local warlords and gang or
Table 1: LDCs in Africa affected by conflict 1997
Mafia leaders. In such circumstances the risk to life
and property have grown substantially - a situation
compounded by the permissive and abundant flows
of small arms.
Of the thirty major conflicts recorded around the
world in 2000, twenty-three are inter-societal, and
many of the latter are protracted. Por instance, the
wars in Angola and Columbia have been going on
since 1963 and 1961 respectively Over time,
protracted conflicts exact a huge cost in human life
and resources (see Table 2 for details). In total, the
twenty-three conflicts listed have resulted in over
four million deaths and have cost the countries a
total of 138 billion dollars (1995 prices). These
figures must be treated with caution, however, as
statistics from conflict-prone developing countries
are notoriously unreliable. Nevertheless, they do
provide some kind of indicator of the immense
socio-economic costs that conflict exacts and give
some kind of scale to the human tragedy that this
form of conflict generates.
Yet another group of states has only recently
emerged from conflict yet remains vulnerable to the
Source: UNCTAD (2000)
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legacies of violence. This includes Guatemala,
Nicaragua, Haiti, Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Kosovo,
Mali, Niger, Chad, Liberia, Central African
Republic, Mozambique, Cambodia, Bangladesh,
Tajikistan, Yemen. Yet other states have formal
ceasefire agreements in operation, but conditions
remain tense: these include Congo, Western Sahara,
Abkhasia, the Kurdish region of Turkey, North
Osetia, South Osetia and two large regions in Peru.
Wars and violence in developing countries have
been variously characterised by liberals as conflicts
between 'erratic primitives of shifting allegiances,
habituated to violence, with no stake in civil order'
(Peters 1994), or conflict is seen to be motivated by
'fanatical, ideologically based loyalties' (van Creveld
1991). Conflict thus perceived is depicted as
irrational and dysfunctional, as it interrupts the
benevolent processes of economic development and
democratisation promoted by civilised powers in
the North. In accordance with this view, conflict
resolution takes place when the various parties are
persuaded to see reason, to recognise the plus-sum
advantages of peace for all, and when the state is











Angola 270 46 412 436 91 13
Burundi 140 44 0.5 119 120 33
CAR 320 48 4.3 92 90 7
Chad 230 46 37.4 225 65 11
DRC 110 52 -7.4 168 149 12
Eritrea 230 49 n.a. 123 11 n.a.
Ethiopia 110 47 67.9 637 152 10
Guinea Bissau 230 42 10 126 304 22
Liberia n.a. 39 291 95 n.a.
Mali 260 46 39.4 455 129 14
Mozambique 140 46 64.4 963 208 25
Niger 200 46 -7,1 341 104 17
Rwanda 210 22 2.6 592 61. 17
Sierra Leone 160 34 9.6 103 122 22
Somalia n.a. 47 0,1 104 n.a. n.a.
Sudan 290 51 97.9 187 91 9
Uganda 330 41 175 840 53 24
But the fact that conflicts in the periphery have
proved largely resistant to the international
communities' peace initiatives suggests there is
something more than irrational behaviour that
motivates and perpetuates violence in the global
periphery
The interpretation of war and violence as irrational
and dysfunctional has been contested by a number
of authors, who argue that conflict serves an
economic function in those regions of the world
where social fragmentation and collapsing states
have become the norm (Berdal and Malone 2000).
Keen, for instance, challenges the common
assumption that war is a contest between two sides,
each trying to triumph over the other. Rather, he
argues, war has become an alternative system of
profit, power and protection, in which adversaries
Source: IISS 2000
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often cooperate in their pursuit of profit (Keen
2000). In much the same vein Duffield argues that,
far from being irrational or anarchical, the
proliferation of international criminal networks,
shadow war economies and cultures of violence in
the developing world are rational, calculated
responses that maximise comparative advantage in
the periphery of a deregulated and liberalised global
political economy (Duffield 2000).
Collier argues that the majority of wars are driven
by the economic motive of greed rather than by
grievance (Collier 2000). This somewhat
determinist argument has been contested by
analysts such as Ero ( 2001) who maintains that
grievance is still a major factor contributing to
violence in many developing countries. Often, of
course, grievance arises due to the economic
Country Duration Fatalities Costs
US$m ('95
prices)
Afghanistan 1992- 72,000 1,800
Angola 1961- 1,555,000 3,350
Algeria 1992- 82,000 7,500
Burundi 1993- 208,000 126
Colombia 1963- 47,000 25,640
Congo 1997 13,000 35
DRC 1996- 100,000 735
Iran 1979 28,000 6,700
Iraq 1988 198,000 n.a.
Indonesia 1975 244,000 23,000
Kashmir 1989 23,000 25,000
Mexico 1994 5,000 10,620
Mayanmar 1985 9,000 18,300
Philippines 1968 121,000 5,100
Rwanda 1990 813,000 466
Russia (Chechnya) 1999 5,000 1,300
Senegal 1997 2,000 33
Sierra Leone 1991 43,000 226
Somalia 1991 375,000 280
Sudan 1983 52,000 940
Sri Lanka 1983 66,000 7,200
Uganda 1993 4,000 354
Total 4,065,000 138,705
Table 2 Current inter-societal conflicts
exclusion of certain ethnic or social groupings, but
this economic motivation is very different from the
motivation of greed identified by Collier. Moreover,
the motivational forces of armed groups often
change over time (Keen 1998). Groups dominated
by warlords, such as UNITA in Angola, the Khmer
Rouge in Cambodia and the FARC in Colombia,
have moved from a strong ideological agenda that
predominated during the Cold War, which was
based on grievance, to one dominated by economic
aims in the current post-Cold War climate.
Wars motivated by greed often centre on the control
of natural resources such as mines, forests,
endangered species, cocaine, marihuana and opium
fields, and lucrative trade routes for illicit traffic.
They tend to be less to do with taking control of the
state. In this context, control of the state and state
borders has become increasingly meaningless. The
state has in effect been replaced by multiple centres
of authority dominated by local elites or 'warlords',
who may not even have a particular interest in
capturing the reins of government, except perhaps
as a means to extend their commercial activities. To
describe such conflicts as interstate, as is so
commonly done, is misleading, as the very phrase
presupposes there is a 'state' over which, and inside
which, combatants are fighting. Duffield (1998)
prefers to refer to these types of conflict as 'post-
modern', a phrase which takes account of 'the
emergence of long-term political and economic
projects that no longer need to anchor political
authority in conventional territorial, bureaucratic or
consent-based structures.
For many actors in conflict, war makes rational
economic sense, not only because it enhances their
local status and wealth, but also because it is rooted
in the power relations in the global status quo ante.
War prövides ample opportunities for elites to
develop links with the global economy via the
diamond trade, money laundering, drug and gun
smuggling. War economies such as those that have
evolved in Angola, Sierra Leone and the Democratic
Republic of Congo are highly integrated into both
legitimate and illegitimate global markets, reflecting
a symbiotic relationship between current patterns
of globalisation and conflict. This is most starkly
illustrated in the relationship between global
corporations and local military elites. During the
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Mozambique war, British Petroleum was obliged to
pay what was effectively protection money to
members of Frelimo, whilst Renamo obtained
regular payments from a subsidiary of Lonhro, for
protecting the Beira oil pipeline (Keen 1998: 16).
Until the recent campaign to control the conflict-
diamonds trade, De Beers bought up the diamonds
traded by UNITA to sell in the global market-place;
and in the Congo, Laurent Kabila reportedly
received £30 million from a consortium of South
African and Namibian businesses, as well as the
Namibian Government, to finance his military
campaign against the rebels threatening to
overthrow his government (Pythian and Duval-
Smith 1998).
Militarised elites, both inside and outside
government, have been able to manipulate control
over local resources and generate political support
via the distribution of rewards to followers,
reinforcing and strengthening the evolution of the
kieptocratic state on the one hand (Bayart, Ellis and
Hibou 1999) or leading to its fragmentation and
collapse on the other (Zartman 1995) - a situation
in which warlords and criminal networks flourish.
In both situations the gun has replaced the rule of
law, bestowing political and economic power. It has
become a means to accumulate wealth and a
guarantor of personal security Berdal (1996: 17)
has noted that, in such a context, 'weapons always
have an economic as well as a security value'. The
widespread resort to arms can thus be viewed as a
Darwinian form of survival through the use of force
in situations where formal guarantees of economic
and physical security have broken down.
Collectively, these observations help to explain the
durability of violence and conflict in the periphery,
and the general resistance that they have to the
international community's attempts at conflict
resolution and international peace-brokeririg
(Berdal and Malone 2000). Far from being the
irrational responses of primitives, these 'post-
modern' forms of conflict are highly rational in a
situation of economic scarcity and exclusion
(Duffield 2000). But more than this, these forms of
conflict are a product and a process of the evolving
global order, not an aberration as is often assumed
in liberal discourse.
7 Security and Sustainable
Development
The traditional discourse on security and
development is found wanting in a world where
familiar boundaries, structures of authority and
identity are breaking down.
For far too long the concept of security has been
tied to the idea of territorial security, the protection
of national interests in foreign policy (or the idea of
global security free from the threat of a nuclear
holocaust). These concepts have overlooked the fact
that for many millions of people the greatest threats
to their security come from disease, hunger,
unemployment, crime, social conflict, political
repression and environmental hazards. In recog-
nition of this hiatus, there has been a shift in the
referent point of security from one that lays stress
on territoriality and sovereignty, to one that
emphasises human security
Human security is here understood as 'freedom from
fear and freedom from threat', and is concerned with
economic security, food security, health security,
environmental security, personal security,
community security and political security These
elements form an interdependent whole. When the
human security of people is endangered anywhere
in the world, other nations are often drawn in. The
problems of famine, disease, drug trafficking,
terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration
know no borders. Their consequences traverse the
globe. Thus the provision of guarantees for human
security to those most threatened in their daily lives
ensures greater global security
The challenge o! transforming an environment that
marginalises and impoverishes people with one that
provides sustainable livelihoods is a starting point
for guaranteeing human security for all. The
emphasis placed on sustainable development rather
than on more orthodox economic growth strategies
derives from a realisation that policies of
development based on material enrichment, as
measured by gross national product (GNP) per
capita, have not necessarily improved the
conditions of the vast majority of the populations of
the developing countries of the world. In fact,
despite growth in GNu poverty and deprivation has
been on the increase and with it a growing
incidence of human insecurity and violence.
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The paradigm of sustainable human development
values human life for itself. It does not value life
simply because people can produce or consume
material goods. Nor does it value one person life
over another (UNDP 1994). In this paradigm, no
human being ought to be condemned to a short life
just because they are born in a certain region or
country are a certain race or sex. Development
should allow individuals the choice to explore their
human potential to the full and to put their
capabilities to best use. The universal right to life is
the link between the needs of human development
in the present and those of the future - especially
the needs for environmental preservation and
regeneration. The strongest argument for protecting
the environment is the right of future generations
to opportunities similar to the ones earlier
generations have enjoyed.
The universal right to life is also the common thread
which binds the notion of sustainable human
development to that of human security The fear or
the reality of want and of physical threat are the
major factors that contribute to the insecurity for
the poor and marginalised in the developing world.
In the sense in which sustainable human
development provides an ethical and normative
framework conforming with certain fundamental
universal moral values about the right to life and
freedom of choice, it can also be viewed as a tool
for conflict prevention and local and regional
security
The recognition of the need to manage economic
reforms in such a way as to enhance, rather than
undermine, political stability has been forced rather
reluctantly on the agendas of the Washington
institutions by the experience of the East Asian
crisis. lt has opened the way to an acknowledg-
ement that governments must be fully involved in
defining the reform process and that programmes
must not be imposed formulaically, but instead
tailored to each country particular political and
economic circumstances. Eut if economic inequality
is to be challenged effectively as a source of
structural violence, the international institutions
need to do far more than simply tinker with
reforms. There needs to be a fundamental
transformation of the ideological foundatioñs upon
which these institutions legitimise themselves.
Global security will not be enhanced until such
time as the existing economic orthodoxy is
challenged and replaced.
8 Conclusion
The neoliberal view of globalisation as a benign
process encouraging peace and development lives
on as the dominant doctrine of the multilateral
organisations. Yet the protracted failure of IMF- and
World Bank-imposed reforms to deliver the most
basic of human needs to over 20 per cent of the
global population, is a testimony to their failure as
a model of both development and stability Rather,
neoliberal policies constitute a form of structural
violence that places the greed of the few above the
basic human security of the many
Increasingly, demands are being made for a reform
of the current patterns of globalisation to redress its
destabilising effects (DFID 2000; Hellenier 1999;
UNDP 1999). Kofi Annan (2000), in his Millenium
Assembly speech, observed that the best way to
prevent conflict is to promote healthy and balanced
economic development, combined with human
rights, minority rights and political arrangements in
which all groups are fairly represented. To achieve
this will require the adoption of a different model of
development to that which currently dominates the
multilateral agenda.
Attempts to articulate an alternative value system
for the global economy are to be found in the
'Alternative Declaration' produced by the NGO
Forum at the Copenhagen Summit. It lays stress on
equity participation, self-reliance and sustainability.
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The 'Alternative Declaration' 'rejects the economic
liberalism accepted by the governments of the
North and South, seeing it as a path to aggravation
rather than the alleviation of the global social crisis.
Moreover, it identifies trade liberalisation and
privatisation as the cause of the growing concen-
tration of wealth globally' (Thomas 1998: 459). Its
alternative conception of development values
diversity above universality, and is based on a
different conception of rights than that which is
articulated by the 'Washington Consensus'. It poses
a challenge to the economic orthodoxy and existing
global structures of power, and intrinsically
establishes a relationship between globalisation and
the rising insecurity in the developing world. In the
absence of a doctrinal change that concretely deals
with the suffering and marginalisation caused by
the inequities of the global system, the spectre of
disorder, instability, crime and violence will only
grow. These are, after all, the rational responses to
the survival of the fittest in a global system that puts
profit before people's basic needs.
Note
1. The criteria defining an LDC include low income as
measured by GDP per capita, weak human
resources as measured by a composite index based
on indicators of life expectancy at birth, per capita
calorie intake, combined primaly and secondary
enrolment and adult literacy, low levels of economic
diversification, as measured by a composite index
based on share of manufacturing in GDP, share of
labour force in industry, annual per capita
commercial energy consumption, and UNCTAD
export concentration index.
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1 Introduction
The extent to which recent African civil wars have
also been agrarian crises has been underestimated.
Urban “loose molecules” and the lure of mineral
resources have been put forward as reasons for
protracted conflicts.Recent research in Sierra Leone
(Richards et al. 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein
2004; Richards et al. 2004) shows that most
combatants came from rural backgrounds and were
induced to fight by promises of food, jobs and
marriage partners, not diamonds. Many ex-
combatants want to go home (to rural areas), but
are unwilling to do so without major agrarian
reforms. These include strengthening the land and
property rights of women and youth. Through
failing to understand the rural roots of recent African
conflicts donors and policy-makers have risked
rebuilding the causes of war. Attention to agrarian
justice, we argue, is now essential if further violence
is to be avoided.
2 The issue of forced labour
A striking photograph from the 1970s shows
“gentlemen farmers” of the Mabole Valley (in
northern Sierra Leone).The fathers and grandfathers
of the group in the picture had maintained large
slave-managed estates to grow rice to feed the
trading caravans along the Falaba Road (between
Port Loko and Guinea). The photograph showed
the group waving aloft a collection of rusty trade
cutlasses.They had posed in response to a question,
“how had landowners prevented farm slaves from
running away?”
The war in Sierra Leone became infamous for
its atrocities, which included the cutting off of
victims’ hands and feet.After intervention by private
security forces (former SouthAfricanDefence Force
counter-insurgency specialists simultaneously
contracted by the government and international
diamond mining companies) and the consequent
collapse of a promising peace process a destabilised
rebel movement exacted terrible revenge. Too little
is made of the fact that the weapon of atrocity was
an ordinary agricultural implement, the cutlass.
It is hard to talk objectively about the issue of
slavery in Sierra Leone andLiberia.The two countries
were founded as homes for freed slaves, and the
issue embarrasses national elites. This
embarrassment also extends to friends of the two
countries.At ameeting about the Sierra Leone crisis
organised by the British government in the early
1990s the senior civil servant in the chair bluntly
warned speakers ‘not to waste our time this afternoon
by raking over old issues concerning slavery’. The
issue does need to be raised, however, because it
left an institutional legacy, which forms an important
background to recent wars inWest Africa.
Domestic slavery was not finally abolished until
around the end of the third decade of the twentieth
century (1928 in Sierra Leone, 1930 in Liberia).
There are still plenty of Liberians and Sierra
Leoneans who were born into a world of domestic
slavery. It was illegal to acquire new slaves in
provincial Sierra Leone after the enactment of the
Protectorate Ordinance (1896). But colonial
government considered the 1898 uprising of interior
chiefs a response to the threat to free existing slaves.
In 1896 it was estimated that as many as half of all
provincial Sierra Leoneans were slaves.Not wanting
to risk further instability, the British soft-pedalled
abolition. The institution (it was hoped) would die
a natural death.
In Liberia,developments followed a similar path.
The country had been founded as a frontier settler
outpost for free Blacks from the USA. Little initial
thought was given to the issue of relations with
African peoples.The constitution gave government
sovereignty over the interior, but there was no
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effective presence when the British and French
expanded into neighbouring up-country Sierra
Leone and Guinea. The colonial powers gave the
Liberians an ultimatum – occupy the interior or
face British and French claims on Liberian territory.
President Arthur Barclay adopted Indirect Rule (the
British-devised system for licensing interior chiefs
to administer on behalf of the state according to
“custom”). The Liberian frontier force “pacified”
the interior, driving many communities deep into
the forest, and waited for chiefs to negotiate with
the ExecutiveMansion. So long as local rulers then
did Monrovia’s will their control over domestic
slaves remained unchallenged.
Domestic slavery remained important in both
countries. Roads and plantations for export crops
were made by slaves. The British were frank that
the prospect of forced labour helped motivate
candidates for chiefly election.Colonially supervised
local courts in Sierra Leone still assisted slave owners
to recover runaways as late as the 1920s (Grace
1977).Although slaves as a proportion of the rural
population declined sharply in districts close to
Monrovia and Freetown, the figure in some more
remote Sierra Leonean chiefdoms adjacent to Liberia
remained 50 per cent or more in 1927 (Grace 1977).
The League of Nations prodded the British
government of Sierra Leone into abolition by 1
January 1928, and a similar reform was enacted in
Liberia in 1930. In the Mabole Valley the
government introduced a work oxen ploughing
scheme to compensate the cutlass-wielding
“gentleman farmers” – a clear indication the slaves
had no intention to stay. In western Liberia, the
anthropologist Warren d’Azevedo (1969–71)
records that slaves departed in droves, and Gola
owners wept at the thought of the work they would
now have to do.
3 The issue of gender and rural
marriage relations
After abolition control of rural elites over the labour
of the rural underclasses was reasserted through
other institutions legitimated by colonial (or
Monrovia) rule.Marriage arrangements became a
key. Leading men used their wealth to patronise
poorer families, and received a disproportionate
number of young women as wives. Poorer men
could not afford bridewealth.Many of their liaisons
were, perforce, with the wives of polygynous village
chiefs and elders. Local courts in both countries
cracked down on these relationships. An
impoverished youngmanmight find himself heavily
fined, and the fine commuted to labour on the
husband’s farm (a kind of retrospective bride
service), for the offence of “woman damage”. Young
women were married to rich elders whether they
liked it or not.
Gibbs (1965: 215) summarised the class
structure of Kpelle society, in rural north western
Liberia in terms of themarriage system.His account
could be extended to neighbouring groups in both
countries. Three groups are distinguished: “rich
people”, “children of the soil” and “clients”.Wealth
was measured (for a man) not only in terms of
money and goods but also in control over women
and children.Control over marriage exchanges was
the key to the differences between the classes of
men as “wife givers”, “wife keepers” and “wife
borrowers”. The three classes were, Gibbs notes,
the freeborn, the slaves and pawns. The toh nuu
(literally “upstanding”, prominent person) might
allow some of his wives “to become consorts of poor
men of the lower class who become his tii keh nuwai
[workmen or clients] … a ready-made claque …
sure to praise the man’s name”.
In recent discussions of war and its causes in
both Liberia and Sierra Leone, the issue ofmarriage
(including women’s property and the exploitation
of the labour of young men) was regularly raised
by villagers and ex-combatants (cf Richards et al.
2005; Richards et al. 2004). Young wives reported
being locked in abusivemarriages because parents
could not afford to refund bridewealth, and
complained that the family of the husband seized
the assets of the marriage where a widow refused
levirate marriage. More generally, it was reported
that ‘the chiefs take everything intended for women’,
including postwar relief supplies, and that legal
redress was impossible, since the samemale elders
sat in the local courts (only the daughter of a wealthy
family could afford to appeal a “customary” case to
a higher court). Youngmen repeatedly objected to
being fined large amounts because of their inability
to marry legally. Many openly stated a preference
for vagrancy to forced labour exacted in lieu of fines.
Militia forces in both countries exploited this
issue. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in
Sierra Leone – a movement in which 87 per cent
of ex-combatants were abducted,mainly from farms
or rural primary schools – formed a “combat wives
units” to offer marriage partners to youngmen who
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would otherwise have been too poor tomarry.Asked
about inducements to remain within themovement
(Humphreys andWeinstein 2004), 24 per cent of
RUF ex-combatants mentioned being given a
marriage partner.TheRUF also sought to empower
young women by training them to fight. As many
as a quarter of themovement’s ex-combatants were
female, though underrepresented in demobilisation
(nationally, women accounted for only 7 per cent
of ex-combatants with benefits). Some women
fighters were explicit that they had joined amilitia
faction because of gender-based rural poverty,
disadvantage and discrimination (Richards et al.
2003).
4 Testimony
The part played by marriage, labour and gender
disempowerment in fostering conflict are illustrated
in the following comments, typical of the
perceptions of ex-combatants and villagers
concerning the causes of the two wars (cf Richards
et al. 2005; Richards et al. 2003).
I joined the rebel forces to fight inequality in the
country, and because of this issue I also
encouraged my three children to join. (Female
ex-combatant, Margibi County, Liberia, 2004)
Chiefs victimise youths by imposing heavy and
unjust fines … [but] protect their own children
from doing communal work; criminal
summonses make youths run from the village.
(Youth focus group, Kamajei Chiefdom, Sierra
Leone, 2002)
This war was caused by poverty and injustice.
Our (youth) poverty is caused by having no
education, no training, no money and no jobs.
[The chiefs] fine us toomuch for any small thing.
Because we are poor, we cannot pay. So
somebody “buys” our case, and then we have to
work for that person, and for the chief. This
means we cannot work for ourselves, so we get
poorer, so some have to steal to survive and,
when… caught …get fined again. (Youth focus
group, Margibi County, Liberia, 2004)
Elders ... force [us] to marry … as soon as we
harvest our first …palm fruits. If you refuse…
they charge you to court for smiling at a girl …
But the bride service is not reasonable. You will
be required to do … jobs for the bride’s family,
like brushing and making a farm for the family
… sharing the proceeds of your own labour,
harvest or business … You will be forced to give
them 70 per cent [of your drumof palm oil], or
you will lose your wife and be taken to court ...
Most of us … avoid the scene ... [inTongo Field,
a diamond mining area] you can … marry a
woman of your choice.Marriage [in the village]
is the same as slavery. (Male ex-combatant,
eastern Sierra Leone, 2003)
5 Policy implications
International opinions about war in Liberia and
Sierra Leone are heavily affected by the views of
national elites. The “children of chiefs” protected
from “community labour”, arbitrary fining and other
abuses, tend to deny or downplay the role of
agrarian factors. Rural commoners, for their part,
are deeply sceptical about the role of elites. In Sierra
Leone they notice the rapid postwar spread of fine
houses in the hills above Freetown in a country
with no effective economy for the past ten years,
while isolated villages, too far off-road to be visited
by aid delegations, continue to lack even the most
basic facilities (schools, health posts, sanitation).
The contrast re-ignites some of the bitterness that
fed the war.
We argue (cf. Richards et al. 2004; Richards et
al. 2005) that only fundamental agrarian reform
will serve to reduce resentment. Five requirements
stand out:
1. Land reform(to introduce guaranteed shorthold
tenancies to reduce the dependence of mobile
young people on traditional patrons)
2. Marriage reform (to protect women’s property
and reduce vulnerability of young people to
labour exploitation)
3. Reform of local courts (to document custom,
and abolish it where inconsistent with national
law, e.g. on rural women’s inheritance; to
supervise court officials)
4. Reform of basic schooling (to increase
participation of rural girls, enable management
of schools by parents, shift curriculum towards
knowledge and skills important in rural
livelihoods, and offer incentives to trained
teachers to work in remote localities)
5. Reform of rural skills training (to stimulate
application of appropriate agricultural
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technologies and business methods, including
electronic networking of rural post-primary
institutions and teaching of information
technology [IT]).
On this last point, it is interesting to note that
IT was among the preferred options of many ex-
combatants. When RUF ex-combatant computer
trainees were interviewed (Richards et al. 2003)
several mentioned that they thought electronic
connectionmight havemitigated the violence.With
the internet, RUF grievances would have been
harder to ignore, with less chance for resentment
to escalate out of control. One female signals
technician talked about how radio training in the
movement had helped give her a sense of gender
empowerment, now being put to good use in
making a success of her small postwar computer-
based typing service.Young women should certainly
be included in any scheme for rurally oriented IT.
More generally, agrarian technologies should be
chosen or designed with a clear understanding of
the institutional disadvantages faced by
impoverished women and rural youth.For example,
bio-engineered seed technologies with a propensity
to spread from farmer to farmer (e.g. disease-
resistant rice or groundnut types, and hybrid oil
palm seedlings) should be preferred to schemes
requiring heavy involvement of government and
landowning elites (such as subsidised agricultural
credit or tractor cultivation).
But technology will be powerless to create
employment and encourage young rural people to
bind with wider society without institutional reform.
The reluctance of governments and donors to
contemplate such reform is a worrying sign. Social
advisers – based in metropolitan capitals and
lobbied on their brief forays into the countryside
by non-agrarian elites – sometimes seem oblivious
to the urgent need for reform of land tenure, rural
justice and marriage. It is argued that these issues
are “too sensitive” in the immediate aftermath of
war. In Sierra Leone we have been told that to seek
to limit the customary privileges of the rural
landowners would risk re-igniting conflict. This
rates risk of a recurrence of the war of 1898 as higher
than that of the war of 1991.
Liberia sets a somewhat better example.When
Charles Taylor stepped down (August 2003), the
women’s caucus in the Liberian Senate introduced
a law recognising many abuses associated with
custom, as applied tomarriage, labour and women’s
property. TheAct toGovern theDevolution of Estates
and Establish the Rights of Inheritance for Spouses of
Both Statutory and Customary Marriages approved
by the Liberian House of Representatives on 7
October 2003 bans recovery of bridewealth
(“dowry”) by a husband if amarriage fails (s. 2.4),
renders it illegal for parents to ‘compel the daughter
or other female relative to marry aman not of her
choice’ (s. 2.10); forbids a husband to ‘aid, abet, or
create the situation for his customary wife to have
illicit sexual intercourse with another man for the
sole purpose of collecting damages’ (s. 2.7) and
renders it unlawful to ‘compel or demand any female
of legal age, whether or not she is his customary
wife, to “confess” or call the name of her lover ...
in order to collect damages from the said lover ...’
(s. 2.8). The Act addresses some of the concerns
cited above, and has relevance elsewhere in the
region.
Other institutional reforms are also needed if
impoverished young people are to return to rural
communities and contribute to agricultural
development. Clear and enforceable contracts
concerning land and labour are as crucial as an end
to the arbitrary workings of undocumented
“custom”.A British-funded scheme to build chiefs’
houses through “community” labour sent a wrong
signal in Sierra Leone. It was seen by many young
people as “punishment” for challenging elders
during the war. But donors also need to put their
own house in order.Abolition of rich country farm
subsidies combined with emphasis on agrarian
rights and justice within the West African region
might serve the interests of peace more than other
aid initiatives combined.
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* This article expresses the personal views of the authors
and not those of their organisations.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, the field of security policy has been
associated with conservative worldviews, which
focus on order and avoidance or management of
conflict. Security provision has been about
specialist agencies, expert analysts and top-down
policy approaches. As an academic and policy
field it is highly gendered (Tickner 1995) and
state-centred (Morgenthau 1948 is just one
example among many). It has focused on threats
to strategic national state interests from without
and also within. However, over the past two
decades, this has been challenged from various
quarters. There has been a move to widen the
meaning of security and to recognise that it is
not just about the state but also about citizens.
Security, it is argued, is linked to the wellbeing of
communities, and this must include protection
from hunger, disease, violence and repression, as
well as consolidation of democracy and social
justice (UNDP 1994). The idea of human
security encourages governments, policymakers
and other organisations to give value and
attention to a broader range of threats to life
than is normally recognised, particularly in the
global South.
However, this shift from state-centred to human-
centred security has uncovered the weakness of
the state and the difficulties it faces in
protecting people from complex forms of
insecurity. It has also increased international and
social demands on states, which are now asked to
protect their citizens from chronic threats in a
particular moment in history during which their
ability to provide even basic protection from
physical violence and attack is in crisis and
undermined by global phenomena. The spread of
‘new wars’ in the global South has highlighted
the limitations of state security provision, but
there are also growing problems of urban and
rural violence in countries that had postwar
peace agreements and even in those which have
experienced no war at all. For example, in the
mid-1990s, the number of homicides among
young men aged 15–44 in Brazil was higher than
that of Colombia, a country recognised to be in
the midst of a civil war (Krug et al. 2002).
This weakness of the state security response has
contributed to a gradual erosion of the idea of
security as a public good, as well as loss of faith in
state security provision. Many people already
‘Security from Below’1 in Contexts of
Chronic Violence
Alexandra Abello Colak and Jenny Pearce
Abstract At the same time that the field of security moves away from traditional state-centred perspectives
towards a human-centred understanding of security, contemporary states seem to be incapable of protecting
people from increasingly complex forms of insecurity. Inadequate and inefficient public responses have
contributed to the erosion of the idea of security as a public good, especially in contexts of chronic violence.
In this article, we suggest that in these contexts ‘security from below’ could help analytically and in practice
to humanise security provision by focusing attention on the lived experiences of insecurity, by encouraging
participation in debates about the local and universal values that should inform state responses and by
enabling people to demand a people-centred but publicly delivered form of security. Rethinking security
from below is not a suggestion for replacing the state; it is instead an attempt to increase the capacity of
communities and local level actors to articulate their demands for better security provision based on agreed
norms and under democratic principles in which security must be at the heart of all struggles for equitable
development and social justice.
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depend on private and informal forms of security
and justice provision. Wealth and poverty
determines the choice: private security firms on
the one hand and local gunman on the other.
Some now argue for a shift from the focus on state
provision in favour of more support for non-state
providers in post-conflict and fragile states. They
include commercial, informal and community
forms of justice and security delivery (Baker and
Scheye 2007: 154). In many such contexts, it is
argued, the state sector will simply never deliver
in the short to medium term and alternatives
need to be found based on local realities.
‘Security from below’, we argue, should not be a
substitute for security as a public good. The
challenge, however, is how the latter can be
constructed in contemporary contexts of
multiple violences and insecurity, with weak
states, corrupt and non-accountable security
institutions and with powerful global networks
trafficking arms and drugs that foster violence
and further erode the state’s legitimate
monopoly over the means of violence. Rather
than widen the idea of security to embrace ever
more areas of human interaction, we need to
‘humanise’ security provision, or make it people-
centred but publicly delivered, and in ways that
promote non-violent forms of human interaction,
encourage civil participation and protect women,
children and vulnerable youth from abuse. We
believe that ‘security from below’ is about
encouraging people to think about their security
as they do about their food, livelihood and
human rights; it is of equal importance.
Security provision must be provided by public
institutions, but it needs to be founded on agreed
norms and shared values. It also has to respond
to contextualised needs in ways that are
legitimate and respectful of human rights. These
norms may well have to be constructed from
‘below’. Developing norms and principles which
are compatible with public provision may be one
of the particular challenges of our times, and
there are contexts today where it is not yet
conceivable that the state can or will take on the
task. Indigenous and community forms of justice
may be the only viable forms in some contexts.
However, there are many challenges on what is
meant by publicly agreed norms and shared
values, when these have not yet been
democratically constructed. While there may be
a need to recognise transitional community-level
security and justice forms, these should, we
argue, contribute to building universal norms,
which can help construct effective state provision
rather than substitute for it.
In order to analyse how ‘security from below’
could help humanise security provision in
contexts of chronic violence,2 our article begins
by exploring the implications of the discursive
shift from state-centred to citizen- and human-
centred security. Drawing mostly on examples
from Latin America and based on our initial
research activities in Guatemala and Colombia,
we then explore the signs of the crisis in
practice, as well as the community, market and
donor agency-led responses to it that have
emerged. We critically analyse their limitations
and question how we can move from failing
public provision to security as a fairly distributed
and effective public service. We finally argue that
‘security from below’ in the specific contexts
under discussion, could help analytically, and in
practice, to build norms and principles to inform
contemporary security approaches. By drawing
attention to real and diverse contexts of security
provision, ‘security from below’ seeks to focus on
the relevance and effectiveness of prevailing
forms of public and non-public security provision.
It asks how far these facilitate participation for
social change and democratic development? If
security is to be judged by such criteria, it
requires new debate to be opened up at the
grassroots level, democratically embedding a
sense of what is right and appropriate in
communities, which have become subjected to
the arbitrary imposition of certain concepts of
perverse ‘order’ in the name of security.
2 From state-centred to human-centred security
As an academic field and as a policymaking
enterprise, security has been dominated by a
Western understanding of world politics. It has
been focused on the protection of the
international system born in Europe in the
seventeenth century which regards state
sovereignty and power competition as the driving
forces of international life. Over the last two
decades, however, traditional theories focused on
state survival and power preservation have been
challenged. By denying the alleged universalism
and neutrality of realist definitions of security
obsessed with state security and survival (Wendt
1992; Cox 1981) and criticising the restrictive
focus of traditional security studies as inadequate
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to contemporary realities (Booth 1991; Wyn Jones
1999), scholars and policymakers have been
invited to consider individuals and communities
as the main referents of any security endeavour.
New feminist perspectives have also challenged
the exclusionary traditional discourse of security
by exposing its deep connections with
hierarchical social relations between women and
men, rich and poor and insiders and outsiders
(Tickner 1995: 180). It is now widely accepted
that the protection of individuals and their
liberties and the creation of contexts that enable
human wellbeing are the main challenges of this
century.
All these contributions and the pre-eminence of
the concept of Human Security after the
publication of the UNDP Human Development
Report in 1994 have contributed to taking security
out from the secrecy and closeness associated
with intelligence, military and defence circles.
Although there is still no agreement on the
definition of Human Security, it is generally
accepted that it places the protection and
welfare of individuals as the primary concern of
any security approach, something that seems
difficult to achieve through traditional military
means. Human security is not only a
comprehensive concept, it is also a campaign to
open up security thinking to new fields and to
bring security practices closer to contemporary
human problems. Appealing to the core idea of
‘humanness’, this broadened concept has made
‘security’ a concept of relevance to the left as
well as the right, to women as well as to men, to
the global South3 as well as the global North, to
non-Western societies and to academics and
practitioners of almost all sciences and fields.
This discursive shift in the field of security has
raised new demands on the state. Under the new
paradigm, the state loses its preponderance but
gains responsibilities. Contemporary states must
not only protect individuals and communities
from a wider set of threats, but they should also
create conditions for wellbeing and social justice,
be respectful of democratic values and human
rights and be accountable to citizens. All this
when rather than strengthening their
infrastructural capacity, states have increasingly
lost their ability to restrain the impact of
transnational phenomena, to maintain their
legitimate monopoly of coercion and to be
responsive to local needs.
The human-security approach suggests multi-
layered and multi-area interventions and implies
new political and institutional landscapes at
national and international levels to protect
individuals and communities. However, state
institutions have not substantially changed or
properly adjusted in that direction over the last
two decades. On the contrary, despite national
and international attempts to reform the security
sector in many countries, traditional assumptions,
practices and values are still deeply entrenched in
state institutions and social groups. Public
responses to insecurity very often slip towards
authoritarianisms and they also lack transparency
and accountability. Citizens in heightened states
of fear are often encouraged to support hardline
and authoritarian public responses. At the same
time, neoliberal globalisation has reduced the
emphasis on building public coffers or increasing
public provision, and it has made the possibility of
handing over the provision of some services to
private actors that are regarded as economically
more efficient than the state attractive, including
security.
One of the most evident signs of crises in security
provision is the lack of effective protection from
physical violence, the basic aspect of security. An
estimated seven million violence-caused deaths
occurred in the world, 75 per cent of them civilian,
between 1993 and 2003 (Smith and Braein,
quoted in Hurwitz and Peake 2004: 1). Internal
wars as well as an increase in the levels of crime
and delinquency around the globe, especially but
not exclusively in growing urban concentrations of
the global South, are responsible for most of those
deaths. In its many forms, violence is increasing in
urban as well as in rural areas, affecting the lives
of millions of people, which produces a growing
sense of insecurity that paralyses cooperative
social interaction, decreases wellbeing, obstructs
democratisation and undermines the states’
credibility. In Latin America where, according to
the World Health Organization (WHO), violence
was the first cause of death in 1999, violence
seems to be growing at an epidemic pace. The
growth in homicide rates has affected countries
with historically low rates such as Costa Rica and
Argentina, as well as countries with a history of
internal wars and high levels of violence, such as
Colombia or El Salvador.4
It is not our aim to discuss here the causes of this
increase in the levels of violence but the
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responses that have emerged and their
limitations. However, it is worth highlighting
that only in some cases the levels of violence are
linked to the legacy of fought wars or, as in
Colombia, partially fed by the ongoing conflict.
But in all cases, violence and a sense of
insecurity are being fostered by the opportunities
offered by globalisation for illegal trafficking of
drugs and arms, by the negative effects of forced
implementation of neoliberal reforms in deeply
unequal societies, by intergenerational processes
of violence transmission, by the failure of current
public policies and state institutions, by the
expansion of a dominant consumption-orientated
culture and by a problematic and manipulated
socialisation of youth in both the global South
and the North.5
It is in this context that public security provision,
as it is conceived now, is proving ever more
inadequate for the task. It is not only inadequate
in terms of the quantity and resources dedicated
by the state to protect communities, but also in
the quality of the provision and its assumptions
about the best way to tackle insecurity. In many
cases, the state does not have a legitimate
monopoly of violence and certainly not over the
entire territory, and where there is provision, it
often abuses rather than protects the population.
In some contexts, the crisis has led to the
emergence of parallel communities where coercion is
exercised outside the institutional framework of
the state. This is the case even where states are
relatively strong (e.g. Brazil) as well as where
they are weak (e.g. Guatemala). In these
communities the state is not normally capable of
providing basic services, including security, and
its intervention is often intermittent, reactive
and disciplinary rather than protective. One of
the characteristics of these parallel communities
is that state institutions such as the police are
not the main, best equipped, or even desirable
providers of protection. Alternative actors often
connected to lucrative illegal or informal
economic activities replace the state and often
act interchangeably as coercive ‘protectors’ for
some sectors of the population, creating
protection rackets.
In these communities, the state–society
relationship is often characterised by mutual
distrust and even resentment. One of the most
critical examples of areas where coercive
protection is provided outside the institutional
frontier of the state is the case of Comuna 13 in
Medellin, the second biggest city of Colombia.
For more than three decades, armed groups have
fought for the control of this area. Citizens living
there have demanded protection from the violent
domination exerted by the armed groups,
including threats, murders, massacres and forced
displacement. Their desperate demands for
protection have been temporarily met by
successive armed groups that replace their
opponents, only to use similar techniques in their
attempt to exterminate them and to gain control
of the territory and of their people.
It was not until 2002 that the state attempted to
retake control through a military operation.
Given the excessive violence used, this state
intervention was initially difficult to differentiate
from the many other interventions by coercive
actors in the past. However, Operación Orion, as
it was called, has been seen as a successful step
towards the pacification of the Comuna 13.
Nevertheless, six years later it is evident that the
intervention has not managed to remove the
deep causes of violence in the Comuna. It is not
yet clear whether the state is the only effective
provider of security in the area, or the reduction
in the number of crimes is due to a deep
transformation in the community. Although the
local government has tried to reform traditional
politics, supported the demobilisation of former
combatants and opened spaces to local
participation, in terms of security, the police and
other state bodies still do not have absolute
control over the situation. There are powerful
actors in the city who people still fear, who
provide some sort of order and decide the fate of
whoever is seen as a threat to their interests.
The crisis in security provision makes more
problematic the lack of connection between the state’s
objectives and local communities’ needs. In the context
of violence, communities need to be protected
and helped to build more secure environments.
However, public security provision tends to focus
on eliminating enemies or competitors to state
territorial control and not on mitigating the
perverse effects of insecurity and violence on
people’s lives. Sometimes the methods used by
the police and military forces increased unrest,
fear and insecurity among the local population.
Lack of communication between communities
and police institutions not only makes it harder
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to identify priorities for responsive security
provision but also detracts from the legitimacy of
the methods used by the state in ‘securing or
pacifying’ dangerous areas.
In Colombia in 1994, surveys were carried out to
ask citizens their views on the service provided by
the police, which revealed systematic distancing
between the police and local communities.
Recognition of this has, in some cases, promoted
the implementation of community-policing
approaches. These contain seeds of an alternative
way of seeing public provision, as measured, for
instance, by whether people feel secure, rather
than the number of criminals arrested. However,
in practice, community police are often not
valued by the rest of the police, undermining the
trust in them. In Medellin, we found that the
community police were seen as the ‘soft’ even
‘feminised’ side of the hard, masculine and ‘real’
policeman’s work; their reputation was useful
when police colleagues were needed to be
deployed in the community or gather
intelligence, but it then eroded when community
police were included in police military style
operations (Abello Colak and Pearce 2008).
Another symptom of the crisis is the exaggerated
social expectation from applying hardline measures.
Given the desperation for relief from insecurity,
many groups are not only adopting aggressive
attitudes towards crime but are also supporting a
more aggressive state response towards
insecurity problems. Hardline responses are
focused on increasing police patrols and attacks
on ‘dangerous areas’ and are implemented by
targeting ‘suspicious individuals’. In Central
America, where the problem of gangs is out of
hand, responses have included increasing
sentences, reducing the age limit for arrests in
order to prosecute younger offenders, and
enabling police to arrest people on suspicion of
belonging to a gang. In some cases, having a
tattoo has become a determining factor for being
arrested. Other responses have been urban
military operations on areas seen as dangerous,
like those carried out in Colombia and Chiapas,
Mexico, with summary executions as the outcome.
Hardline measures give rise to three sets of
problems: (1) they exacerbate social tensions
through their reactive and punitive targeting of
certain social groups ‘problematic communities’;
(2) they deepen existing gaps between the level
of protection that different sectors of society
receive from the state; and (3) they delay
reforms to security provision that could make it
more preventive and less reactive, and impede
dealing with fundamental problems. As the case
of Medellin shows, hardline measures can give
the initial impression that the state is tackling
the security problems, but they cannot prevent
future violence. Rather, a tense calm is created
until new groups emerge.
From a citizen’s perspective, public security is
failing, especially in the most violent contexts
and where protection from physical attack is
needed. However, security remains important to
the survival of citizens and communities, and
some responses to the crisis have emerged. Some
of these are led by the market for protection and the
commoditisation of security, others are responses led
by communities and others are responses led by
international donor agencies. In the next section we
explore the main features of these responses and
their limitations.
3 Responses to the crisis in security provision
3.1 Market-led initiatives
One of the most lucrative businesses, in the
context of violence, is the provision of security.
The market for protection is growing and
becoming highly competitive. A growing number
of private companies are offering protection to
national and multinational businesses, banks and
individuals. The privatisation of security is not
an exclusive phenomenon of the global South. In
the European Union, Canada and Austria, the
number of private guards has already exceeded
the number of police officers (Richani 2002).
However, in the context of chronic violence,
leaving security in the hands of the market runs a
greater risk. The creation of a private space for
the profitable provision of security can be easily
manipulated by powerful coercive actors. In some
cases, the state supervises the process, but not in
ways that are democratically accountable or
transparent. One example is the experience of
Las Convivir created in Colombia. These were
private forms of security, supervised and
authorised by the state with around 9,633 men. In
rural areas they were quickly controlled by
powerful elites and narco-businesses to serve their
interests and to cover more vicious forms of
private security already in place, like paramilitary
forces. In highly insecure contexts it is very
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difficult for a weak state to ensure that criminal
actors do not co-opt the very lucrative private
security business. By profiting from insecurity, the
latter can also further undermine the state’s
capacity to improve public provision. In Colombia,
almost $150 million annually is being spent on
private security (Richani 2002: 92); money which
could finance better police forces through taxes
and to improve the public security sector.
The other problem with the privatisation of
security is that protection becomes a commodity
and even a privilege. Deciding what is punishable,
what is worth protecting, by what means and
based on which values cannot be the result of a
decision left to the market or private interests.
Whoever is capable of providing security in a
given society is also entrusted with power and has
leverage to impose a specific social order by
managing social conflict and deciding what is
acceptable or punishable. In Colombia, this
means that paramilitary groups, even ones which
have officially been demobilised, often impose
rigid social norms around dress and behaviour in
the areas they control. Similar patterns have
been found in other areas of the world where
community authority is under de facto
paramilitary, militias or drugs lord control. It is
the poorest communities that are most exposed.
3.2 Community-led initiatives
There are other responses originating in
community initiatives. Some are based on
traditional indigenous values and on a long
history of local conflict management within
communities. Some of these traditional forms of
justice and conflict management may conflict
with Western values and understandings of the
state. Customary law is sometimes in tension
with state justice and security, with mutual
denials of legitimacy, while elsewhere customary
law and state institutions may coexist with
customary law acknowledged and recognised by
the state. These forms of justice provision are
sometimes the only available forms of security in
violent contexts and need to be recognised. They
respond to the immediate concern of how to
create some sort of immediate order and seem to
be good at responding to local needs. However,
they may also be rigid and reproduce traditional
discriminations on ethnic or gender lines. It is
important to explore the values behind them,
how they respond to minority rights and what
kind of relation they can have with the state.
There are other more extreme community
responses to wrongdoing, such as street justice
and lynchings in rural (and sometimes urban)
communities in countries like Guatemala. These
highlight in a dramatic way, the extent of the
failure of security and justice provision, as well as
how the sense of abandonment in communities
can lead to even more violence. In the end, such
kinds of responses leave communities vulnerable
to manipulation and facilitate their
stigmatisation by other sectors of society that
consider them savage, primitive and ignorant.
We would like to highlight, however, that
sometimes other (more positive) forms of
community-led responses to violence can emerge.
We have witnessed how people can organise
themselves and stand up to violence in countries
like Colombia and Guatemala, where civil society
organisations have tried to create spaces for
action that delegitimise violent actors (Pearce
2007b). There are numerous examples of how civil
society participation is promoting social change,
fostering municipal development initiatives and
improving women’s capacity to participate and to
challenge political and social violence.
Greater participation does not immediately or
automatically translate into a change in security
provision, but it affects the way in which state
and society interact – potentially affecting
assumptions about what the state should do and
protect and, in consequence, about the kind of
state that is being constructed. Community and
civil society participation is prompted by the
desire to defend fundamental rights and to
empower people to act against conditions that
are seen as life or livelihood threatening. Such
participation can help to build public opinion, to
disseminate a sense of rights, to encourage
people to challenge the status quo and to engage
citizens in addressing issues of security, human
rights and the rule of law (Pearce 2007b).
3.3 International donor agency-led initiatives
The third kind of response to the crisis in security
provision is led by donor agencies through their
support to security sector reforms (SSRs). Their
focus is on state institutional transformation.
Such reforms, however, suffer from their lack of
local embeddedness. In some cases, like in
Guatemala, they have had qualified success in
fostering cooperation between civil society
organisations and state institutions in designing
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security policy (although in a weak state context,
such as Guatemala, this does not easily impact on
actual public security provision). But this does
not mean a better connection between the state
and the wider society (Pearce 2006). In fact, civil
society organisations have tended to become less
responsive to the needs of local communities,
especially in rural areas. SSRs have focused more
on training and adoption of new values by police
and military institutions, but less on supporting
communities and citizens to gain their own
understanding of issues and build their own
consensus on the kind of security they need.
In sum, none of the three responses discussed
totally addresses the problem. Security provision
needs to be based on agreed norms compatible
with universal values, equitably provided and
should be responsive to local needs. Some
community-led responses are trying to tackle the
issue of lack of effective provision and draw on
indigenous values. However, they cannot respond
to the complex challenges and problems that
create insecurity in this century without
improved state provision. To tackle insecurity
today, it is necessary to develop robust political
commitment, strong anti-corruption
enforcement to prevent mafias from permeating
institutions and urgent attention to the
socioeconomic contexts of insecurity.
4 Rethinking ‘security from below’
We suggest, therefore, that we need to progress
beyond these different modes of crisis response,
and reaffirm that security be regarded and
provided as a public service! The idea of rethinking
‘security from below’ is not a suggestion for the
replacement of the state. The latter is still the
only actor that could guarantee that public goods
and services are provided, and not sold or
administered according to the rational choice
logic that guides markets. ‘Security from below’ is
a call to increase the capacity of people to think
about their security and to define collectively the
values and norms that should inform state
provision. It is a call to find ways to increase
accountability of the state, not to foreign
investors or economic elites, but to common
citizens. It is also an attempt to increase the
capacity of communities and local level actors to
articulate their demands for a better security
provision under democratic principles in which
security must be at the heart of all struggles for
equitable development and social justice.
In order to rethink security and to develop new
practices, academic research on security needs to
develop a better understanding of the daily
experiences of victims of insecurity and also of
police officers working in contexts of violence. The
analysis of security provision requires research
that is commensurate with the complex reality on
the ground. To help people to think about the
norms and values which should serve as
foundations for public provision of security and to
improve their capacity to control it, it is necessary
to get closer to people’s everyday lives in violent
contexts and to the difficult work of police officers
and other state officials in such contexts. While
there are many abusive and corrupt officers, our
work with the community police in Medellin
suggested that many are devoted to public and
community service but that the prevailing police
structures are a disincentive to their endeavour.
We believe that research methodologies
involving people in the co-production of
knowledge6 in the field of security could help to
increase the possibilities of articulating
alternative visions of security that are locally
relevant and that can have an impact on public
institutions. Action research can also have an
impact on society’s capacity, as well as on state
willingness to agree on norms and values for a
more efficient form of security provision.
Encouraging people to think about their security
can enable problem areas to be recognised and
addressed: for example, the fact that men and
women, old, poor and privileged experience
insecurity in different ways, means that provision
should be adapted to particular needs. People
can also be encouraged to think of which local
values or local capacities can inform public
security policies; in some cases this will include
indigenous ways of conflict management.
Mainstream approaches could learn from some
of these time-honoured experiences.
The greater intensity with which insecurity
affects people’s lives demands new thinking and
new practices. The idea of ‘security from below’
could help state institutions to open channels to
communicate with communities and to respond
to local needs. There are examples of how
opening institutional and political spaces for
participation encourages civil and community
actors to communicate differently with the state
and to build better oversight of state institutions.
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In Medellin for example, advances have been
made with monitoring mechanisms for the
municipal development plan that allow social
organisations and the private sector to have a say
in the municipal planning process. Such
accountability mechanisms could be adapted and
extended to security issues. Of course, this would
require a cooperative attitude from the state and
support from political authorities. Such was the
case in Medellin, with the election of
independent Mayor Fajardo and the use of the
constitutional recognition of participatory
planning systems achieved in Colombia in 1991.
We hope that the idea of ‘security from below’ can
encourage academics, authorities, communities
and civil society organisations to think about
security in a different way. We also hope it can
help the latter to articulate their needs from the
perspective of their lived experiences. They need
to participate in debate about the local and
universal values that should inform policing
approaches and state responses. Nevertheless
some civil society organisations resist
participation in debates about security; they see
security as the domain of the conservative
political right that is more interested in
preserving social order than in social change.
Resistance from within state security institutions
can also be expected. These attitudes need to be
overcome so that people with agendas for social
change take the security dimensions of these
agendas seriously and help to strengthen a public
provision which will guarantee freedom to
challenge the status quo by democratic means.
5 Conclusion
We stress the need to recognise that security is
something more than eliminating threats to
human and social life. It is a public service that
should be fairly and effectively provided by the
state through mechanisms that guarantee the peaceful
management of social conflict and the de-escalation of
violence. These mechanisms should comply with
three requirements: they should be informed by
universal as well as local values and respectful of human
rights; they should be agreed by society and responsive to
local needs and they should not create more fear or
insecurity among populations. ‘Security from below’
has nothing to do with vigilantism or de facto
civilian responses to their insecurity.
In the context of complex urban and rural
violence, accountable, effective and inclusive
public security, which does not create more fear
in its implementation, is a vital component in
enabling the poorest to rebuild their
communities and reduce the violence within
them. The lack of basic physical security is an
impediment to social change and progress in the
poorest communities of the global South and the
North that affects the lives of all in society. Daily
violence and crime affect human interactions,
democratic participation and public life. These
problems are increasingly affecting
neighbourhoods and communities, and they are
linked to global dynamics as well as national and
local problems. In the face of inadequate and
inefficient forms of public security provision, new
forms of provision will continue to appear, some
of them in the form of a lucrative business, and
not driven by social public interest.
We hope that the development of ‘security from
below’ thinking and practice can help to prevent
the manipulation of people’s fear and desire for
protection for political or economic purposes. It
focuses our attention on the lived experiences of
insecurity and how people can shape their
security on the basis of their own needs as well as
universal norms, and be empowered to demand it
from the state.
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Notes
1 This was the term used in the Colloquium for
Global Security Transformation, which took
place in Sri Lanka in September 2007.
2 By chronic violence we refer to the context in
which rates of violent death are at least twice
the average for high- and low-income
countries, respectively; where these levels are
sustained for five years or more and where
frequent acts of violence are recorded across
several socialisation spaces, including the
household, the neighbourhood, the school,
intercommunity and the nation-state
(including disproportionate acts of violence
attributed to state security forces) (Pearce
2007b).
3 The Final Report ‘Human Security Now’
published by the Commission on Human
Security in 2003 is a good example of how the
problems of the global South are reshaping the
security agenda. It identifies six critical issues
on human security: protecting people caught
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up in violent conflict, protecting people on the
run, especially migrant and displaced
populations, protecting people in countries
recovering from violent conflict, protecting
people from poverty, recognising the link
between health and security and guaranteeing
access to basic education and knowledge.
4 Although there are variations across the
region, the general tendency has been towards
increased violence and the countries with the
highest homicide rates are El Salvador, where
the number of deaths per year in the 1990s
exceeded the average during the war in the
1980s, Colombia, Venezuela and Brazil.
5 Young men in particular are affected by lack
of self-esteem (Pearce 2007b). On gender
issues in violence, see Pearce (2007a).
6 Co-producing knowledge recognises different
kinds of knowledge that can be brought to
bear on a problem and engages thinkers and
practitioners in a joint endeavour to develop
new knowledge relevant to context. Different
kinds of knowledge range from the academic
forms of propositional and analytical
knowledge to the experiential knowledge of
actors in their contexts.
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1 Introduction
It is a curious fact that in June 2003, 20 years
into Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, the country’s
military leadership chose to introduce their
forces as ‘ceremonial institutions since
independence’.1 Today, such a narrative is no
longer tenable or desirable. How do we
understand this change and what issues does it
foreground particularly on gender and security in
Sri Lanka? That the narrative of ceremoniality is
heard less often reflects a military turn in the
country, which complements the determination
of both the Sri Lankan government and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) for a
decisive ‘final battle’ that will end the 25-year
war. It also points to the significant shifts that
have taken place in the Sri Lankan military, its
current ethos as a hardened and modernised
fighting force, and its central role in the nation’s
imaginary. In the emerging security regime
driven by these forces, there is a vivid interplay
of security and gender: of masculinised
militarism and gendered insecurity that have
their corollary in violence against women and the
marginalisation of women’s labour. This article
explores these issues, first by marking the new
security paradigm in Sri Lanka, and second by
examining the Free Trade Zones in the south of
the country where the feminisation of labour and
masculinisation of security concur, and where
security is marketed as a public good in a
manner which elicits consent for the
militarisation of society as a whole. The ‘social
imaginary’ that results is constitutive, in turn, of
deeply gendered fault lines.
2 The Sri Lanka military: entangled
temporalities, multiple identities
The popular narrative of the Sri Lanka military
as a ceremonial institution until the first Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)2 insurrection in 1971
and more pertinently until the 1983 separatist
war, denies its true antecedents. During British
colonial rule, security in Ceylon rested on a
volunteer rather than regular armed force. But
this volunteer force was called out on many
instances to quell anti-British ‘riots’ as in 1818,
1848 and 1915. In 1915 in the aftermath of
Sinhala–Muslim clashes and anti-colonial
agitation, the military was incorporated as a unit
of utmost value when martial law was declared.
The regular force of the Sri Lanka Army came
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into effect in 1949, one year after independence.
Almost immediately, whether in its first
operational role of preventing an influx of ‘illicit’
immigrants from India in 1952 or in containing
anti-state dissent in the hartal of 1953, the
agitation at Gal Oya in 1956, or the Emergency
of 1958, its engagement in securing Sri Lanka’s
borders and the state brought it face to face with
Tamil dissent. During the Emergency of 1958
precipitated by Sinhala–Tamil clashes, the
military was under state orders to ‘shoot and
shoot to kill’ (Vittachi 1958: 55–6). This was also
the first time in an independent Sri Lanka that
military officers were gazetted as coordinating
officers of provinces, thereby superseding the
government agents of those provinces who were
drawn from the civil service (SLAC 1999: 102).
Given this show of force, which continued into
the 1960s,3 what made it possible to represent
the Sri Lanka military as ceremonial? Until the
first JVP insurrection of 1971, the security forces
were not meaningfully modernised (SLAC 1999:
300), and not until after 1983 and the 1987–9
second JVP insurrection had it to face organised
armed combatants on a significant scale. One
could argue therefore that the description of
ceremoniality carried the trace of non-combat.
But the use and exchange value of this term
(primarily by those in power rather than by those
oppressed by the military), point to far more
complex structural features, which underpin
militaries today.
One such feature is of the multiple temporalities
and identities that modern militaries inhabit. In
Sri Lanka, although deployed as a tool of social
and political control, the military did not
automatically enjoy superiority over civilian
authority until relatively recently. There were
instances of deference to civilian power even at
heightened moments of military engagement,
which underscored the army’s commitment to
democratic constitutionality. For example,
during the Emergency of 1958, despite the
powers it vested on the military, faced with a
3,000-strong crowd, the commander of the army
unit in Pollonnaruwa requested written
permission first from the government agent to
open fire before ordering his men to do so
(Vittachi 1958: 43). In 1962, following the
abortive coup, the army leadership distanced
itself from the rebel faction within it,
acknowledged damage to its reputation and
initiated public image-building exercises to
restore confidence in the institution (SLAC 1999:
163).4 Much later, in 1989 when a Major General
wanted the Ops Combine to be centralised under
his sole authority in order to effectively fight the
JVP, his request was granted but not without
‘some delay and exchange of letters’
(Chandraprema 1991: 301). Such actions
enabled the army, even as it resorted to hardline
tactics against the rebel JVP and LTTE, to
simultaneously inhabit multiple registers of
discourse and when required, trace a ceremonial
history, assert its commitment to the
constitution and draw attention to its leadership
as ‘officers and gentlemen’. It thereby also
forwarded a gendered ethos, which privileged
elite males and masculinity.
In such state–military relations, the military
became both central and auxiliary to the
purposes of governments, available for battle and
a return to barracks.5 It was permitted to think of
itself on dual registers: as honourable men who
safeguarded the constitution and deferred to
elected civilian authority, and as combatants who
dirtied their hands in battle, which allowed the
ordinary soldier as much of a chance as the elite
officer to become a Rana Viru or War Hero. Even
as its excesses in exterminating insurgency and
separatism were ignored and/or actively
promoted, the Sri Lanka military was encouraged
to embrace a humanitarian vocabulary central to
the moulding of modern, professional militaries
today (Kennedy 2004: 268). This has not meant,
as David Kennedy notes, that we cannot ‘often
tell who is speaking … as if a tune were being
played in slightly different keys. We can hear the
voice of victory and the voice of virtue’ (Kennedy
2004: 282). But the multiple registers and
entangled temporalities the military inhabits as it
conjures up both ceremoniality and martial
valour, both humanitarian outlook and
militarised efficiency, are important to note. They
provide an understanding of militarisation as a
dynamic process in which the military can be
marketed in different ways all containing traces
that, together with contingency, can play a part in
how the current military turn in Sri Lanka
intensifies or abates.
3 The military turn
Sri Lanka’s current security regime is boosted by
an absence of serious political will towards a
negotiated settlement to the ethnic conflict.
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Inevitably state–military relations have moved
closer towards installing states of exception as
the norm. The military turn is one of its effects,
particularly evident in the eastern province after
the victory for government forces at Thoppigala.6
Martial law was not declared, but the Sri Lanka
army was empowered to act for the state. In July
2007, the military commander of the eastern
province notified local civil administrators that
his office ‘would have the final say on which
humanitarian and development NGOs [non-
governmental organisations] were allowed to
work in the areas recently re-taken from the
LTTE’ (ICG 2008). Ministry of Defence approval
had to be obtained prior to all visits by
international NGOs to the east. Similarly in
Jaffna (as well as portions of the eastern province
recaptured from the LTTE) the Sri Lanka
military issued its own photo identification card
which residents are required to carry in addition
to the standard national identity card (NIC).7 In
tandem with such developments, the LTTE also
commanded a significant presence within civilian
institutions in areas it controlled. Two or more
LTTE operatives functioned as grama sevakas
(village administrators) in each village in full
possession of details of all households, etc. by
virtue of their office (Jeyaraj 2007a: 6). What is
evident here is a constitutive characteristic that
Achille Mbembe noted of the post-colony: of a
‘form of government [which] forces features
belonging to the realm of warfare and features
proper to the conduct of civil policy to coexist in a
single dynamic’ (Mbembe 2001: 74).
4 Life and law in the free trade zones
The free trade zones (FTZs) in the south of Sri
Lanka are sites where this particular form of
governance, in which national security and public
policy are sutured into violence, militarised
surveillance and coercion, take on particularly
gendered forms. The FTZs are where many of the
garment factories under Sri Lanka’s Garment
Factory Program (GFP) are situated. The GFP
was inaugurated in 1992 as a response to
unemployment, poverty and male youth unrest
that led to the second JVP insurrection of 1987–9.
Despite its initial objective to provide
employment to rural Sri Lankan male youth,
President R. Premadasa mandated that each
factory should employ 450 women and 50 men
(Lynch 2004: 170).8 Consequently, significant
numbers of rural Sri Lankan women began
working in the semi-urban FTZ garment
factories. Epitomising the feminisation of labour,
enduring oppressive work and living conditions,
which approximate, according to one female
worker, a ‘slave camp’ (Hewamanne and Brow
2001: 21), these women suffer alienation and
social stigma. Commonly referred to as ‘garment
girls’ or juki kello,9 they are accorded diminutives
that refuse to recognise them as members of a
significant political community. Such a politics of
recognition has led to the FTZ women being
constituted primarily as sexualised subjects. In
turn they have elicited public disapproval
amounting to a ‘moral panic’ at the
transformations that have taken place in their
lives as a result of migration from the villages
and their financial independence, etc. The
‘garment girls’ became subjects of derision, and
in the 1990s were the pivot around which taunts
and rejoinders about Sri Lanka’s insertion into a
transnational economy were publicly bandied and
a moral politics on the degradation of young
Sinhala Buddhist women under neoliberalism
launched (Lynch 2007: 91–120, 2004: 113–16).
Attempting to survive the cycle of poverty and
harsh labour, the FTZ women often look to
relationships with army men, popularly referred
to as the ‘army boys’. This diminutive however,
unlike the ‘garment girls’, is a term of affection.
Moreover, as Rana Viru (War Heroes), these
military men are vested with tremendous social
capital that the women do not enjoy. Although
the women contribute in large measure to the
nation’s foreign exchange earnings, because the
men are entrusted with its security during times
of war, they are accorded hyper-recognition in a
militarised public sphere at the expense of the
women whose labour remains unrecognised and
undervalued. This is a gendered hierarchy
endorsed by the military itself, which accepts
that it is the duty of these women to serve and
nurture military men. It is common practice for
military vehicles to drop off male soldiers after
hours at garment factories, positioning garment
factory women as extensions of camp followers.
In turn, the women often look to the military
men and their socioeconomic status as paths
towards their own upward social mobility. Their
gendered insecurity feeds into a paradigm where
the militarised male is looked upon as the
protector and provider of security even as the
women suffer domestic violence, unwanted
pregnancies and rejection at the hands of these
men. These experiences, depicted forcefully in
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Sinhala language films, such as Asoka
Handagama’s Me Mage Sandai (This is My Moon)
(2001), Satyajith Maitipe’s Bora Diya Pokuna
(Scent of the Lotus Pond) (2003) and Inoka
Satyangani’s Sulang Kirilli (Maidens of the Wind)
(2002) provide vivid examples of the fraught
entanglements of security, gender, life and law
within the FTZs.
The women respond to their condition in
complex ways. On the one hand they sport a
subversive deportment that flaunts their
garment factory worker status in the face of
public denigration (Hewamanne 2003: 76–80,
2008a: 179). On the other, they demonstrate
docility and compliance, which affirm their
suitability as marriage partners (Hewamanne
and Brow 2001: 22). Forming relationships with
military men and seeking militarised protection
is also a way in which the FTZ women attempt to
evade the gendered violence and verbal abuse
often directed at them in public. These
relationships with military men reflexively
confer on the women a ‘respectability’ within a
social imaginary that allots value to martial
virtue, patriotism and duty during times of war.
Citing examples of how women workers observed
two minutes of silence on a factory floor for their
brothers and boyfriends in the military, despite
objections from the factory supervisor, trips to
Buddhist temples to invoke blessings on the
army, and their relationships with military men,
these women become in effect ‘good women’ by
offering support to men on the battlefront
(Hewamanne 2008b).
Such a repertoire of activities, including the
strategic use of a legitimising narrative on
patriotism towards an act of resistance on the
factory floor, enables the women to reconcile the
tension between their stigmatised reputations
and dutifulness as citizens in times of war
(Hewamanne 2008b). They endorse a social
imaginary towards a sense of the common good
(Taylor 2004: 23). That this common good is
sutured into militarism, and that the women’s
resistance incorporates forms of desire that
accept the authority of militarisation, illustrate
Saba Mahmood’s argument that in locating
women’s agency, ‘it is important to interrogate
the practical and conceptual conditions under
which different forms of desire emerge, including
desire for submission to recognised authority’
(Mahmood 2005: 15). The popular construction
of FTZ women as sexualised subjects constitutes
such a set of conditions under which militarism
gains value because of its transactional ability to
confer respectability on the FTZ women who
display loyalty to military boyfriends, even if it
means violence and rejection at their hands. The
rejection most often stems from the fact that
while military men are happy to have affairs with
FTZ women, they do not see them as worthy
marriage partners, preferring instead to choose
wives from a pool of women who work as school
teachers and/or public servants and thereby
enjoy social prestige.
The impermanent nature of these relationships
resonates with the sense of alienation and
transience that characterises FTZ life
(Abeysekera 2005: 24–5) Given the conditions of
labour, the FTZ women view the factory work as
temporary.10 Under the constant threat of
summons to the battlefront, mobility also
characterises the sojourn of the army men. But it
is precisely this fluidity and the absence of
familial structures and surveillance of the village
that affords them the opportunity of new
relationships. The women also form close
friendships with other women workers who are
lodged in the same boarding houses, while
camaraderie as a valued principle of a military
corps encourages the army men to develop close
masculine bonds with military colleagues. In a
context where traditional labour unions have
been weakened, alternative ways of organising
labour provided by women’s groups, drop-in
centres and self-awareness/education centres
within the FTZ also encourage the women into
new forms of membership and socialite. Yet,
there also exists a tension between regularity
and provisionality. The very open-endedness of
the outcomes of these collaborations holds forms
of ‘not knowing [which] is where the notion of
uncertainty lies and uncertainty is how risk is
shaped’ (Patel 2007: 103). Exactly how risk,
gendered insecurity and their corollary in
violence are experienced in the ‘everyday’ by
these FTZ women was brought out starkly with
the rape and murder of 22-year-old garment
factory worker Chamila Dissanaike, and its
aftermath.
The Chamila Dissanaika case highlights the
extent of the security dilemma faced by FTZ
women when their personal security has been
eroded by the very public institutions charged
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with safeguarding it. Chamila, who sought
treatment at the Negombo base hospital, the
main public medical facility available to FTZ
women working in the Seeduwa area, was raped
by the doctor she consulted, dragged through a
corridor and flung out of a sixth floor window to
her death. In the aftermath of this crime, a web
of authority functioned to sanction violence
against FTZ women. It was learnt that the doctor
had a history of sexually abusing women to which
the authorities had turned a blind eye
(Jayasinghe 2007). Thereafter a janitor who had
worked for five years at the hospital and had
witnessed the doctor drag Chamila along the
corridor, was dismissed from her job.
This prompted several waves of protest by FTZ
workers. A thousand-strong crowd participated in
a demonstration three days later that was to end
at the hospital but was stopped by the police at
Mal Farm junction (Lankadeepa 2006; Silumina
2006). Following the janitor’s dismissal from her
job, the FTZ and General Services Employees
Union launched a campaign of protest. Her
dismissal not only resonated with job insecurity
as a general condition for women working within
the FTZ, but it was also recognised as a move to
obstruct justice. The doctor, who had been
remanded and had attempted suicide in his cell,
had later been warded at a mental health
institution and deemed unfit for trial. All of this
prompted the FTZ and General Services
Employees Union to call in a letter for a public
demonstration by FTZ women on 8 March 2008,
International Women’s Day, to highlight the
issues of the Chamila case, the public image
(samaja garuthwaya) of FTZ women and their
gendered insecurity (anaarakshithabhavaya). In an
interview with the BBC Sinhala Sandeshaya
service, one of Chamila’s friends linked the
systemic devaluing of FTZ women’s labour and
violence against women and stated bitterly ‘We
are treated like toys. That is why my friend faced
an unfortunate death. Society should take action
to prevent these things happen[ing] to us. We
contribute to [the] Sri Lankan economy and we
deserve better recognition and respect’.11
Despite these waves of anger and protest, the
twin rationalities of globalisation and
militarisation, which animate the FTZs and the
masculinised patriarchies they endorse, work to
rein in the necessary female workforce. But on
what terms is such a potentially volatile
workforce kept in check and secured? To begin
with, the many instances of women’s ‘consent to
patriarchies’ as Kumkum Sangari notes, ‘is often
an effect of the anticipation of violence, or the
guarantee of violence in the last instance – to
ensure obedience, inculcate submission, punish
transgression’ (Sangari 2008: 3, my emphasis).
This enables ‘Patriarchies [to] rest equally on
consent by women, violence against women, and
on legitimating ideologies’ (Sangari 2008: 3).
What are these legitimating ideologies that work
to elicit women’s consent to the status quo even as
they organise against its sanction of gender-
based violence? Foremost is the promise of the
‘good life’ within neoliberal promise, which
depends, to quote Sangari, ‘on both active
consumers and a docile labour force’ (Sangari
2008: 17). And if, as Chandra Mohanty noted,
‘global assembly lines are as much about the
production of people as they are about ‘providing
jobs’ or making profit’ (Mohanty 2003: 141),
then this ‘production of people’ is about shaping
a social imaginary that, within the context of the
Sri Lankan FTZs, entices women into a Faustian
pact with militarism.
5 Militarism and the good life
What are the terms of this bargain? And how
does the state mediate and monitor its contract
imbricating the good life and militarism as two
public goods that in turn conjure a powerful new
social imaginary? If Shakespeare’s Prospero (the
archetype imperialist) provides clues to how the
modern state ‘oscillates’ as Veena Das notes,
‘between a rational mode and a magical mode of
being’ (Das 2006: 162), Achille Mbembe points
to mechanisms such as salary and privilege in a
postcolonial state as ‘gift[s], when examined
closely, allocated for the purpose of
institutionalising a form of domination having its
own rationality’ (Mbembe 2001: 54, my
emphasis). The social and economic capital
enjoyed by military men in Sri Lanka is a direct
effect of such ‘gifts’ or allotments by a state fully
committed to the war effort. Reports that
civilian men pose as military ones to seduce FTZ
women (Pereira and de Silva 2007: 10) highlight
the currency Sri Lankan military men enjoy over
their civilian counterparts. In an economy
characterised by a shrinking public sector, the
expansion of the military complex is the
exception. Salaries within it are attractive. As of
2007, a private in the Sri Lanka army enjoyed a
basic pay of SL Rs12,000/month, rising with
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additional allowances for uniforms, service in the
operational areas, and frontline activities, the
take-home salary is approximately SL
Rs17,000–20,000/month. This is a high salary for
those from rural backgrounds, and importantly, a
steady income, paid to the soldier even if
disabled in war, and to his widow and dependants
if he dies in action. The FTZ women who aspire
to be military wives know that the military
income and the pensionable service they are part
of would give them an economic edge both within
rural and semi-urban social structures. The
promise of the good life becomes attainable, and
loyalty to the military institution becomes
inexorably linked to the means by which the
good life can be attained.
For a cash-strapped government faced with a
huge debt burden as a result of borrowing largely
to finance the war,12 there are other mechanisms
of ‘transfers, reciprocity and obligations’ which it
can dispense towards social control (Mbembe
2001: 75) and the construction of ‘a common
material imaginary’ (Mbembe 2001: 55). The
2006/523 government circular on Admission to
Grade One in government schools which provide
free education is an example. The circular
attracted widespread controversy and provoked a
tussle between the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka,
parliament and the cabinet. It brought into play
the alumni of powerful national schools, the
Lanka Teachers’ Union, educationists, school
administrators and the media. Yet in the contest
over the allotment of points to different
categories – school alumni, professional parents,
residential address, child’s aptitude, etc. – the
maximum of ten points granted to children of
parents in the military was not seriously
questioned either in the petitions to court or the
parliament, and only meagerly so in the media.
Under previous schemes, five seats per class
were held for the children of security personnel
(Hettiarachchi et al. 2007: 1). Awarding ten
points to each eligible military parent meant,
therefore, a dramatic increase in their capacity
to enrol their children in the best national
schools providing free education. The procedures
they had to follow also conferred greater
authority on the defence establishment charged
with vetting and endorsing the applications.
An emerging but already significant social
imaginary in Sri Lanka today has therefore
installed militarism and the good life as two
public goods, twin rationalities that animate
factory floors, privileges and allotments, life and
the law. If a new kind of politics in which the
voice of virtue became central in eighteenth
century European social imaginaries and had
fused self-love with love of country (Taylor 2004:
121), a parallel can be seen in Sri Lanka where
security is currently marketed as a public good,
and martial virtue folds into a promise of the
good life uniting both individual and collective
desire. These combined forces transact, in turn,
acquiescence to gendered violence in sites such
as the FTZs.13
A reordering of Sri Lankan society is therefore
under way, pointing to the entanglement of
militarisation, martial virtue, nationalism,
transnational capital, and gendered violence as
structural features of its social imaginary. The
army’s recent successes have bestowed on it an
unprecedented aura as a successful and
significant agent of a new, emerging Sri Lankan
nationhood. It is likely therefore that in the short
term at least, the army and its strategists will
play a major role in the country’s political sphere
and that its soldiers will continue to enjoy
socioeconomic capital. However, whether the
military will continue in this role is contingent
on many factors, including future LTTE strategy.
For instance, if the war morphs into long-term,
low-level guerrilla skirmishes, this will impact on
the army’s current public profile and growth. By
foregrounding the Sri Lanka military not as a
monolithic but complex institution that has
continuously occupied several identities, this
article has attempted to show that it is a partner
in a far more complex state–military relationship
than the one usually assumed; and that these
identities carry traces which can be called upon
to determine how the current military turn in Sri
Lanka will unfold. At the same time, Sri Lanka’s
insertion into global capital ensures that its
national security regime will continue to protect
transnational capital. A compliant labour force
that is also consumer-oriented is necessary for
the success of this enterprise. At the heart of this
matrix are rural Sri Lankan women who
experience gendered violence, social stigma and
poor working conditions, yet hold to the promise
of a good life which can be secured through and
by the military. Whatever the outcome of Sri
Lanka’s tragic war, these conditions ensure that
‘the public good’ will continue to be maintained
and marketed in military terms.
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Notes
1 Sunday Times, Colombo (6 July 2003),
Observation report by the commanders of the
Sri Lanka army, navy and air force on the
proposed Higher Defence Control Act, p. 11.
2 The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (Peoples’
Liberation Front) comprised of southern Sri
Lankan youth-staged armed insurrections in
1971 and 1987–9.
3 The Federal Party’s call for a satyagraha in
Tamil-dominated areas in 1961 resulted in the
mobilisation of the army in the north and
east, as well as in the tea plantations in the
central hills.
4 One of the responses was the recruitment of a
batch of officers from non-elite Colombo
schools, the majority of Sinhala ethnicity
(SLAC 1999: 163). Today the identity of the
Sri Lanka army is largely Sinhala.
5 The return to barracks during the 2002–4
ceasefire was resented by some factions within
the military. The attitude of disabled soldiers
who voiced bitterness at how their sacrifices
had been in vain, marks this mood (de Mel
2007: 144–5) Yet despite such disgruntlement,
the military leadership bowed to civilian
authority with regard to the ceasefire.
6 An official ceremony to celebrate this event
was held at Independence Square on 19 July
2007 at which the military chiefs handed over
a scroll (thombu) to the President, reminiscent
of the ceremonies held by Sinhala kings when
territory had been conquered.
7 In Jaffna, regular roundups by the security
forces take place of people aged 17–30 and
their NICs are removed. These young people
are then instructed to collect their NICs at
the nearby camp where they undergo
interrogation and repeated scrutiny (Mustaffa
2007: 8).
8 This policy reversal points to how women’s
labour is ‘the easiest to cheapen’ (Enloe 1989:
159).
9 Juki is the brand of a sewing machine. In the
Sinhala language, kello means girls.
10 The women rarely work for more than five
years in any given FTZ after which they
return to their villages (Hewamanne and
Brow 2001: 22) or migrate internally
elsewhere following marriage.
11 www.bbc.co.uk/sinhala/news/story/2007/11/
071125_woman.shtml (accessed 11 March
2008).
12 The Sri Lanka government entered into a
controversial US$500 million bond issue in the
open market to shore up the country’s foreign
exchange reserves and finance the war.
Economists have warned of a massive debt
burden which peaked to SL Rs3,016 billion in
November 2007, a sum higher than the
national income in 2006 (Nation on Sunday
2008).
13 A parallel took place in LTTE-controlled
areas where the LTTE marriage bureau
arranged marriages among its cadre to
reproduce a militarised group imaginary.
These marriages were buttressed by special
entitlements that amounted ‘almost [to] the
creation of a special caste of persons’ (Samuel,
in press). Recently however, requiring cadre
for fighting, the LTTE declared a moratorium
on marriages until 40 years of age for men
and 35 years for women (Jeyaraj 2007b).
During its June 2006 recruitment drive it also
annulled marriages already contracted by
Tamil villagers to evade conscription (Jeyaraj
2007b). By doing so, the LTTE chose to install
its own juridical terms, overriding religious
rites and civil law.
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No, you keep quiet because you’re afraid, right? For
fear of things because you have kids and they are out
and about, they go to the [football] pitch to play [...]
My son goes to work at night and you know that you
can’t, well, for fear that they might do something to
your [loved ones], you know? So even though, erm, you
know things, no one speaks about it because the truth
is that with those men, well, you are afraid because
they don’t mess around before they hurt your family.
That’s the type of fear that comes from speaking about
things, so although you know what’s going on, you say
nothing because you are afraid.
Anon. woman, Soyapango, 2002
In the above quote, an inhabitant of a low-
income community on the outskirts of El
Salvador’s capital city, San Salvador, uncovers
some of the tensions in speaking about violence
in her locality. Her words indicate how silence is
both productive of and symptomatic of the fear
and ever-present threat of violence. All research
on violence is informed by silences, whether this
is discussed explicitly or not. In practical terms,
an immediate reading of silence may be that it
presents an obstacle for the researcher who is
dependent on people who are willing to speak
out. Such a reading positions silence as
restricting knowledge about violence and actively
undermining efforts to challenge it. While this is
certainly the case, a less obvious, but no less
pertinent, interpretation of silence is that its
presence is central to what we know about
violence. Rather than an obstacle to be
surmounted, silence can be a useful starting
point from which to generate critical
perspectives on and, therefore, challenge
normative understandings of violence that
appear as unquestionable truths.
Reflecting on two periods of research in El
Salvador,1 I argue that a critical analysis of
violence should confront directly the effects of
silence and silencing. Informed by central
questions of feminism, I explore this issue in
three ways. First, I address how institutions
undermine not only what we (can) know about
violence, but also responses to it. Second, I
explore how men deflect attention away from
their use of violence by invoking widely accepted
excuses and blaming women. This takes us to the
final point which argues that as long as men and
masculinities remain ignored in most analyses of
violence, our knowledge remains limited, and
normative understandings of violence that fail to
uncritically unpack and problematise its
masculinised dimensions are privileged. In other
words, it becomes so conventional to speak about
(public) violence in terms of murderers, gang
members and so on, that the gendered character
of the violence merits no scrutiny and is not
subject to research. Before I engage in this
analysis, I will offer a brief overview of my
Researching the Gendered Silences of
Violence in El Salvador
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Abstract All research on violence is informed by silences. In practical terms, an immediate reading of silence
may be that it presents an obstacle for the researcher who is dependent on people who are willing to speak
out. Another interpretation of silence is that its presence is central to what we know about violence. Silence
and the invisibility of gender in mainstream analyses of violence are closely connected. This article reflects on
research in El Salvador, arguing that a critical analysis of violence should directly confront the effects of
silence and silencing, particularly as they concern violence against women, which is often separated from ‘real’
violence. It discusses the excuses and localised rationales that work to silence women’s experiences of abuse.
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approach to the research and introduce some
reflections on my understanding of silence.
1 Situating a feminist analysis of silence in El
Salvador
El Salvador underwent a brutal civil war from
1980 to 1992 and its peace remains characterised
by violence and insecurity. Despite much
international focus on the country as a positive
example of negotiated resolution of armed
conflict, the dividends of ‘peace’ in El Salvador
have been largely ‘negative’ for the country’s
poor, since little attention has been paid to
addressing structural inequalities and poverty
(Pearce 1998). Since the cessation of the war, the
country continues to demonstrate one of the
highest rates of violent crime in the world
(FESPAD 2008). Less visible are the high levels
of violence in the home that predominantly
affect women and children. There are little
reliable data about domestic abuse and sexual
crimes, which are characterised by silence and
under-reporting. In effect, a separation of
violence between public and private spheres
renders such violence a public secret. People
know it exists, even expect it and accept it. Yet,
it is rarely singled out for attention in wider
debates on citizen security (Hume 2004), with
public discussion limited to the women’s
movement and international organisations.
It is precisely the invisibility of gender in
mainstream analyses of violence – both popular
and academic – that shaped my research
questions. I worked for a Salvadoran feminist
NGO from 1997 until 2000, and witnessing the
struggles of women in confronting violence in
their public and private lives inspired my
research questions. Living in El Salvador, it is
impossible to escape the everyday panic about
issues of security. People speak about crime
constantly and often have a story to tell about
personal experiences or those of family members
and friends. Caldeira (2000: 19-20) argues that
‘talk of crime’ produces particular
understandings of crime that both reproduce and
magnify actual problems. Much of it is implicitly
about certain types of crime by certain types of
people, reinforcing normative and highly
discriminatory understandings of violence. It is
almost exclusively about crimes that take place
in the public sphere. The more I listened to the
stories of my research participants, the more
aware I became of the complex and often
conflicting ways in which people spoke about
different types of violence in their daily lives. I
also became aware of what people did not say
and how humour, tears and silence combine in
the stories people tell about violence. Listening
critically to these discursive practices awakened
me to different meanings of violence, and alerted
me to the importance of local and euphemistic
vocabularies. The exaggeration of specific acts of
violence was often juxtaposed with the
minimisation of certain behaviours. The degree
of harm seemed in many instances to be
incidental to the interpretation offered. In the
noise about violence and crime, certain versions
dominate, leaving little room for alternative
stories. The effect of this is to silence marginal
voices, such as women, the poor and young
people who struggle to find a space to articulate
their fears and concerns.
It is against the silencing of particular voices that
feminism, post-colonialism and subaltern studies
have emerged. These critical research approaches
confront the effects of silencing on the way
knowledge is produced. Addressing the silencing
of women’s experiences has been a unifying
concern for feminists for decades (Aretxaga
1997).2 Widely understood as research ‘on
women, for women’, feminist research has always
engaged with and problematised issues of male
power and violence. Feminist activists and
scholars have campaigned on the importance of
naming violence and uncovering its ‘hidden’
dimensions (Kelly and Radford 1990; Kelly 1988).
A central task of this feminist project has been to
explode the widely held ‘silences’ that both
inform and limit what we know about violence. It
follows, therefore, that it is an essential task for
the committed researcher to ‘listen’ out and think
about these in a critical manner. In this vein, I
argue here that silence should be understood not
just in terms of what is not said but also in terms
of how people speak about violence and what they
are ‘allowed’ to say (Foucault 1980: 27).
2 The limits of public knowledge and response:
silencing gender
Accessing basic data on violence is a challenge.
Accessing data that are disaggregated by gender
is even more so. Although both access and quality
have improved, data collection on violence is
inadequate and different state bodies maintain
contradictory databases for each crime (Cruz et
al. 1999). Although I have found accessing public
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registers more straightforward today than even
five years ago,3 it remains a challenge to find local
or gender-disaggregated data. Accessing basic
information is difficult from outside state bodies,
but even the sharing of information between
agencies cannot be taken for granted. One civil
servant spoke of ‘institutional jealousy’ with
regard to the sharing of statistics (Interview,
October 2007). As in other contexts, the silencing
and manipulation of data on violence also serves
the political purpose of justifying or limiting
certain policy initiatives (Shrader 2001).
Important information is collected at the
moment of recording details of a violent
incident, but mechanisms to transfer data from
local to national levels tend to aggregate basic
data on age and gender at the local level, thus
losing important details for analysis. For
example, Oxfam America (2007) show that
information on the sex of the victim in rape
cases is often recorded as ‘unknown’. This gap
hides important gender dynamics of certain
types of violence, and it also contributes to
misinformation on the scale of non-lethal
violence. Jackson (2006) suggests that research
on gender issues is often required to present
more evidence than ‘mainstream’ research. If
even the most basic evidence is difficult to come
by, this makes the task of analysing the gendered
dynamics of violence all the more difficult.
Linked to this is the huge problem of under-
reporting of crimes, especially gendered violence.
Lack of information about rights and processes,
misinformation or indeed partisan politics at a
local institutional level can have a deterrent
effect on citizens reporting violence. One man in
Soyapango suggested that for a poor person to
report a crime was as futile an exercise as
‘throwing salt into the sea’ (February 2002). A
group of women in San Marcos suggest that state
agencies are highly partisan, and the degree of
attention you receive depends largely on who you
know. Even officials acknowledged that it was
important to ‘recommend’ women to other
institutions in order for them to be treated well
(Interviews, October and December 2007).
Important here is the perception. The perceived
association of personal or party political
connections with state agencies silences
attempts to access services. In turn, this risks
undermining attempts between state and civil
society groups to forge pathways out of violence.
Another important obstacle to addressing
violence against women is the high level of
institutionalised patriarchy that serves to
reinforce male impunity. In a focus group in San
Marcos (October 2007), women suggested that
they face a double threat. Police invoke
patriarchal notions of the ‘ideal-type’ family to
dissuade women from pressing charges against
the ‘father of your children’. In return, men
‘punish’ women for speaking out:
You call the police but all the police do is say ‘so
Missus, your husband hit you then? But he’s your
husband, the father of your children, are you going to
leave your kids without a father? No? OK then,
forgive him and let him in’.
Is that what the police say?
Yes, and the husband says: ‘Why did you put the cops
on me?’ and beats her up again. That’s the reality; he
hits us and we can’t do anything about it.
This vignette exposes how levels of institutional
collusion with men actively limit the options
available to women. In order to speak out and to
challenge these normative, gendered frameworks,
women must feel safe. Despite local authorities’
legal remit, the fact that women perceive them as
protective of male privilege actively dissuades
women from speaking out and seeking justice. The
context of wider violence means that local
authorities are overwhelmed, under-resourced and
unable to cope with the levels of violence in society.
A group of women from Soyapango, interviewed in
March 2002, indicated that they would not
intervene in cases of violence in the home for fear
of what might happen to them: ‘We are afraid to
call the police because they might see you and
thump you’. When I asked a group of women in
San Marcos in October 2007 how they respond in
cases of violence against women, they replied:
Advise her, give her advice [on what to do].
Advise her? Anything else?
See if the institutions ... orient her, help her.
And if she is a member of your family?
Support her, accompany her too.
And if she is a neighbour?
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See what you can do for her; take her to an institution
that can help her.
So the community gets involved if there is a case
of domestic abuse, everyone realises it is
happening?
First you call the police, and then you help her.
One of the most basic lessons of social research
is that respondents often offer researchers the
answers they think they want to hear, rather
than what corresponds to usual practice. The
conversation continues:
I have a question, is that what you actually do or
is that what you should do?
That is what you should do.
What do you actually do?
The opposite.
And what is the opposite?
You keep quiet.
And why do you keep quiet?
Because of fear, because of shyness, because we don’t
know that we can help. All of this is because of the
lack of trust in the authorities. That is why the
battered pregnant woman has to take the first step
and not us because if not, we get ourselves in big
trouble and they are fine. It’s just as the saying goes:
between family and a married couple, you don’t get
involved.
There was a clear distinction between what these
women perceive as the ‘correct’ response and
what is actually done in practice. The underlying
issue here is the perceived privacy of family life,
unfortunately summed up in the popular phrase
cited above. Prevailing gendered norms and
attitudes have negative implications for both
raising awareness of the problem and its
prevention. This not only silences women’s
claims to citizenship but closes down a deeper
analysis of the problem that transcends the
public/private divide. Speaking out risks getting
into ‘trouble’ and shifts responsibility from
perpetrator to victim. It is to issues of
responsibility and blame that I now turn.
3 Blame and responsibility
It is not unusual in accounts of violence for
narrators to look for someone to ‘blame’.
Apportioning blame can help make sense of
violence, but also works to silence questions of
responsibility and accountability. In defence of
their own actions, men repeatedly pointed to
their mothers as the figures that ‘taught’ them
how to be men. Many of the interviewees’ fathers
were absent or themselves abusive. In interviews
with men, they often referred to women’s
violence and its role in reproducing machismo. I
was concerned that this not only silenced
women’s experiences and interpretations of
violence, but that it invoked a partial reading of
the problem. While talking informally to a group
of men in El Boulevar, they stated that violence
against men was more of a problem than
violence against women in the community:
‘Here, the women are terrible’, they laughed.
Although a flippant remark, the sentiment
implicit in the statement caused me to reflect
upon how I was approaching the research. After
an initial concern with masculinities, I realised
that I needed to speak to women in order to
achieve a more comprehensive (and critical)
analysis. Scheper-Hughes (1995: 411) argues that
there is ‘little virtue to fake neutrality in the face
of the broad political and moral dramas of life
and death’. While this may be more an obvious
concern in situations of political conflict, it
presents a challenge to all research on violence.
It is in this vein that Liebling (2001: 428)
reminds us that violence talk is a ‘constant form
of moral discourse’ and researchers make
judgements. The process of ‘judging’ violence is
far from straightforward and highly subjective,
engaging with issues such as rapport, the
researcher’s own biography and how well the
interviewee presents his/her rationale.
Elsewhere, I have argued that researchers should
not situate themselves outside the process of
judgement, but should challenge their own
feelings and emotions with regards to the
research process (Hume 2007a). We must, as
Robben (1995) warns, be aware of the pull of
‘anthropological seduction’ when research
participants try to convince us of their
‘rightness’. Apportioning blame to women is not
incidental. It is suggestive of a tendency among
certain groups to blame others in order to deflect
attention from their own use of violence and
promote their own rationales. In the case of
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violence against women, it is also indicative of
social attitudes that trivialise the problem and
silence women’s own experiences and
interpretations. Attitudes that hold women
responsible for violence continue to have
currency among younger generations. One boy in
a school in Soyapango commented in May 2002:
In the whole country there have been a lot of rapes ...
even of men, even men are raped and [men] look at
women all provocative like because women even wear
mini skirts and you can see almost everything and
that tempts the man and he goes and f...cks her and
worse if he is drunk or on drugs, he grabs her more.
Within this logic, women are to blame because of
their dress. Men invoke a range of such strategies
to justify and excuse their behaviour. Research
that fails to explicitly challenge such attitudes
risks reaffirming male power. Cavanagh et al.
(2001: 695) speak of the ‘exculpatory and
expiatory discourses’ that dominate men’s
narratives of violence. Central to such narratives
is the two-fold objective of ‘mitigating and
obfuscating culpability while at the same time
seeking forgiveness and absolution’. Many
interviewees made a distinction between the ‘odd
slap’ and repeated abuse. Key to men’s narratives
was that they were not the worst. There was
usually a case they knew about: a neighbour or
friend whose use of violence was more severe.
Although some men spoke of the physical and
psychological violence they had used, this was
often minimised by language – ‘problems at
home’ – or by seeking to explain their behaviour
due to the influence of drugs, alcohol or
provocation. An important criticism of feminist
research on violence is that men impose their
own definitions of violence in order to neutralise
or minimise women’s experience of abuse.
Research on women has also highlighted that
they too tend to minimise their own subjections
to abuse (Kelly and Radford 1990).
As researchers, we must be alert to the power of
localised interpretations and be wary of the
hegemony of normative explanations. A woman
recounts her neighbours’ experiences:
Since I have been living here, I know of about three
women ... It usually happened because the husband
drank. When he came home drunk, he would start to
beat her; he threatened her with a machete. I remember
one December one of my neighbours came here because
he came home about 10 at night. She arrived all
bruised because her husband had been hitting her and
my mother had her stay here.
(Anon. woman, San Marcos, December 2008)
None of these women reported the abuse to the
authorities. It is a challenge for the researcher,
then, to separate issues of blame from issues of
cause. It is also essential to challenge the widely
accepted ‘myths’ of violence: the normative
understandings of violence that people believe to
be true (Hume 2008). It is not uncommon for
violence against women to be associated directly
with the consumption of alcohol and many men
and women in the communities blame
alcoholism for violence against women and
children. The focus on men’s drinking, while
clearly a problem, obscures the fact that many
men use violence without the ‘mitigating’ effects
of alcohol or drugs (Cavanagh et al. 2001).
Research shows that out of a total of 361 men
who were reported to the authorities, 220 were in
a ‘normal’ condition when they committed
violence and 122 had been drinking (Oxfam
America 2007: 11). By naming drinking as the
cause, alcohol rather than violence becomes the
problem. This has particular ramifications for
developing strategies to move beyond violence. It
also silences the violence embedded in gender
relations that marks the experience of many
women. Missing from these stories of violence is
a critical analysis of men.
4 Missing men: whose voice counts?
During my research, I was struck by the
apparent routinisation of violence within the
family compared with what policymakers often
think of as ‘real’ violence in the streets.
Respondents repeatedly assessed violence
against women and children as ‘normal’.
Although the scale and degree of abuse within
families is an obvious area for concern, I found
its apparent ‘normality’ even more disturbing.
This is more than a linguistic nuance. The
positioning of public violences as separate and
different has implications for policy.
Feminists have challenged this arbitrary
separation between ‘real’ violence and violence
against women (Stanko 1990). The struggle to
have domestic abuse and sexual crimes
recognised and legislated against has been a
central struggle of feminism, yet there is still an
implicit minimisation of the effects of such
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violence in relation to its more ‘public’ forms.
The gendered dynamics of ‘real’ violence are
rarely considered in policy debates. Instead,
domestic abuse is popularly regarded as ‘private’
and a problem to be resolved within the context
of the family, while the gendered aspects of
violence between men is rarely singled out for
critical attention.
As in most contexts, in El Salvador it is young
men who dominate in statistics of both
perpetrators and victims of violence and crime. In
the ‘talk’ of violence, most people seemed to
agree that young male gang members were the
key protagonists in El Salvador’s post-war
violence wave (Hume 2007b). Their masculinity
and the gendered dimensions of these crimes are
rarely problematised, except in specific studies of
masculinities (Hearn 1998). While it may be
mentioned in passing that youth gangs are
predominately made up of young men, this
gendered aspect of gang violence is seldom
considered worthy of emphasis or analysis (Hume
2007c). Ignoring that men predominate as ‘doers’
of violence, and also as its principal victims,
silences the critical analysis of men’s power in
relation to women and other men (Hearn 1998).
Throughout the research, men and women alike
emphasised that the use and experience of
violence appears bound up with dominant
notions of what it means to be a man (Hume
2004). Women in a focus group made direct
linkages between machismo and violence:
It results in violence against women. Because of their
machismo, men think that you can’t disrespect them,
they lift us up, they push us about, they beat us, and it
is all because of their machismo.
(Anon. woman, Ahuachapan, December 2007)
In general terms, all men (and women)
interviewed agreed that violence against women
was widespread in their neighbourhoods: ‘it is
rare the home that is not affected by it’ (Focus
group, Soyapango, March 2002). This exposes an
interesting tension. Domestic abuse is not strictly
invisible, but it is regarded as private. It is not
silent, but silenced. This distinction is important.
Most of the women I spoke to testified to having
been subjected to violence at the hands of their
current or previous partners. One elderly woman
in a focus group in Soyapango, declared: ‘I no
longer have the problem of a husband. He’s
dead’. This sentiment was shared by other women
whom I interviewed, who also no longer had the
‘husband problem’. The routinisation of violence
can become so entrenched in everyday relations,
it is almost expected as an inevitable and
culturally sanctioned element of growing up or
being a woman. This provokes a different type of
silence to simply not speaking about an issue.
Women are expected not to make a fuss. As one
woman emphasised, ‘it is the simple fact of being
a woman’.
It is important to challenge how different
silences that surround violence are reinforced by
political and social structures. Many women are
subjected to violence on a daily basis from their
fathers, brothers and husbands, not to mention
wider society. The degree of violence women are
subjected to, however, is not universal. For some,
it was part of systematic physical and
psychological abuse at the hands of partners,
whereas others mentioned specific episodes of
physical violence. Despite important changes in
legislation, women are still expected to ‘keep the
peace’ with regard to men’s use of violence. This
is not to say that attitudes are not changing, with
more women reporting violence, but challenges
remain. The real power of silences lies in the way
they naturalise particular understandings of
violence that privilege certain groups. The
separation of public and private expressions and
the disinterest in violence’s gendered dynamics
not only obscures important characteristics of
violence, but silences a deeper analysis of the
problem.
5 Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that it is necessary
to foreground the issue of silence as an integral
part of research on violence. Silence is more than
what is not said about violence. It is also how
violence is talked about and the masculinist
norms that inform ‘violence talk’. I have
addressed overlapping issues in this article: the
arbitrary separation of violence against women
from consideration of ‘real’ violence; the gaps in
our knowledge of violence and the excuses and
localised rationales that work to silence and
indeed justify women’s experiences of abuse.
Central to this has been a critical appraisal of
men’s role in reproducing violence.
In this sense, addressing silence becomes not just
a challenge to research but also the scaffolding
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on which knowledge is constructed. Many
initiatives that work to end violence against
women address precisely the challenge of
breaking the silence. Unless we move towards a
more critical analysis of silence as
multidimensional, meaningful and more than
just what is not said, our knowledge and actions
will always be partial.
Notes
1 The first period of fieldwork was doctoral
research that addressed violence and gender
in two low-income communities in Greater
San Salvador, while the second project refers
to research carried out in conjunction with
Oxfam America on women’s perceptions of
responses to gendered violence in San Marcos
and Ahuachapan.
2 I am not suggesting here that there is a
singular feminism; much debate has gone into
highlighting the range of feminist
perspectives. For recent critiques, see Jackson
(2006) and Stanley and Wise (2000).
3 The United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP) has a programme on challenging
violence and they maintain a website of
research on issues of crime and violence at:
www.violenciaelsalvador.org.sv and the
Central American Observatory on violence
contains state statistics for different types of
crime, at: www.ocavi.com
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1 Introduction
The analysis of violence from an individual or
household perspective is arguably one of the
most challenging research areas in social science.
Outbreaks of violence affect the core of human
relations and social norms, disrupting
livelihoods, socioeconomic security, health and
the formation of group interactions and social
networks. They occur in non-linear cycles, where
times of violence and peace do not necessarily
represent opposite ends of a continuum, but
rather co-exist – often simultaneously – in
different degrees of intensity and at different
levels of social interaction within the family, the
community or the state. This complexity cannot
evidently be restricted to the boundaries of one
social science discipline or method of analysis.
This article reflects on an innovative
methodology adopted by the Violence,
Participation and Citizenship (VPC) group of the
Development Research Centre on Citizenship,
Participation and Accountability1 to capture the
experience of living with violence in
communities in Brazil, Jamaica, Mexico and
Nigeria that made use of quantitative methods of
analysis implemented within qualitative research
processes.2 This methodology has confronted
different disciplinary boundaries by encouraging
close dialogue between quantitative and
qualitative researchers in violent settings, and
creating processes for learning and sharing. The
novel aspect was to implement the quantitative
instruments within the qualitative process and
not as a parallel methodology. This article
describes the methodology used, presents the
main results of the quantitative analysis and
reflects on the challenges and lessons presented
by the methodology employed in the different
case studies.
2 Methodological approach
Some of the most relevant insights into why
individuals and groups engage in violence and
the processes that lead to the onset of violence
have been gained from localised qualitative
research undertaken by sociologists,
psychologists and anthropologists (Chatterji and
Mehta 2007; Hume 2007; Jaffrelot 1996; Moser
and McIlwaine 1999 and 2004; Pearce 1986).
Their work relies on contextualised studies and
qualitative information gathered through
participatory and ethnographic methods.
Quantitative analyses of the causes and
consequences of violence at the individual and
household levels have only started to emerge
recently due to improvements in the availability
Quantitative Methods in Contexts of
Everyday Violence
Patricia Justino, Jennifer Leavy and Elsa Valli
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and collection of systematic and comparable
micro-level datasets (Justino 2008). However,
with the exception of recent research on civil
wars (Kalyvas 2007; Petersen 2001; Weinstein
2007; Wood 2006) and urban violence (Moser
and McIlwaine 2004), few studies combine large
quantitative surveys and qualitative methods of
analysis to research the outbreak, consequences
and processes of violence at the micro-level. This
absence is due to the difficulty in applying
traditional methods of micro-level quantitative
analysis in violent contexts, notably the
implementation of quantitative surveys based on
random samples of individuals, households and
communities (Justino 2009).
People involved in forms of violence and conflict
are either averse to answering questions related
to their experiences – for fear of retaliation,
particularly among interpretation, or reluctance
in reviving painful memories – or will try to use
the research process itself to advance their
causes.3 In addition, both perpetrators and
victims of violence tend to hide and change their
identities, making the tracing of social and
political transformations difficult (Belousov et al.
2007; Justino 2009; Lee and Renzetti 1990).
Outbreaks of violence destroy documents and
infrastructure, displacement is frequent and
often not registered, making it difficult to follow
households into new locations. Researchers and
subjects of research in contexts of violence often
face considerable security problems and ethical
challenges (Justino 2009; Wood 2006). The use of
standard survey methods in large samples of
individuals and households may therefore result
in high non-response rates or inaccurate
answers, as answers to more sensitive questions
depend on the establishment of strong bonds of
trust between interviewee and interviewer,
something for which traditional survey methods
may not allow space, time or resources. In
addition, random sampling of representative
individuals or households in conflict contexts is
often difficult as conflict events tend to be highly
clustered geographically and among certain
types of individuals.
This project attempted to address some of these
shortcomings by bringing together aspects of
quantitative and qualitative methods that
complement each other in the design of the
research process, and the collection and analysis
of the information. This article reflects on some
of the quantitative results obtained thus far. The
team of researchers employed qualitative
methods typically used in in-depth studies of
conflict contexts, to apply a questionnaire. This
was designed to capture quantitatively
fundamental aspects of violence and links
between communal living and socioeconomic
welfare at the individual level across a sample of
646 people in four distinct communities (229
respondents in Brazil, 187 respondents in
Jamaica, 85 respondents in Mexico and 145
respondents in Nigeria). The questionnaires
were implemented within the qualitative process
itself, having first been discussed among the
research participants and then implemented
within the various communities, in some cases by
the very same participants (Cortez Ruiz, this IDS
Bulletin). Baseline data were collected on
individuals, households and communities being
researched by the VPC teams in Brazil, Jamaica,
Mexico and Nigeria, using questionnaires
containing a mixture of open and closed
questions, adapted to the local context and to
the particular focus of the study in question.
The main objective of the questionnaire was to
build a database that was comparable between
the various case studies. A ‘master’
questionnaire was adapted by the field
researchers for the local context. This gives us a
mix of information on violence comparable
across countries where the same questions were
asked everywhere, as well as data that are
context-specific. In particular, the Jamaican data
is heavily context-specific due to the child-
focused nature of the research (Moncrieffe, this
IDS Bulletin).
The questionnaire contains several modules.
Modules A-D refer to key socioeconomic
characteristics of individuals and households,
module E includes information on community-
level variables and module F contains
information on violence across space and time. A
particular emphasis of Module F was on
establishing ways of capturing quantitatively
notions of chronic violence at the micro-level in
each of the communities where research has
taken place. We analyse these results in more
detail in the next section.
The questionnaire was implemented using two
different sampling methods, both largely
purposive. In Brazil, Jamaica and Mexico, the
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questionnaire respondents were part of the
qualitative component of the project. This was to
enable us to link directly the quantitative
analysis and the results of the qualitative
research at a later date. In order to increase the
sample size, participants in the qualitative part
of the research in Brazil and Mexico were asked
to nominate other community members to
answer the questionnaire. In Nigeria, the
research team chose to select individuals from
the local community where research took place,
but who were not necessarily part of the
qualitative research. None of the samples chosen
was representative of their community, region or
country. In order to facilitate trust among those
being interviewed, interviewers were mainly
members of the community. In the Jamaica case,
the interviewers and interviewees were children.
Table 1 shows gender and age distributions of
respondents across the four countries.
3 Perceptions of violence in four communities
The experimental design of the research itself,
not least the combining of quantitative and
qualitative methods, presented many challenges,
and lessons from the research process make a
valuable contribution to micro-level research on
violence. Unsurprisingly, our greatest challenge
was the presence of missing values, due to
respondents electing not to respond to particular
questions or sections of the questionnaire. This
was for reasons of security, fear and reluctance in
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Table 1 Gender and age distribution of respondents
Brazil Mexico Nigeria Jamaica
Gender
Male 97 (42.4%) 39 (45.9%) 83 (57.2%) 82 (43.9%)
Female 131 (57.2%) 37 (43.5%) 36 (24.8%) 99 (52.9%)
Missing data 1 (0.4%) 9 (10.6%) 26 (17.9%) 6 (3.2%)
Age
Young (up to 30) 93 (40.6%) 21 (24.7%) 45 (31%)
Adult (30–50) 67 (29.4%) 37 (43.5%) 67 (46.2%)
Old (over 51) 62 (27.1%) 8 (9.4%) 32 (22.1%)
Missing data 7 (3.1%) 19 (22.4%) 1 (0.7%)
Table 2 Community relationships and unsafe places
Brazil Mexico Nigeria
Do you have good relationships with other community members?
Yes 221 (96.5%) 49 (57.7%) 126 (87%)
No 7 (3.1%) 5 (5.9%) 15 (10.3%)
Missing data 1 (0.4%) 31 (36.5%) 4 (2.8%)
Have you ever had any quarrels/disagreements with other community members?*
Yes 50 (21.8%) 31 (36.5%) 33 (22.8%)
No 177 (77.3%) 39 (45.9%) 108 (74.8%)
Missing data 2 (0.9%) 15 (17.7%) 4 (2.8%)
Are there any places in the community where you feel unsafe?
Yes 86 (37.6%) 24 (28.2%) 54 (37.2%)
No 138 (60.3%) 4 (4.7%) 79 (54.5%)
Missing data 5 (2.2%) 57 (67.1%) 12 (8.3%)
Total 229 85 145
* For Mexico this question is slightly different: ‘Are there places in the community where there are problems of
violence?’
revisiting traumatic events. Nonetheless, the
response rate was relatively high (see Tables
2–8), giving us a rich dataset that provides
valuable insights into experiences of living with
violence in the study communities.
One of the most notable findings, shown in
Table 2, is the fact that in general, respondents
across the four communities felt they have good
relations with their neighbours and other
community members. This is not to say that
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Table 3 School relationships and unsafe places
Jamaica
Do you have friends at school?
Yes 181 (96.8%)
No 3 (1.6%)
Missing data 3 (1.6%)
Do you feel safe at school?
Yes 82 (43.9%)
Not all the time, but generally 69 (36.9%)
No 32 (17.1%)
Missing data 4 (2.1%)
Do you feel safe in your community?*
Yes 90 (48.1%)
Not all the time, but generally 36 (19.3%)
No (or rarely) 31 (16.6%)
Missing data 30 (16%)
Total 187
*We added the category ‘Rarely’ (only 3 answers) to the category ‘No’ (28 answers).
Table 4 Episodes of violence in the community
Brazil Mexico Nigeria
Do you remember at least one episode of violence?
Yes 158 (69%) 37 (43.5%) 138 (95.2%)
No 41 (17.9%) 4 (4.7%) 7 (4.8%)
Missing data 30 (13.1%) 44 (51.8%) 0
Were you affected by that episode of violence/conflict?
Yes 110 (48%) 16 (18.8%) 53 (36.6%)
No 27 (11.8%) 33 (38.8%) 84 (57.9%)
Missing data 92 (40.2%) 36 (42.4%) 8 (5.5%)
Do you think violence is a problem in your community?1
Yes 105 (45.9%) 47 (55.3%) 70 (48.3%)2
No 116 (50.7%) 11 (12.9%) 49 (33.8%)
Missing data 8 (3.5%) 27 (31.8%) 26 (17.9%)
Total 229 85 145
1  For Mexico the possible answers were ‘no, sometimes, often, always’. We grouped ‘sometimes, often and always’ in
the groups ‘yes’. For Nigeria, the question is qualitative, not like the others which require a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer, asking
‘How much of a problem is violence in this community?’
2  In this case, we considered as ‘No’ all the answers of ‘not much of a problem’ or ‘not any more’. This variable is
based on our personal interpretation of the answers, as in some cases we had to make decisions about whether to
consider the answer a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. Many of those interviewed answer ‘not any more’ or ‘less than before’ so it is
not always easy to understand whether violence is still a problem (or is just less than in the past) or if it is not a
problem any more.
violence is not felt acutely by people or that
community relations are not affected by
outbreaks of violence. In line with other studies
(Lederman et al. 1999; Colletta and Cullen 2000;
Chatterji and Mehta 2007), we found that social
cohesion is negatively affected by violence:
people feel unsafe in many areas of the
community and perceive violence to be a real
problem in their daily lives. But our strongest
finding is that in general people seem to draw
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Table 5 Children’s attitudes towards and involvement in violence – Jamaica
Yes No Missing data
Do you think that it is sometimes necessary to be violent? 57 (30.5%) 96 (51.3%) 34 (18.2%)
Has anyone who lives in your house been a victim of violence? 56 (30%) 99 (52.9%) 31 (17.1%)
Has any member of your family died as a result of violence? 50 (26.7%) 107 (57.2%) 30 (16%)
Have any of your close friends died as a result of violence? 48 (25.7%) 109 (58.3%) 30 (16%)
Have you ever been involved in a fight? 93 (49.7%) 63 (33.7%) 31 (16.6%)
– with a weapon 26 (13.9%)
– without a weapon 67 (35.8%)
Table 6 Violence in Nigerian communities, by region and religious affiliation 
Total Region Religion
Kaduna Kano Plateau Muslim Christian
Have you been affected by episodes of violence?
Yes 53 (36.6%) 24 (52.2%) 8 (16%) 21 (42.9%) 22 (28.6%) 30 (44.8%)
No 84 (57.9%) 19 (41.3%) 37 (74%) 28 (57.1%) 50 (64.9%) 34 (50.7%)
Missing data 8 (5.5%) 3 (6.5%) 5 (10%) 0 5 (6.5%) 3 (4.5%)
Were you directly affected?
Yes 43 (29.7%) 22 (47.8%) 5 (10%) 16 (32.7%) 17 (22.1%) 25 (37.3%)
No 81 (55.9%) 22 (47.8%) 26 (52%) 33 (67.4%) 49 (63.6%) 32 (47.8%)
Missing data 21 (14.5%) 2 (4.4%) 19 (38%) 0 11 (14.3%) 10 (14.9%)
Were you injured due to the violent events?
Yes 9 (6.2%) 3 (6.5%) 1 (2%) 5 (10.2%) 3 (3.9%) 6 (9%)
No 106 (73.1%) 37 (80.4%) 25 (50%) 44 (89.8%) 57 (74%) 48 (71.6%)
Missing data 30 (20.7%) 6 (13%) 24 (48%) 0 17 (22.1%) 13 (19.4%)
Did you lose any work/earnings/assets due to the violent events?
Yes 55 (37.9%) 24 (52.2%) 7 (14%) 24 (49%) 25 (32.5%) 29 (43.3%)
No 34 (23.5%) 6 (13%) 5 (10%) 23 (46.9%) 20 (26%) 14 (20.9%)
Missing data 56 (38.6%) 16 (34.8%) 38 (76%) 2 (4.1%) 32 (41.6%) 24 (35.8%)
Has any member of your household been directly involved in any other type of violent event?
Yes 33 (22.8%) 16 (34.8%) 3 (6%) 14 (28.6%) 15 (19.8%) 18 (26.9%)
No 85 (58.6%) 20 (43.5%) 30 (60%) 35 (71.4%) 48 (62.4%) 36 (53.7%
Missing data 27 (18.6%) 10 (21.7%) 17 (34%) 0 14 (18.2%) 13 (19.4%)
Do you foresee violence again?
Yes 44 (30.3%) 20 (43.5%) 12 (24%) 12 (24.5%) 11 (14.3%) 33 (49.3%)
No 88 (60.7%) 18 (39.1%) 33 (66%) 37 (75.5%) 59 (76.6%) 28 (41.8%)
Missing data 13 (9%) 8 (17.4%) 5 (10%) 0 7 (9.1%) 6 (9%)
Can there be lasting peace in this community?
Yes 116 (80%) 36 (78.3%) 41 (82%) 39 (79.6%) 61 (79.2%) 54 (80.6%)
No 14 (9.7%) 6 (13%) 4 (8%) 4 (8.2%) 6 (7.8%) 8 (11.9%)
Missing data 15 (10.3%) 4 (8.7%) 5 (10%) 6 (12.2%) 10 (13%) 5 (7.5%)
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solace and strength from their community
relations.
The Brazil, Nigeria and Mexico surveys reveal
similar patterns in terms of respondents’
relations with their fellow community members,
with sometimes large majorities rating them as
‘good’. The Mexican survey exhibited a large
number of missing values, but once these were
taken into account, of those who did respond,
91 per cent felt their relationships with fellow
community members were good. The analogous
question in the Jamaican survey was whether or
not the respondent had friends at school – with
97 per cent stating that they did (Table 3).
In terms of feuding and conflict with other
community members, 22 per cent of Brazilian
respondents, 23 per cent of Nigerian respondents
and a slightly higher 37 per cent of Mexican
respondents reported arguments with their
neighbours. These estimates vary across
different gender and age groups. In Brazil and
Nigeria, a higher proportion of women and young
people than men reported quarrelling with other
community members, whereas for Mexico, the
figures showed a higher percentage for men and
those over 30 years old.4
Community-level violence is widespread. Table 2
shows that many people feel unsafe in some
parts of their community; in all cases, the
majority of those feeling unsafe are women and
young people under the age of 30. By contrast, of
the Jamaican children who were interviewed,
girls seem to feel safer than boys at school.5 In
addition, as Table 4 shows, 95 per cent of
Nigerian respondents and 69 per cent of
Brazilian individuals can remember at least one
violent episode in their community. Almost half
of Brazilian and Nigerian respondents perceived
violence to be a problem in their community,
while more than 50 per cent of Mexican
respondents felt this to be so. The percentage of
women reporting to have memories of episodes
of violence is higher than for men in Brazil,
Mexico and Nigeria. A similar pattern is found
for the linked question, which asks whether the
respondent was affected by the episode of
violence. More women report having been
affected by violent events, with the exception of
Mexico, where the percentage is slightly higher
for men. The age variation is small.6
The picture of community violence coming out of
the Jamaican questionnaires, shown in Tables 3
and 5, is perhaps the most striking of the four
surveys. An alarmingly high proportion of
children felt unsafe – either always, or some of
the time – both at school and in the community.
Only 44 per cent felt safe at school and 48 per
cent in their community. The number of relatives
that respondents report as having died because
of violent episodes is very high and some of the
responses to the violence questions are rather
unsettling. Very high numbers of people lost
relatives and friends who were involved in fights,
and many of these respondents stated that they
think violence is sometimes necessary. Almost
half of the children interviewed had been
involved in fights, of which more than one-
quarter had involved a weapon.
In the Nigerian communities, violence and
conflict seem connected to religious factors and
events, for example the implementation of
Sharia, and to elections. As Table 6 shows, there
are also regional patterns. Violence appears to
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Table 7 Violence in Brazilian and Mexican communities
Yes No Missing data
Mexico
Did you have violent episodes in your family? 24 (28.2%) 59 (69.4%) 2 (2.4%)
Is there any problem related to alcohol consumption in your family? 31 (36.5%) 44 (51.8%) 10 (11.8%)
Brazil
Did you have to escape from here for any reason? 24 (10.5%) 196 (85.6%) 9 (3.9%)
Have you been directly involved in a violent episode? 8 (3.5%) 131 (57.2%) 90 (39.3%)
Has anyone in your family been involved in any violent episode? 11 (4.8%) 184 (80.4%) 34 (14.9%)
affect slightly more Christians than Muslims –
almost half of Christians and 29 per cent of
Muslims had been affected by episodes of
violence, and a greater proportion of Christians
were also ‘directly’ affected – 37 per cent
compared with 22 per cent of Muslims. Despite
their apparent greater involvement in violence,
Christian respondents are relatively more
hopeful of a ‘lasting peace’ in their community.
Regionally, Kaduna exhibits the greatest
proportion of respondents affected by episodes of
violence, while Kano region has by far the lowest
incidence of reported violence. Not surprisingly,
Kaduna residents are also far more likely to
foresee violence again (44 per cent compared
with 24 per cent in both Kano and Plateau
Regions), although this does not seem to
diminish their optimism for the future. They are
just as likely as Plateau residents to consider
lasting peace in their community to be a
possibility despite their relatively higher levels of
experience of violence.
Findings from Brazil, in Table 4, show that 110
respondents have been affected by violence. We
believe that the higher level of positive answers
to this question in the Brazil case is partly due to
the type of violence prevalent, with some of the
neighbourhoods surveyed being severely affected
by street violence and drug-traffic (Wheeler, this
IDS Bulletin). It is clear from the Brazilian
questionnaires that violence is a problem in
these communities, and people were quite afraid
of talking about it. This came through quite
strongly in the responses to the more qualitative
questions. The violence in these areas is street
violence, mainly driven by drug trafficking, and
this appears to have a big impact, acting as a
constraint on lifestyle and everyday life.
Nevertheless, as shown in Table 7, in only 3.5 per
cent of cases did respondents state that they had
been directly involved in episodes of violence.
Just 5 per cent reported that at least one
household member was involved in any type of
violence. However, in these few cases,
respondents explained neither the episode nor
the role of the household member in the episode.
From the qualitative answers to some of the
survey questions, we were able to identify two
main causes of violence in Mexico: domestic
violence and political violence. Violence seems to
be quite widespread in the domestic
environment, with 28 per cent of respondents
reporting violent episodes in the family, often
linked to problems of alcohol consumption
(Table 7). From the qualitative answers in the
questionnaire, we can infer that politics appear
to play an important role in the life of those
interviewed and this is also often linked with
violent episodes in the community.
Despite contextual differences in levels and
intensity of violence, on the whole, people across
the four communities are happy to live in their
community. Questions on satisfaction with living
in one’s community were worded differently
according to location but with remarkably similar
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Table 8 Satisfaction with community living
Brazil
How do you feel about living here?
Like it 113 (49.3%)
Don’t like it 18 (7.9%)
More or less likes 59 (25.8%)
Like it a lot 35 (15.3%)
Other 2 (0.9%)
Missing data 2 (0.9%)
Total 229
Mexico
Are you happy to live in this community?
Yes 77 (90.6%)
No 3 (3.5%)
Missing data 5 (5.9%)
Total 85
Nigeria
How do you rate living in this community?
Like it a lot 105 (72.4%)
Don’t like it 24 (16.6%)
Indifferent 9 (6.2%)
Missing data 7 (4.8%)
Total 145
Jamaica
How do you rate living in your community?
Like it a lot 52 (27.8%)
OK, not a bad place to live 67 (35.8%)
Don’t like it most of the time 32 (17.1%)
Hate living here 14 (7.5%)
Missing data 22 (11.8%)
Total 187
results, shown in Table 8. Mexican respondents
were asked whether they were happy to live in
this community: 91 per cent responded ‘Yes’.
Both Nigerian and Jamaican respondents were
asked to rate living in their community: 72 per
cent of Nigerian respondents ‘like it a lot’,
compared with just 28 per cent of Jamaicans,
although a further 36 per cent of Jamaican
respondents considered their community to be
‘OK, not a bad place to live’. When asked how
they felt about living in their community, a total
of 90 per cent of Brazilian respondents answered
positively to the question: 49 per cent like to live
in their community, 15 per cent ‘like it a lot’ to
live in their community and 26 per cent ‘more or
less like’ to live in the community.
4 Methodological lessons
The research undertaken in the four case studies
has revealed some important advantages in
combining different methods of analysis to
understand contexts of violence. The researchers
obtained a high response rate from respondents
and the implementation of the various
questionnaires was overall quite smooth. The
precision of some of the answers was however
affected by a variety of factors, mainly related to
the sensitive nature of the material.
Understandably, research on violence will always
be met with reluctance in addressing more
personal questions. This problem was lessened to
some extent by the fact that the interviewers
were local members of the community, known to
the respondents. It was also mitigated by
applying questionnaires within the context of
qualitative or participatory processes, and within
the framework of relationships that these
processes had already established.
Despite these caveats, we feel we have obtained
enough quantitative information to richly
supplement the qualitative results. In particular,
emerging themes identified above indicate some
important issues for future social research on
communities repeatedly exposed to violence.
Notably, the quantitative results suggest that
daily violence does not necessarily reflect upon,
or at least impinge on, community relations.
Even if they do not feel completely safe, people
carry on with their lives and continue engaging
in relations with their neighbours, friends and
relatives. Recent research on urban violence has
suggested that civic engagement may be a
powerful counteraction to the outbreak of
violence in communities prone to conflict
(Varshney 2002). Our results show that high
levels of social interactions and community
goodwill can coexist with different levels and
intensity of violence. This opens very interesting
research paths on the links between citizenship
and violence that deserve further exploration.
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Notes
1 For more details on the research of Violence
Citizenship and Participation thematic group
of the Development Research Centre, see
Pearce, this IDS Bulletin.
2 For contextual information on violence in
these four communities, see Wheeler, Cortez,
Moncrieffe and Abah et al., this IDS Bulletin.
3 This is of course not exclusive to individuals in
violent contexts. All forms of private and
sensitive information are difficult to research.
This is discussed more extensively by Nleya
and Thompson, this IDS Bulletin.
4 Data available from the authors.
5 Data available from the authors.
6 Data disaggregated by age and gender is not
presented due to space constraints but is
available from the authors.
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1 Introduction: untangling the impacts of
complex compound crises
A widely learned lesson from history is that
economic crises can have seismic effects on
society and security. This article looks at some of
these from the perspectives of rural and urban
people living in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Jamaica,
Kenya and Zambia. It is based on original
research into the global economic crises,
including the food and fuel crises that dominated
2008, and it focuses on the crime and social
cohesion impacts. These include that livelihood
adaptation strategies have left people at or over
the edge of legality, and concerns about youth
criminalisation and the provision of policing and
security. Inter-group and community relations
show signs of strain after economic shocks,
particularly the food price crisis; there are also
signs that community support mechanisms,
including local charity, have faltered under this
strain. The article concludes with some
discussion about the importance of monitoring
the wider social impacts of crisis: the insights
this will provide should not only aid
understanding of how crisis is being experienced
and mediated, but also offer potential insights
into supportive interventions. Crucially, both
crime and social cohesion impacts have
immediate consequences for people’s wellbeing,
as well as the more enduring potential
consequences for economic development,
governance conditions and politics.
1.1 Which crisis? Experiments with people-centred
monitoring in five countries
The research on which this article is based was a
pilot study commissioned by the UK Department
for International Development which aimed to:
(a) provide ‘real-time’ data on the human
impacts of the food, fuel and financial crises and
(b) test an approach to participatory and
qualitative monitoring. Details on country and
site selection, as well as more detail on the
research findings, can be obtained in Hossain et
al. (2009). The research was undertaken in rural
and urban communities, one each in Bangladesh,
Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya and Zambia, during
February 2009. Methods included a mix of
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qualitative and participatory tools and
techniques such as focus group discussions and
case study research; in most cases, the
researchers had prior relationships with the
community through earlier research. The social
impacts of the crisis were a specific area of focus.
The value of the research was chiefly that it
demonstrated the scope for rapid snapshots of
the experience of economic crisis that would go
beyond and humanise the macroeconomic
statistics that dominate measurement of impact.
In addition, as this article shows, it enables an
exploration of the non-economic dimensions of
economic crisis that quantitative monitoring
methods are unlikely to capture. It also
highlighted the complex nature of the multiple
crises being experienced. Particularly crucial was
that the exploration of experiences of crisis shed
light on how the impacts of the food and fuel
crises were undermining capacities to cope with
the global financial crisis, which in February
2009 was still only beginning to be felt in some
poor developing country communities.
The limitations of the approach are primarily of
scale, and include the constraints to
generalisation due to the qualitative,
community-based approach. The findings are
illustrative rather than representative. In
recognition of these important limitations, the
present article does not claim to represent
conditions in all contexts, but to highlight
processes and routes through which crime and
social cohesion have been affected in the ten
communities in the study, and to indicate
broader lessons about the impact of economic
crisis on crime and social cohesion in developing
country contexts.
A key finding of the research was that even as
the global financial crisis was beginning to strike
developing countries, many communities were
reeling from the effects of the food and fuel
crises. Food prices had not come down
everywhere, nor by enough to bring them down
to pre-2008 levels. The research found that
global crises were being compounded locally by
adverse climate conditions locally (drought in
Kenya and Jamaica, localised flooding in
Indonesia, cyclone and floods in Bangladesh,
heavy rains in Zambia) and difficult political
transitions (post-election violence in Kenya, a
caretaker interregnum in Bangladesh); these
additional factors were contributing to
uncertainty around agricultural production and
local economic decline. Compound, complex
crises were found to be interacting with each
other, making it difficult to disentangle their
impacts on people’s lives.
These local accounts of how the crises were being
experienced offered insights into how the food,
fuel and financial crises were unfolding in poor
developing countries. The situation was different
everywhere, but everywhere were signs of strain.
Many people were trying hard to adapt their
livelihoods. There was support from within
communities, as well as some valued government
and faith-based support. But many people were
reporting not being able to make ends meet:
managing food, health and educational needs
was proving to be a struggle, and not only for the
very poorest; many middle class people were also
reported to be finding the high prices difficult to
cope with. For some, particularly children, there
were impacts that looked set to be irreversible,
because they were dropping out of school to earn
or because their parents could not afford fees,
books, or breakfast. As this article discusses in
more detail, the ties that bind communities
together were showing signs of unravelling, as
people were getting together to save or celebrate
less than they used to. While there was evidence
of neighbourly support, some believed this was
declining. In all five countries, people believe
crime rates have risen. From the worst-hit
communities were reports that children and the
elderly were being abandoned by people no
longer able to cope. In terms of social protection,
people reported that some government
programmes were working well. The most widely
heard complaints included that these covered too
few people with too little support to make a
difference. Other schemes were not reaching the
poorest. And much assistance – including from
religious institutions and NGOs – was considered
to be unpredictable or even to be declining.
2 Crime in a time of crisis
2.1 Livelihoods at the edge of legality
Reports that the economic shock of high food
prices was prompting diversification into new
economic activities were common in all the
communities. In many instances, this involved a
shift into informalisation: traders and food
sellers reported shifting into unbranded or
repackaged goods. This suggests a rise in
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unregulated sales of food items, with
considerable scope for adulteration and
contamination. Poor women in the community in
Dhaka, Bangladesh, had carved out a niche in
sales of rejected vegetables as prices rose and
remained high throughout 2008; this included
selling food items that had been rejected as unfit
for sale, and, reportedly, of items stolen from
wholesale deliveries to markets. In the Kingston
communities in Jamaica, people were reportedly
finding ‘novel ways of hustling’: one strategy
reported was that of ‘goose men’ who accept
sales commissions and then over-charge for the
product, to increase their commission rates.
Men in the rural Kalimantan village in
Indonesia, had responded to the downturn in the
rubber trade on which their livelihoods had
depended by travelling to another island to
engage in illegal gold mining. Having borrowed
funds to finance the travel and mining
equipment costs, they encountered official raids
and some were ultimately driven back to
Kalimantan, having lost more than they had
earned by mining gold. By contrast, in rural
Bangladesh, cross-border smuggling of fertiliser
became highly lucrative at the height of the fuel
prices, when fertiliser costs peaked. Landowners
in the rural community in Naogaon complained
that smuggling had become so common a
livelihood strategy there that agricultural wage
labour rates had been driven up, in response to
the labour shortage that resulted.
In Dhaka, Bangladesh, the unregulated end of
the garments industry was reporting to be
thriving since the start of the global financial
crisis in the final quarter of 2008. This was seen
in the good trade among many small sub-
contractor factories, whom garments workers
claimed were as, if not more numerous than
before, and hiring as many, if not more workers.
These smaller factory units are mainly
sweatshops that do not comply with labour and
social standards of production; workers
complained that these were factories in which
managers ‘misbehave with workers and beat and
abuse them ... They will hire you instantly. But
there is no job security there. After ten days they
may fire you’. In the peri-urban Jakarta
community, the global downturn was also
bringing regulatory weaknesses in the protection
of workers’ rights to the fore; there were reports
that workers who had been laid off were
experiencing difficulties claiming their
entitlements from the labour outsourcing
companies through whom they had been
contracted.
In many communities, people felt that petty
theft was on the rise. In the Jakarta community,
motorcycle and mobile phone theft was reported
to have risen. This was the only community in
which it was possible to triangulate these
findings with reference to official crime
statistics. There, local police confirmed that
there had been a rise in reported crime in the
previous three months (up to February 2009).
While there was a seasonal element to this –
crime rates often rise in the period preceding the
major Eid festival – the police noted that the rise
was over and above seasonal increases. This
suggested that economic crisis was driving rises
in rates of reported crime.
2.2 Substance abuse and antisocial behaviour
Concern was expressed in all the countries about
criminalisation and/or substance abuse among
youth, directly attributed to the pressures of the
crisis. In Kenya this was associated with concerns
about how unmarried youth were being excluded
from relief. Raised levels of drug abuse were
reported in Bangladesh, Jamaica, Zambia, and
Kenya, and rising alcohol abuse was reported in
Zambia, Kenya and Indonesia. In Zambia, young
focus group participants chewed khat throughout
the session. A man in Nairobi said that:
A man in hunger cannot afford leisure. Even if one
drinks beer, it is not for leisure as before, but just to
kill the stress.
Other focus group participants in Nairobi said
that the lethal local brew ‘kill-me-quick’ was
replacing the beer that people used to drink for
leisure. While in some contexts this was seen as
merely an antisocial or wasteful way of coping
with the stress and frustration of coping with
crisis, in Kenya and Jamaica there were concerns
that this was connected to a growing involvement
in the drugs trade among young people in these
communities.
Children and youth becoming involved in
criminal economic activity were also reported.
Again in Nairobi, a headteacher told the
following story of criminalisation among
schoolchildren:
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A copper bell belonging to our school was stolen by one
of the students and sold to a scrap metal dealer at an
industrial area at a cost of KSh20. The bell was very
valuable to the school since it was bought when the
school was first opened. We pursued the issue with the
chief and after investigations we learnt that the boy had
sold it to a middleman who then sold it off to the dealer.
By the time we got to the dealer, the bell had already
been smelted. I received threats from the middleman that
I would be raped should I pursue the issue further.
Children in Nairobi were also reported to be
carrying criminals’ guns for a fee of KSh25.
Girls and young women were said to be
increasingly entering into sex work in Kenya and
Zambia. In Lusaka, youths reported a rising
number of girls and young women entering sex
work as one of the most significant problems
facing their community, caused by poverty and
unemployment, family problems and low income,
and the pressure ‘to look good’. Among the
effects they detailed included HIV/AIDS/STIs,
children being born out of marriage, and school
dropout. In Nairobi, youth had also witnessed a
rise in sex work, involving girls as young as 14, as
well as boys. Teachers in Nairobi attributed the
rising number of schoolgirl pregnancies to
hunger, as girls were believed to have been
exchanging sex for food and snacks. In the
research community, there had been 13
pregnancies in primary schools in 2008, a figure
which teachers felt constituted a rising trend.
2.3 Policing and security
There were some indications that the provision
of policing and security had also been affected by
economic crises in these communities. The
impacts of crisis on the state of policing were
traced most directly in Kingston, where people
had the following to say:
More police are on the road but the police are also
hustling.
I asked one policeman for money and he said ‘when
him done run the road’ [taken bribes from drivers].
More police hustling since the crisis. Dem a di biggest
hustlers, tief and extortionists. Nuff a dem a criminal
who get license to become police. They wear knapsack
and go around collecting.
Over the last year, problems with police have become
worse.
In the Kingston communities there was no
strong sense that that crime rates were rising,
even though people were generally agreed to be
‘hustling’ and ‘going on the juggle’ – finding
ways of earning a living that were not necessarily
within the law. It is possible that this is because
rises in criminal activity are not being felt locally
but involve acts perpetrated in other locations.
Control by powerful ‘dons’ in these Kingston
communities had maintained local order
according to local rules without any inter-group
violence in the previous five months:
Under community rules and regulations, there is to be
no violence against women, no [thieving], no raping,
no disrespect to elders, no telling tales to Babylon, no
homosexuality (though we have it here a lot; all bad
man too). If you are found in the act, you get flogged.
People use sticks and big boots. If two women fight,
they get beaten too.
In the Nairobi community, local security was also
being provided by what appeared to be criminal
gangs. Business owners reported paying a
mandatory daily fee of KSh20 to a group called
the ‘Maasai’ to ensure the security of their
business. That this group was reported to have
prevailed in recent clashes with the feared
mungiki militia group1 gives a sense of the degree
of violence and control exerted on the local
community under study.
The burden of coping with insecurity and
ineffective law and order in poor communities may
be exacerbated by economic crisis, as they add to
financial strains that for some households are
already unbearable. This was brought home in the
case of one Dhaka household which was struggling
to continue fighting a case against their former
landlord who had raped their, then, 13-year-old
daughter the year previously. Her father and uncle
had raised the Tk100,000 (US$1,450 at May 2009
rates) so far needed to fight the legal battle, but in
so doing left the family destitute. They had moved
to the slum in which they were interviewed to cut
expenses, the girl had been removed from school
to try to contribute to the family income by
working, and her mother was now working in a
garment factory; meanwhile her grandmother had
returned to the village to try to raise the money to
keep her younger brother in school. But the food
price crisis had added to an already difficult
financial and law and order situation, and the
future of the legal case was uncertain.
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3 Social cohesion
3.1 Inter-group and community relations
There were incipient signs of social tension
between social groups, most notably in the
Nairobi community. The most tangible signs of
growing tensions emerged in relation to majority
Christian views on a feeding programme for
practising Muslims:
Although we are suffering as youth in [the Nairobi
community], and our parents and friends are
struggling, the Muslims always have food. Every
Friday, the mosque opposite provides food and even
clothing. This support is only for Muslims. We have
been to the mosque a few times dressed in buibui2 like
the other Muslim women and managed to get food. It
seems the people at the Mosque found [out]. We are
told they cannot give food to kafirs. A few weeks back
our friends, young men, were caught dressed in buibui
like women; it was embarrassing, but we must
survive. (FGD participant, Nairobi)
The exclusion of people of other faiths from the
support provided by Muslims seemed to generate
animosity and intense hostility. Some people
argued that when there is support from the
church or government there is no discrimination,
yet Muslims were seen to be encouraging
discrimination, and possibly using food to
convert desperate residents to the Islamic faith.
Also in Nairobi, there were accounts of young
boys being sold to Asian traders for sex in
exchange for food; such reports highlight how
deprivation has heightened awareness of
socioeconomic differences along religious or
ethnic-cultural lines, creating social tensions.
In both the rural Bangladesh and the Jakarta
community, there was a tendency to deny that
minority social groups were disadvantaged
compared with the majority. In both
communities, the impression that was conveyed
was one of social harmony, despite difference.
This may indeed be true under non-crisis
conditions, although what appears to majority
and powerful groups as social harmony may also
be containment of social tension or divisions.3 In
both those communities, there were minority
groups that were disadvantaged with respect to
official social protection schemes. In rural
Bangladesh, the indigenous Shaotal population is
typically excluded from government
programmes, the benefits of which are in the
hands of local government representatives who
seek to maximise political capital from their
distribution. Church- and Christian faith-based
organisations were known to provide some social
services to this group, however. And the Shaotal
population has a political history of mobilisation
around their rights in this part of Bangladesh. In
the Jakarta community of Gandasari, migrant
export sector workers were generally excluded
from the rice for the poor and cash transfer
schemes from which some longer-term residents
benefit. While this was not a community
featuring the exclusion of all migrants – other
non-natives had received considerable help from
local officials and community leaders, including
the right to live on public land – there was a
distinct sense of separation between the
temporary residents and the more permanent
inhabitants. In both rural Bangladesh and
Jakarta, there was ample scope for social
tensions to arise around the distribution of
resources for coping with crisis.
In Bangladesh, Indonesia and Jamaica, there
were also signs that social practices that had
previously cemented the social capital between
groups were declining. The decline of the arisan
or rotating savings scheme in the rural
Indonesian site (see below) also affected
attendance at the yasinan or weekly group
recitation from the Koran, which had been
conducted at the same time, and which was an
important regular social event. Many people said
they no longer attended. To date, however,
community members noted that there had not
been any conflict among the participants, and
there were other signs that a sense of solidarity
within the community was strong; this social
harmony was attributed to a shared reliance on
rubber farming, and fairly strong adherence to
common religious practice. However, as the
impacts of the global financial crisis in the form
of low rubber prices persisted into the fifth
month, people were concerned that the
community’s harmony, mutual understanding
and safety would begin to be affected, and that
practices of giving credit and helping each other
were at risk as the financial situation continued
to worsen.
Changes in social participation were not noted in
the Jakarta site; there, people said they were still
managing to contribute to, for example, funeral
costs, borrowing from family members if
necessary, in order to meet this important social
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obligation. But in rural Bangladesh, people noted
a decrease in the number and scale of major
social events such as weddings or milads (prayer
and sermon sessions to mark anniversaries or
important events). There were fewer such big
occasions now held, fewer people were invited,
and the food was less lavish when they did occur.
Together with the reported decline in private and
informal charity in some contexts, these changes
in social behaviour signal a growing inability to
finance the rituals and practices that bind
societies together.
3.2 Credit
Customary savings and credit groups appear to
have been most important in the rural
Indonesian and both the rural and the urban
Jamaican communities. No such groups were
mentioned as prominent potential or actual
sources of support in either Bangladesh or
Zambia. However, in both rural Indonesia and
Jamaica, these customary modes of rotating
savings and credit appear to have suffered during
the current crisis. The Jamaican practice of
‘throwing partners’ involves a group of like-
minded community members who agree to
collectively save on a regular basis, with an
agreed banker and period of time between
‘draws’. In Kingston, some investors in a financial
services company that had crashed in early 2008
were reported to have invested their partner
money in the company. Other views were that the
practice was struggling during the downturn:
We used to survive by throwing partners. Now, we
don’t have the income to save to throw partners. You
see partner a throw, you have to know where the money
is coming from or else you may start the partner and
can’t maintain it.
The partner thing don’t work well like last time.
Without jobs, it’s impossible.
The view was similar on the other side of the
world in rural Banjar, Indonesia, where arisan
had to date been the main source of capital in
the community. Arisan are customary groups that
bring together between tens and hundreds of
community members, who agree to save a fixed
amount, usually starting at around Rp5,000 each,
which are raffled off weekly. Most community
members are members of an arisan. The weekly
arisan meeting has to date been a major event in
this community, and also involves a yasinan or
Koran recitation. However, recent changes
include the postponement and even the
disbanding of some arisan. In one case, a group
that had only conducted the raffle twice was
terminated, and the winners of the arisan funds
were asked to return the funds. Others have
increased the timetable to once every two or four
months, which seems to be more manageable for
people during a period of financial strain.
3.3 Charity
Informal sources of support, in particular loans
and gifts from neighbours, relatives and local
shops, stalls and food vendors were relied on by
many at the height of the food crisis. Migrant
remittances may also fall into this category of
charitable support, particularly where payments
are occasional support to poor relatives in times
of household crises such as illness or death,
rather than regular payments. However, there
were some findings that indicated that informal
private charity had been hit hard by the crisis.
The experiences of women earning a living as
beggars in rural Bangladesh were indicative;
they reported the following changes since the
crisis: (a) a halving of the amounts of rice they
used to earn regularly by begging;4 (b) a decline
in other charitable gifts (clothes, cash);
(c) competition with other poor and even lower
middle class people over wild foods gleaned from
public and private lands; and, (d) a matter which
greatly offended these women’s sense of personal
dignity, a rise in aggressive and rude responses to
requests for alms. Other people reported that it
was less possible than before to depend on
neighbours and relatives for support, because all
were suffering from the food and fuel crisis. One
reason that informal support may have declined
is that food and fuel prices appear to have hit
middle-class or relatively affluent groups in these
communities fairly hard.
Informal private charity may have been hit
particularly hard because many middle class
people are in formal sector occupations where
cash incomes are relatively fixed over the short
to medium term; by contrast, informal sector
traders, people involved in the extra-legal
economy, and even manual wage labourers in
some sectors have seen their nominal incomes
rise, even if in real terms they remain absolutely
worse off, their decline in purchasing power has
been somewhat less precipitous. Informal charity
appears to be highly elastic, and quick to decline
Hossain Crime and Social Cohesion in the Time of Crisis: Early Evidence of Wider Impacts of Food, Fuel and Financial Shocks64
when middle class incomes drop. In Bangladesh
women engaged in begging reported that
wealthy people had brushed off their requests for
assistance with reference to government
programmes to which they are, at least in theory,
entitled.
The impacts of crisis on charitable giving were
not all negative, however. Near the Dhaka
community, a charitable feeding programme at
the tomb of a Sufi saint was reported by the
manager to have received more donations at the
time when food prices were at their peak, when
they were feeding some 550 people daily. Most
charitable donors to the tomb are themselves
poor, and the manager speculated that it is
because political and economic crises make
people feel more vulnerable that they depend
more on extra-mundane (spiritual and religious)
means to help them through crises; this is why
donations rise during crises. One pilgrim the
researchers met during the research had brought
a goat as an offering. He was a poor man, like
most of the other two million pilgrims each year.
It had taken him six months to save the money to
pay for the goat, and he had brought it because
he had vowed to sacrifice a goat in return for his
daughter’s recovery from her illness. Donations
from poor people like this pilgrim were reported
to have kept the food service and other charity
activities of the tomb going during the crisis, and
donations had almost doubled over the period
2005–6 to 2007–8.
4 Conclusions: why crime and social cohesion
matter for development
The research discussed above does not claim to
be representative, even of the countries in which
it was conducted. It may not be possible to
generalise about the likelihood that economic
crisis will lead to rising crime and declining
social cohesion in poor communities. However,
the evidence presented here provides credible
illustrations of the routes through which serious
shocks to food security, as occurred throughout
the world in 2008 and continue to occur well into
2009, can result in informalisation and more
seriously, a criminalisation of livelihoods, as well
as undermine the bases and forms of social
connectedness in communities.
There are at least three reasons why the impacts
of economic shock on crime and social cohesion
levels matter centrally to crisis coping and
development prospects in the recovery period.
The first is that levels of crime and social
cohesion are likely to be of central significance
because of their immediate or short-term impacts
on people’s wellbeing. Participatory approaches
to understanding the experience of poverty such
as the Voices of the Poor study have consistently
identified crime and violence as prominent
features of the experience of poverty in its more
multi-dimensional senses, or illbeing.5 Similarly,
it is now widely recognised that livelihood
strategies for adapting to and coping with food
insecurity crises depend more on community-
based support than is typically documented.6
A second reason these broader social impacts
matter is their potential economic and poverty
impacts in the medium term. There are good
reasons to believe that social fragmentation
during protracted economic downturn will have
enduring effects on societal responsibilities for
children, the elderly and the very poor. In the
current crisis, there were signs from Bangladesh
that the local elites who bear customary
responsibility for supporting the very poor were
abandoning those responsibilities, and re-
defining the role of state and NGO programmes
to replace them in those roles. The sense of
uncertainty bred by rising crime is also likely to
have enduring medium-term impacts. In one
particularly telling instance, a farmer in the rural
Kenyan community in the study explained his
hesitation about planting food crops, despite the
high prices he could expect to earn from them:
I have been growing maize, beans and other crops ...
I have been sacrificing a lot in terms of minimising
expenditure in order to buy fuel only to find my crop
stolen from the shamba. This kind of theft was
unheard of in the period before 2007. It has been
brought about by lack of food since those that steal do
it to feed themselves and their families and not for
commercial purposes.
A third reason crime and social cohesion impacts
are likely to be of more enduring significance in
the crisis recovery period is the potential longer-
term impacts on politics and governance
conditions. While reported rising crime rates in
these communities are an insecurity phenomena
of a significantly lower intensity than found in
conditions of conflict and civil war, there are
parallels with the impact of economic shock on
the shift into semi-legal and criminal livelihood
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activities that are worth attending to. In her
analysis of the micro-level factors that shape the
relationship between poverty and violent conflict,
Justino points out that relatively little is known
about how ‘micro-level economic factors and
decisions influence the start of violent conflicts’,
and that strategies for adaptation for survival
may include ‘adopt[ing] forms of livelihoods that
may lead to severe poverty traps but avoid
famine ... or may lead to a life of crime and
violence (or both) (Justino 2009: 3–4).
With Justino’s reminder that we are yet to fully
understand the ‘micro-level economic factors and
decisions’ that influence the start of violent
conflicts, it is worth recalling the political effects
of the current crises so far. The current crisis
(including global food price inflation) has
already witnessed a considerable amount of
political turmoil. While no source for the much-
cited figure that 30 countries had experienced
demonstrations or what are loosely called ‘foot
riots’ since 2008 could be found, a five-minute
internet search found credible references to such
protests in Bangladesh, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Guinea, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Mauritania,
Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique,
Pakistan, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia,
Uzbekistan, and Yemen. Two West African
countries and Haiti saw governments topple as a
result of the food and/or financial crises in the
last year. In Bangladesh, the siege of barracks
and gruesome massacre of army officers by their
subordinates in February 2009 was initially
explained by frustrations around inadequate pay
in a time of food inflation.
There is little interest in or understanding of
these protests. In the current crisis, food riots
seem to be seen as an automatic, almost
physiological response to acute food insecurity.
See this description of financial crisis ‘contagion’
by a leading New York University economic
forecaster in the blogosphere:
If cargo trade stops, the wheat doesn’t get exported. If
the wheat doesn’t get exported, the mill has nothing to
grind into flour. If there is no flour, the bakeries and
food processors can’t produce bread and pasta and
other foods. If there are no foods shipped from the
bakeries and factories, there are no foods in the shops.
If there are no foods in the shops, people go hungry. If
people go hungry their children go hungry. When
children go hungry, people riot and governments fall.
(Roubini 2008)
But food riots are a political phenomenon, a
barometer of political opinion and capacity to
mobilise. While elite observers often assume that
mass protests of this kind are stirred up by
outside rabble-rousers with their own political
agenda, there are better reasons to believe that
they emerge out of or are informed by a shared
political ideology about the responsibilities of
government or the authorities during episodes of
food crisis.
While it involves a considerable stretch to detect
political and governance impacts of this higher
order in this local evidence of rising crime and
declining social cohesion, it is known that
perceptions of public safety shape attitudes
towards democracy (Fernandez and Kuenzi 2006;
Pérez 2003/4). And there are reasons to believe
that political trust in poor, risk-prone societies
rests considerably on governmental capacities to
support people during crises (Hossain 2008). In
brief, faith in democratic governments can be at
stake during economic crisis. Monitoring the
wider social impacts of economic crisis, with a
particular focus on crime and social cohesion, is
thus about tracking factors that affect poor
people’s immediate, medium- and longer-term
capacities to cope and to live well. The
combination of the potential short-, medium- and
long-run impacts of crime and social cohesion, for
poverty and for politics, suggests these are
important indicators of the development impacts
of economic crisis in poor countries.
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Notes
* This article is based on research conducted by
partners, the partners included: Mamunur
Rashid, Bayazid Hasan, Nabil Zuberi and
Sheikh Tariquzzaman of BRAC Development
Institute in Bangladesh; Rizki Fillaili,
Widjajanti I. Suharyo, Bambang Sulaksono,
Hastuti, Herry Widjanarko, Sri Budiyati,
Syaikhu Usman, Nur Aini, and Faisal Fuad
Seiff of the Social Monitoring and Early
Response Unit (SMERU) in Indonesia, Joy
Moncrieffe (IDS), Paulette Griffiths-Jude and
Nellie Richards in Jamaica, Grace Nyonyintono
Lubaale of Mpereeza Associates with Peter
Otienoh Orwa, Elizabeth Kariuki and Maurice
Owino Ligulu in Kenya, and Mwila Mulumbi of
Civil Society for Poverty Reduction, Lusaka and
Wala Mubitana in Zambia.
1 For more details on the mungiki, see The
Economist, ‘Next Machetes, Then
Machineguns?’ 12 March 2009.
2 A garment that covers the head and body worn
by Muslim women; a local variant of the burkah.
3 During focus groups with women in the Jakarta
community the researchers noted a visible
tendency for the discussions to be dominated by
the permanent villagers; migrant worker women
were notably more hesitant and reluctant to
speak. Views on social harmony within the
community, could easily reflect the relative
power of permanent local residents, many of
whom are landlords of migrant workers.
4 In Bangladesh and across parts of South Asia,
begging does not generally attract the level or
type of stigma it does in contemporary
Western societies; for many, giving to beggars
can be a spiritual act which brings religious
blessings. Widows and people with disabilities
may be able to survive on the income from
begging, as had been the case for the group of
beggar women involved in this research.
5 In her review of participatory explorations of
poverty and illbeing, Brock (1999) found that
crime and violence and fear of crime and
violence were significant sources of illbeing for
poor people. The participatory ‘Consultations
with the Poor’ exercise conducted for the World
Development Report 2000/1 also identified crime
as a major source of illbeing for the poor.
However, the final Report contains relatively
little discussion of this point. One advisor to
the participatory research process, Robert
Chambers, noted that while the police had
emerged as an important institution affecting
poor people’s wellbeing, this point had been
excluded from the final report.
6 See Adams (1993); Corbett (1988); Davies and
Hossain (1997).
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1 Introduction
When a county descends into violent domestic
conflict, obviously its security is challenged. But
the threat is not only to the security of the state
or even to the physical protection of its citizens
from violent aggression. As long ago as the English
Civil War philosophers recognised that conflicts
and other human acts that lead to a significant
diminishment in other aspects of a community’s
wellbeing also shorten lives and thus are dangers
to human security as well (Hobbes 1939 [1651]).
Thus the threats and conflicts to be considered
include not only violence itself but also ones to the
resources and livelihoods on which communities
are dependent. In the communities most affected
by the civil wars in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo (DRC), Mozambique,1 Sierra Leone
and Somalia modern medicine disappeared, the
future livelihoods of young people were
diminished when their education was disrupted,
and malnutrition increased, such that in Sierra
Leone, for example, children even died from a
lack of salt (Leonard and Samantar 2011; Mushi
2012; Vincent 2012). These casualties of war are
as fatal as the more obvious wounds produced by
bullets and cutlasses. Even though Thomas
Hobbes did not feel a government owed its
citizens prosperity or justice, he did feel that a
state that could not protect its subjects from life-
threatening insecurities such as these had no
right to expect their obedience.
All governance is co-produced. Even if the law
assigns sovereignty and suzerainty to one actor,
that law is but one of the multiple resources that
are needed for effective rule. And different actors
possess those varied resources and supply them
with greater or lesser degrees of compliance. For
example, it matters whether taxes are paid
willingly or evaded (Liebermann 2003). And even
the lowliest workers may provide their labour
enthusiastically or reluctantly (Barnard 1968
[1938]). Thus the effectiveness of all governments
relies upon numerous actors at multiple levels
within and beyond the state, connected to one
another and the various functions of governance
through complex and divergent networks
(De Herdt 2011).
Social Contracts, Networks and
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States: An Overview
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Abstract In this IDS Bulletin we present fieldwork from articles covering the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Mozambique and Somalia to show that assumptions derived from the
classical social contract theorists frequently lead the international community astray as it attempts to rebuild
these African states. The historical social contract for most Africans is not between the state and individuals
but with communities. When it comes to security, there are two contracts and two bargains to consider
instead of the single one of classical presumptions. The contracts are (i) community governance structures
with local families; and (ii) the state with community governance systems, with supplemental ties to
individuals. The bargains are (iii) the regime with the military; and (iv) the state with the international
community. The military is frequently a source of predation on communities rather than of protection. The
dynamics of these contracts and bargains can be in conflict with one another, leading to a situation where
governance is multilevel and networked. The presence and importance of international actors in the
networks changes policies and indirectly affects politics, but it does not threaten the integrity of the state as
an institution itself, which instead is rooted in the processes of the other three compacts.
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If all governance systems are multilevel and
networked to some degree, this reality is even
more pronounced for countries that are
emerging from prolonged periods of civil
violence. In this research we have been
concerned with the subset of conflict and post-
conflict countries located in Tropical Africa. And
scholars have long remarked on the unusually
large gap between what they have called
‘juridical’ and ‘empirical’ sovereignty in parts of
that region; the international system grants the
privileges of statehood (including international
legal recognition and the last word over
development assistance) to many countries that
in fact are unable to exercise the monopoly over
their full territory of the legitimate exercise of
force that the concept of statehood requires
(Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Katzenstein 1996;
Weber 1947). 
When a conflict or post-conflict country is unable
to exercise ‘empirical sovereignty’, no one
institution or even set of institutions is in charge.
Authority is negotiated in complex and fluid sets
of relationships between institutions that range
from peasant villages to the metropoles of the
industrial world. Whether or not the erosion of
sovereignty in Africa is judged to be good or bad,
it is a practical reality and must feature
prominently in any attempts to understand and
improve conflict management on the continent.
The question therefore is not whether or not a
particular type of sovereignty should exist but
what new concepts can be proposed to better fit
the current situation and improve it. Networks
are one of those concepts.
The networks governing a country gripped in
conflict or recently emerging from it will include
not only its national government and its key
economic and military actors but also other
countries, international organisations, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and local
level systems of governance. The former,
national set of actors will have lost power and
coherence, sometimes to the extent of
threatening the collapse of the state itself, which
opens the way for a much more significant role
for the latter set. In this era of United Nations
and regional peacekeeping missions and of
bilateral and multilateral development
assistance, the impact of internationals is widely
acknowledged. In addition, however, a key
finding of recent research (including our own) is
that local-level systems of governance (including
churches) generally are the key building blocks
of social order in a post-conflict situation – for
they usually were the only units managing and
resolving disputes during the conflict period
(Manor 2007; Bastian and Luckham 2003).
Neither the diffusion of core responsibilities in
conflict states to both local and transnational
non-state actors nor attempts to build state
capacity directly are likely to slow or halt;
neither are the fundamental tensions between
the two trends likely to dissipate. As such, we
must attempt to understand the implications of
networked governance for institution-building in
weak and fragile states. 
We start by using social contract theory to look
at the local-level building blocks for the
reconstruction of social order and then turn to an
examination of the changes and operation of the
other networks engaged in governance. 
2 Local governance and the social contract
Local governance structures most often have
undergone considerable change during the
conflict – for example, inequalities become larger,
patronage more prominent, and the influence of
the ‘purveyors of violence’ greater (Leonard and
Samantar 2011). Thus the ‘building blocks for
peace’ are not reflected accurately any longer in
the classical anthropology texts on the social
systems in question. A correct understanding of
the evolution of these ‘primary’ governance
systems under conflict and what can be expected
of them subsequently is fundamental to the
success of efforts to create peace and rebuild
general social order.
African states that have collapsed into prolonged
violent conflict severely test the ways of thinking
used by those who want to help restore their
populations to security. Those who populate the
international organisations and donor agencies
who come forward to provide assistance have
never lived for long themselves in such
conditions – certainly they didn’t keep their
families with them. And the same is true of the
academics and consultants who advise them. The
instinctive response of internationals is to
recreate the state as it has existed in Europe
since the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia. The
international community has helped to prevent
the complete collapse of some states, but without
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necessarily creating durable conditions for the
efficient performance of the whole political
system. It sometimes has helped some regimes
extend their control over large territories but
frequently has not yet succeeded in stabilising
the various internal systems of governance that
really sustain the state. Thus, on the basis of this
project’s fieldwork in the DRC, Côte d’Ivoire,
Mozambique, Sierra Leone and the former
Somalia, we submit that the international
community is struggling with inadequate
conceptual tools.
Generally when Westerners confront collapsed
states in Africa, Thomas Hobbes and the social
contract are in the background. They presuppose
that the structures of the central state must be
restored in the first stages of any solution, for, as
Hobbes had it, life without it is ‘nasty, brutish
and short’ (Hobbes 1939 [1651]).2 Also, they
implicitly assume that the state must have failed3
because the social contract it had with its
citizens has been broken and that the recreation
of order will require its restoration (multiple
conversations with donor staff; OCDE 2008).
Neither of these assumptions is wholly without
merit. But we will show that they need to be
reformulated to meet the conditions of
contemporary post-conflict Africa. First, Hobbes
was right that states are capable of providing the
highest levels of human security and that in their
absence predatory violence by competing armed
groups is likely. But some states themselves
create predation and insecurity and there are
non-state forms of governance that can provide
better than they do for safety and economic
development. The DRC, Sierra Leone and
Somalia all have been subjected to extreme
predation by the state at certain periods in the
last quarter of a century and many parts of
Somalia demonstrate alternative forms of
governance today (Kamara 2010; Leonard and
Samantar 2011; Little 2003; Menkhaus 2006;
Prunier 2009). 
Second, states do need legitimacy if they are to
succeed. The Zaire phase of Congo’s history
illustrates the point well – without a normative
underpinning, the need for coercive or material
inducements for compliance spiralled upward until
the resources to provide them were exhausted
(Etzioni 1964). Zaire probably was no more
corrupt than a number of other states that have
survived but, unlike them, in its last 20 years it
was seriously deficient in its normative claim on
the obedience of its citizens (Young and Turner
1985). As a result, it collapsed when challenged
in the aftermath of the Rwanda genocide.
The ‘social contract’ is a thought experiment,
whereby we ask when people would agree to cede
authority (i.e. the obligation to obey) to a
governing body in return for the social order and
other benefits it might provide. The classic social
contract theorists (Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau,
Kant) did not posit that such an agreement was
an historical act; for them it was simply a
philosophical device. Nonetheless, their thought
is based on clear assumptions about how humans
behave, on what would lead them to consider
authority legitimate, and thus on the principles
from which a stable political order would need to
be (re)constructed.4 Most important for our
purposes they assumed that the state was based
on a single ‘social contract’, which in principle
could have been consummated between relatively
equal, individual citizens. In this Overview we
will show that security in the contemporary
African state is actually founded on two
contracts5 and two bargains, in which the key
actors are unequal groups rather than
autonomous individuals.6 Contracts and bargains
both are based in exchange, but contracts come
to be valued for their own sake and thus create
stable obligations, whereas bargains exist only so
long as they produce immediate benefits for all
parties.
3 The community contract
The fundamental social contracts in Africa are
not between the state and individuals alone but
by individuals with their communities and by
communities with the state. Of course the
African state in its contemporary configuration,
save for Ethiopia, was a colonial creation and
thus came into existence through external force.
The colonial state could not be efficiently
maintained on coercion alone, however, even
with superior military technology; some
normative compliance was needed as well.
(Significant material inducements were not even
considered.) An implicit contract therefore was
struck between local ‘traditional’ leaders (either
existing or newly created) whereby they would
lead their communities in complying with the
writ of the state and the colonial power would
protect these authorities from any local
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challenges (Oliver and Fage 1966). In this way a
necessary modicum of ‘traditional’ legitimacy
was captured in support of a ‘legal-rational’
state, to use Max Weber’s terms (Weber 1947).
In most of Africa this community sanction
continues to underwrite the authority of the
state at the local level outside the major towns,
even where ‘traditional’ rulers have been
supplanted by appointive or democratic systems
of governance. Mahmood Mamdani argues that
this colonial legacy divides African populations
between rural subjects and urban citizens
(Mamdani 1996). In Congo, Côte d’Ivoire and
Sierra Leone it is clear that many town dwellers
and most elites do feel a powerful, unmediated
commitment to their contemporary states, which
has given these countries territorial resilience
(and which was surprising to many external
observers of the DRC in the Congo Wars). And
legally Africans today are bound to their states as
individuals. Nonetheless, the informal reality of
the community contract and its mediated
relationship with the state remains, for non-elite
urban Africans are still subject to the authority
of their rural communities of origin if they wish
to retain land rights there (as most do). 
The point then is that the social contract with
the state is a mediated one for most Africans in
most countries. They owe allegiance to their
community and the community has a contract with
the state. Today the latter contract continues to
provide support for the community’s governance
structure and usually would involve its physical
security, roads, and access to education and
modern health care as well. In post-conflict
situations the ‘terms of exchange’ for the contract
will have slipped, however, so that just physical
security is enough to assure the allegiance of the
community’s governance structure.
The nature of the community social contract is
quite important as well. As Mark Button
suggests, social contracts are not self-enforcing.
They require supporting cultural values and
institutions, which will be built in interaction
with the contract itself (Button 2008). Thus the
local contract has implications far beyond the
community itself and powerfully shapes the
discourse in the national political system as well.
Authority at the local level is closely linked to
control of land. In most of Africa peasants work
their own land, but they do not have individually
transferable ownership of it. Instead they have
use rights (usufruct in Latin) but only as long as
they occupy and till it (la mit en valeur in French).
The right to dispose of unoccupied land belongs
to the state and the local authority (usually a
chief). The local social contract as we observe it
in conflict and post-conflict countries depends
very little on the delivery of ‘development’
services but instead relies on the perception of
local citizens as to whether they are being
provided with justice, which means both
(a) access to land for the purposes of production,
and (b) local order that is balanced and not
unduly oppressive, especially that judicial fines
are in line with local income possibilities.7
The traditional authority-holder at the base
typically is not representative of the whole
community but is the leader of what is
considered the ‘founding family’ (usually
through clearing the bush, sometimes by
conquest). The ‘strangers’ who come after the
founding family are given permission by its
representative to use the land – which creates
value and adds to the strength of the community
– in return for which the ‘stranger’ and his
descendants are to give tribute and obedience to
the scion of the founding family (the chief). So
even if the founding social contract might
originally have been between a group of relative
equals, over time it becomes one between the
founding families and the followers (settlers by
petition, conquest or slavery).
There are places in Africa where traditional
authorities no longer exercise local authority and
therefore the occupant is not necessarily from a
‘founding family’. In Kenya and eastern Nigeria
chiefs were a colonial creation. But in both
countries the administrative chiefs conform in
other respects to the analysis we provide here. In
Tanzania party secretaries replaced chiefs at
independence and the determined egalitarianism
of its socialist period seems to have spared it
from autochthon (‘sons of the soil’) challenges.
In effect they have replaced the chiefs as local
authorities. The socialist government of newly
independent Mozambique attempted to follow
the Tanzanian model of party secretaries but this
threat to the still highly legitimate authority of
traditional chiefs was one of the causes of the
civil war there (Manning 1997).
One of the tensions underlying the local social
contract in most of rural Africa is that the land
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frontier is now largely closed, so that in many
places these immigrant families have come to be
seen as competitors, not as contributors to the
welfare of the founders. There are two types of
this conflict – the first, where the settlers have
blended into the original community culturally
but still retain a subordinate place; the second,
where they retain their cultural distinctness, in
which case the conflict takes the form of
autochthony (a clash over who has the right of
priority because of original settlement – the
‘sons of the soil’). The second sometimes arises
from state intervention to grant group’s or
individual’s land rights in areas where locals
regard them as outsiders. Parts of Sierra Leone
illustrate the first type of conflict, as the sons of
subordinate families now have difficulty getting
farms on which they can grow permanent crops
(without which they also can’t support their
wives) and this led them to provide early support
for the civil war there (Jackson 2006; Richards
1998). Congo’s South Kivu (Vlassenroot 2002)
and western Côte d’Ivoire (Boone 2009; Allouche
and Zadi Zadi, this IDS Bulletin) illustrate the
variant of the second type where there has been
initial local consent, while North Kivu and
Kenya’s central Rift Valley are examples of
earlier state interventions. Both of the latter two
variants have fuelled virulent xenophobic
appeals to the ‘true’ locals (i.e. the descendants
of the first settlers). In western Côte d’Ivoire the
perception of young ‘sons of the soil’ is that
chiefs failed to protect adequately their rights to
land in their communities, which undermined
traditional authority. The consequence was that
in this situation the chiefs were less able to
contain inter-ethnic conflict in the rural areas of
the west than the central state officials in the
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Illustrative vignettes of community governance
Southern Sierra Leone
The many paramount chiefs are elected for life by representatives of local taxpayers.
All resident adults are eligible to serve as electors but only descendants of the founding
family are eligible for selection. The paramount chief in Shenge is an elderly woman who
had a distinguished career in education. But to be elected she had her elected brother
deposed by the courts on the grounds that he had been only adopted into the founding
family (Vincent 2012).
Eastern Congo
Rwandaphone pastoralists were present in the Congo’s South Kivu Province by the late
nineteenth century, before Belgian colonial occupation. Local acceptance of their being
there was based on their providing tribute to the Bami (kings) of the already present
Babembe, Bavira and Bafulero, payment of which was abrogated in the 1920s. The right to
determine who is ‘present’ on their land remains an important symbolic issue for the
‘autochthonous’ groups as it relates to the (Rwandaphone) Banyamulenge and has been a
subject of occasional violent conflict since the Mulele uprising of the 1960s (Vlassenroot
2002). Babembe land, for example, is not scarce, but the Banyamulenge are pastoralists
and come from the high plateau into the former’s cultivated fields in the June–September
dry season. A fee for this presence has now been negotiated by a political officer from the
UN peacekeeping mission MONUSCO, and the problem therefore should be solved. But the
Babembe elite continue to want the Banyamulenge to acknowledge symbolically that the
land belongs to the Babembe, just as it is important to the Banyamulenge that they be
recognised as having become genuine indigines through the state’s granting their territory
a separate administrative status (Mushi 2012). 
Somalia
For Somalis the primary provider of personal security is the diya-paying group, which
comprises about 100 adult males and which negotiates compensation (or exacts revenge)
for torts committed on or by outsiders. Islamic courts supplement this tit-for-tat justice and
are especially important for business contracts. Thus even in Somaliland and Puntland
most justice is delivered by non-governmental institutions, giving both clan and Islam
centrality to Somali systems of legitimate governance (Leonard and Samantar 2011).
nearby towns. Here, then, we see the importance
of the community-level social contract because it
had been weakened. In Somalia the concepts of
descent and clanship by adoption are present but
ownership is recognised as fluid and subject to
conflict, negotiation and contract – which in
some ways is less subject to larger-scale violent
conflict than the other two.
The cultural and institutional patterns created by
the rural social contract are carried over into the
cities as well. In urban Bukavu and Uvira (South
Kivu), in the absence of strong policing and with
simmering rural conflict, we observed that
insecure ethnic groups have tended to consolidate
in exclusive neighbourhoods. During periods of
conflict, groups also organise their own collective
night-watch security. Mutualités have developed
for all the significant groups in the multi-ethnic
towns. These have elected officers (and thus
break with the traditional administration practice
of appointment by descent). Intra-communal
disputes are judged by committees of the ‘wise’
(sages) and inter-communal ones are negotiated
by the officers between mutualités. Those who
refuse to be bound by their community’s decisions
will be ostracised by it, thereby losing its
protection and influence, which can be very
dangerous for the lone individual. The pattern
that has evolved of kinship-based protection,
collective decision-making in a more consensual
mode, and intergroup negotiation is very similar
to the diya-paying8 group and clan governance
processes that have survived or been revived in
Somalia (Leonard and Samantar 2011).
The more difficult conflicts in Africa become
rooted in disputes over these intra-local contracts.
The inter-area conflicts, which are played out on
the national stage, are more easily managed by
negotiation and division of ‘spoils’. (Examples of
both types of conflict and the differences in
handling them are evident in Kenya and Nigeria.)
Note that these intra-local conflicts rarely
threaten state boundaries, as that is not the level
at which the intense conflicts lie. Severine
Autesserre stresses peacekeepers in conflict
states need to address conflicts at this local level,
as they sustain the larger, more internationally
visible ones that are directly implicated in state
breakdown (Autesserre 2007, 2010). 
The local social contract remains hugely
important even when its terms are being
somewhat renegotiated. In eastern Congo,
Mozambique and Sierra Leone many chiefs were
killed during their civil wars and most of the
more senior ones fled the rural areas. Some of
these chiefs (more so the Bami in Kivu, Congo
than their equivalent paramount chiefs in Sierra
Leone) have not returned to their rural
residences after the war, which has weakened
their legitimacy. Customary tribunals also are
not as active in Congo and Sierra Leone as they
were before the war. The fact that the customary
tribunal judges depend on fees and fines for their
income increasingly has led to their being seen
as corrupt – or at least biased.9 Alternative, non-
governmental dispute resolution services,
sometimes tied to the enforcement potential of
the magistrates’ courts, are becoming more
prominent.10 Thus the chiefs are less relevant in
adjudication now and their legitimacy is
somewhat diminished. Nonetheless, it is striking
that in Congo and Sierra Leone the role of
traditional chief was quickly re-established after
the wars and its fundamental legitimacy is not
challenged at any level. In Mozambique, where
the government had wanted to displace the
chiefs, one of the rationales for ‘bringing them
back’ was to help re-establish order and it was
strongly supported by women’s groups
(paradoxically as ‘tradition’ is patriarchial, but it
makes sense because they are the first victims, at
home and outside of the home). Chiefs continue
to control land allocation and only rarely have
men who led self-defence militias during the
wars been able to challenge their leadership
more generally. (In Mozambique, rebel
RENAMO11 has been able to gain a role in
parliament, but with the support of the chiefs
with which they were most closely allied during
the civil war.) The social system of the Somalis is
non-hierarchical and the title of ‘elder’ is enjoyed
by all adult men in a clan diya-paying group. The
continued civil wars have made the diya-paying
groups less egalitarian, as the patronage of
wealthy businessmen and the militia leaders they
support has intruded. But the diya-paying groups
themselves have become fundamental again to
the security of almost all Somalis. So in all four
countries the operation of the local social contract
is being renegotiated but not its existence. 
In all four countries we see traditional
authorities renegotiating their role by also
participating in the competition for control of
the modern state. In the former Somalia,
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traditional structures of governance and their
leading elders have been involved in negotiating
successor polities. Their role was particularly
central in Somaliland and these elders were
appointed to an upper house of its legislature.
Similarly, in Puntland these traditional
structures continue to select all members of the
legislature. On the other hand many elders were
perceived as having been bought in the
establishment of the Transitional Federal
Government of Somalia and were discredited as
a result (Leonard and Samantar 2011). The
neglect of traditional governance structures in
the centre and south of Somalia seems to be a
major factor in the failure to re-establish order
there and in the growth in competition from
political Islamists (Leonard and Samantar, this
IDS Bulletin).
In Sierra Leone democratically elected district
councils were recreated after the civil war,
probably with the intention of diminishing the
authority of the chiefs, whose failing in some
regions were seen as having contributed to the
conflict. A change in national government has
led to increased influence for the chiefs, however,
and election to district councils and the national
parliament is strongly influenced by the
endorsements of chiefs. 
In South Kivu (DRC), although the power of
traditional chiefs is still respected, there are a
number of new leaders who are developing new
venues of power attached to positions within a
larger polity and this has brought many traditional
chiefs to reconsider their role and to use it in
order to provide new venues for themselves, their
offspring or closely related family members.
Chiefs seeking to reposition themselves by
capitalising on their traditional authority either
can compete directly with these new leaders for
elective or appointive positions in the provincial
or national legislatures, or they can strike
bargains to influence the votes of their subjects.
It is hard (even if not impossible) for someone to
be elected without the backing of his/her
communal base, which is heavily influenced by
verbal signals from the traditional chiefs. 
In all four countries (as generally in Africa)
elected representatives are seen as the
ambassadors of their communities (Leonard
2009). No matter whether the local authorities
are ‘kingmakers’ or clients and whether their
position is traditional, appointive or democratic,
they powerfully mediate the relationship
between average citizens and the state,
preserving key aspects of the traditional two-
stage social contract. 
Mahmood Mamdani in Citizen and Subject
(Mamdani 1996) implies that we should be
moving away from these local social contracts and
embracing (the French Revolution) concept of
national citizenship. We are inclined to think this
is ahistorical, since local-level social contracts
persisted everywhere in the world, including the
early industrialising world, until at least 1800. It
is true that most Africans today see themselves as
having an allegiance to their state (even if not
always its regime) but this is in addition to their
local allegiance and is still most often mediated
operationally through the local social contract. The
challenge therefore is not to end local social
contracts but instead to make local governance
more responsive and effective without
challenging the deep residual legitimacy the
traditional authorities have in most localities. At
least in post-conflict situations, elected local
governments and appointed magistrates’ courts
may be appropriate but they cannot replace the
chiefs. The former two can be as corrupt as the
latter and elected representatives rely too heavily
on chiefs to mobilise electoral support. 
Reform of traditional administration, not its
displacement, is probably in order in post-conflict
situations. Three related possibilities occur to us.
First, all local adults might be permitted to elect
their chiefs from among the many descendants of
the ruling lineage. (This is the Sierra Leone
practice, unlike that of Congo where the
successor is the child effectively designated by the
preceding chief and confirmed by the provincial
government. The Somalis do not have chiefs. In
Mozambique tradition and party still contend for
local leadership in a hybrid system, though the
former is now accepted by the government.)
Second, chiefs might be asked to renew their
mandate every, say, ten years by standing for
re-election. (Sierra Leone chiefs serve for life.
Congolese chiefs can be removed by the state for
malfeasance, but of course this is not a renewal of
a local mandate.) Both of these practices would
make traditional administration more
accountable to those it serves (and therefore less
likely to be exploitative) and would help to weed
out those who have become old or have proved
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incompetent. Third, the practice of chiefs and
customary judges deriving their incomes from the
fees and fines they charge for their decisions
needs to change.12 This practice exacerbates the
already prevalent problem of corruption and
enhances the perception that local governance is
biased. To achieve this, however, government
revenues need to be separated from the incomes
of governing personnel – one of the classic steps
toward modern bureaucracy that Weber
chronicled (Weber 1967). Fourth, throughout
Africa, wherever land is becoming scarce, the
arbitrariness with which chiefs often allocate it
weakens the effectiveness of this critical link in
local governance, particularly with young men.
But in conflict situations (from strong states like
Côte d’Ivoire and Kenya through to the weaker
ones of Congo, Sierra Leone and Somalia) central
management of the closing land frontier has
often been worse and thus is a challenge to
governance at all levels. 
In practice, Somalia has already adopted the first
two points, as leadership of the diya-paying group
is not hierarchical and most Islamic Sharia court
judges are not hereditary. Nor are Sharia courts
seen as being as corrupt as other government
offices. Thus non-state governance has been
resilient in Somalia and movements based on
Sharia have special appeal there (Leonard and
Samantar, this IDS Bulletin and 2011). 
4 The military bargain
The effective agreement between an African
country’s military and its governing regime (and
hence the state) is the most problematic and
unstable of the four pacts underlying state
security. Coups have been notoriously common in
independent sub-Saharan Africa. Civilian leaders
have found it hard to create bonds of legitimacy
with militaries; the result has been not social
contracts but bargains of temporary convenience.
Even before the rise of the modern state in
Europe the identity of military officers there was
separate from that of villagers and was closely
tied to that of superordinate political authorities.
Thus European states and proto-states enjoyed a
residual legitimacy from their militaries,
particularly in the face of peasant uprisings. The
loyalty of the majority of African militaries to
their presidents is more likely to be ethnic and
based on immediate material advantage. Of
course there are exceptions: the presidents of
Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda came to power at
the head of rebel armies. In Tanzania President
Nyerere instituted universal six-month military
service, so that career officers command only
conscripts (who are driven by civilian concepts of
loyalty to the state). The Kenyan military seems
to have concluded from its participation in
United Nations peacekeeping missions that
military interventions in politics are always
disastrous; and the Nigerian army developed an
identity with the state through defence of its
unity in the country’s painful civil war and is
kept in check now by the widespread view that
military rule was a failure. 
In the DRC, Sierra Leone and Somalia, however,
the civil wars were prompted at least in part by
military predation and incompetence. In all
three, the government was unable to pay either
the army or the police an adequate salary and
they proceeded to live off the communities where
they were posted – which made them militarily
ineffective as well. It is an error to see the
military in a failing state as an instrument for
the provision of security to citizens. In fact in
conditions of instability in Africa, army and
police instead tend to be predatory – in which
case it may or may not be possible for local
authorities to make a purely local supplementary
contract with them. 
In Congo it is quite explicit in the constitution
and law that even the police are concerned with
the security of the state, not the population
(Nlandu 2012). In eastern Congo the situation is
even more extreme. What began as a Rwandan
invasion to root out the Rwandan Hutu forces
that carried out the genocide and threatened the
country from nearby refugee camps in the DRC
evolved into an occupation of North and South
Kivu by a Rwandaphone, even if nominally
Congolese, national army. This is not the place to
describe the complicated process by which this
took place. But Congolese Hutu came to be
combined with the Tutsi in the part of the newly
integrated Congo army stationed in North and
South Kivu and the two turned their attention
from the Hutu genocidaires to the local Maï Maï
rebels who have consistently resisted the
Rwandan invasion. The presence of this army
thus exacerbated rather than solved the local
security problem and served to delegitimate the
national government and UN peacekeeping
forces (MONUSCO), which are seen locally as
having condoned this development (Mushi 2012).
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The fiction that this Rwandaphone army was
serving the Congo has now disintegrated and the
former has returned to the status of a militia and
is now fighting both the Congolese army
(FARDC – Forces Armées de la RDC [Armed
Forces of the DRC]) and MONUSCO.
The more general issue is the relationship that
the army and police have with the populations in
the areas they ‘serve’. These aspirants to a
‘monopoly over the exercise of legitimate violence’
(to use another concept from Weber) in failing
states actually are rarely paid properly or on time
and thus must derive their incomes from local
resources if they and their families are to survive.
In the worst instances they simply plunder the
locals without limit. In Sierra Leone people
consistently spoke disparagingly of the predation
of the ‘sobels’, soldiers who had joined the rebels
against the government. In Kivu local chiefs
optimally negotiate an agreement with the army
and police that the community will provision them
as long as they don’t otherwise impose on the
people. In between are soldiers and police who
don’t murder or rape locals and take only what
they really need. (Congolese informants speak of
the latter type of predation as ‘well disciplined’.)
We found several instances in Kivu where ‘living
off the land’ created severe local tensions and
petitions from communities that the army be
removed from their areas (because they found it a
source of insecurity, not protection). The chiefs
who negotiated local provisioning essentially have
adopted an ancient practice – as paying armies
(rather than having them live off enemy land) is
no more than a century and a half old anywhere in
the world. One of the American grievances in its
revolutionary war was the British practice of
‘quartering’ individual soldiers abroad on specific
families/households, who then were responsible
for their room and board. Similarly, Napoleon
expected his armies to ‘live off the land’ in the
countries he conquered.
Such ‘quartering’ is an unsatisfactory practice,
however, as it was for Napoleon in Spain and for
the British in the American colonies. Proper
provisioning through the national budget is
much to be preferred. This can be expensive,
however, particularly in the aftermath of a civil
war. In Somaliland approximately 70 per cent of
the government budget goes to its army, which is
the remnant of the forces that won the country’s
independence in 1991.
Provisioning and reorienting the military and
police has been easier in Sierra Leone, as the
original army was completely decommissioned
after it joined the rebels and its replacement was
trained and financed by the British. Similarly the
police in Sierra Leone were reformed with British
help to orient them to the protection rather than
control of the population (Charley and M’Cormack
2011). But even when the police and army cease
being predators, the major instrument of local
order (including in Mozambique) is through
communal authority. National police and army
can keep others from predating, which does
improve local security but only by stabilising the
predation. They are too sparse on the ground to
create full security against local crime. A major
issue troubling both the DRC and Sierra Leone
is that the ‘customary police’ of the traditional
local authorities are not being financed any
longer and therefore are not effective. 
5 The international bargain
In practice, weak sub-Saharan African countries
experience a fourth agreement with the state as
well, one that generally is essential to the other
three but is destabilising to them as well. Poor
countries lack sufficient domestic finances for the
roads, health and education that their
communities expect in their social contract with
the state and their governments also will strain to
pay the salaries of their civil and military services
without international development assistance.
Many failed states in Africa have been infected as
well with conflicts from their neighbours and
need regional and ‘Northern’ assistance with
their attempts to find peace. These forms of aid
in effect are bargains and come at a price.
First, the various donors have their own agendas.
Some are very much driven by their own domestic
interests, such as Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and
the USA in Somalia and Burundi, Rwanda and
Uganda in eastern Congo. Others are more
selfless, such as the UK and Nigeria in Sierra
Leone or the UN in all three. Even the benign
agendas may be discordant with local priorities,
however. For example, the desire of Western
powers to support the reconstruction of post-
genocide Rwanda is in tension with their desire to
bring peace to eastern Congo, where Rwandan
activities are a core part of the problem.
Thus, second, international military and budget
support is likely to have a shorter time horizon
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than the ten years most observers have
concluded is necessary for reconstruction
(Collier 2007, 2009). And the countries that
prove willing to commit troops may have a
counterproductive effect, as did Ethiopia in
Somalia and Rwanda in Congo.
Third, international efforts at peacekeeping and
state reconstruction are focused on national
institutions and conflicts. The internationals
tend to have a very weak ability to understand
and support the resolution of purely local
conflicts (which may actually be sustaining the
larger ones) or to buttress the reconstruction of
effective local governance, as is evident in both
eastern Congo and Somalia (Autesserre 2007,
2010; Leonard and Samantar, this IDS Bulletin
and 2011; Menkhaus 2006). Relatedly, the rules
of engagement for UN peacekeeping forces limit
contact with local communities to a few officers
and reduce tours of duty to six months,
effectively preventing understanding of local
realities. Similarly the expatriates who lead
donor organisations and control their purse
strings rarely stay in-post for more than a few
years, so that they too generally don’t
understand the subtleties of national, much less
local, structures of governance.
Fourth, internationals conceive of rights in terms
of individuals rather than collectivities. Thus
their interventions have a poor ‘fit’. The impact
can be positive. Women in Sierra Leone are much
better off since the war. They paid a terrible
price of rape during the war itself, but the post-
war reconstruction efforts unleashed a huge
amount of female consciousness-raising by
NGOs (both local and international) and by the
British with the police. The result is that women
(at least in the south and east) are much more
conscious of their rights today, they are much
less willing to accept abuse from their husbands,
they are more aggressive about protecting their
rights in court and supporting other women in
doing so, and the traditional authorities feel
(some reluctantly) that they must respect and
enforce these new rights. The same efforts are
under way in Congo.
None of this is to say that international
involvement in conflict and post-conflict situations
is unnecessary or generally counterproductive.
The huge imbalance between domestic and
international military and financial capabilities,
however, gives unusual weight to the
internationals. But their imperfect understanding
of the national context makes their power
clumsy and draws attention away from the local
levels to which much more attention must be
given if the human security of the populations is
to be recreated.
6 Networks
The prominence of international actors in the
sustenance and functioning of post-conflict states
raises the question of whether they threaten the
integrity of the African state itself. There is no
doubt that governance becomes more horizontal
and the actors involved are more numerous and
financially consequential in a post-conflict
situation. International actors also change the
policies countries pursue and indirectly make
their politics more open. We conclude, however,
that they do not threaten the integrity of the
state itself.
International donors tend to network with one
another around subject matters of common
interest. Nonetheless their differing visions and
competing interests do create space within which
the recipient national government is most often
able to influence if not determine an outcome –
as long as it cares deeply about it and is
relatively united itself. Even in the case of
Somalia the donors have not been able to
coordinate their activities and priorities
effectively, despite trying to do so, being located
together outside the country in Nairobi, and
facing a very weak Somali government (see
Schmidt, this IDS Bulletin). 
During the period of conflict, the work of
humanitarian international NGOs (INGOs) will
be coordinated by UNOCHA (UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance), so as
to assure fairly good geographic and functional
coverage. Local communities and local NGOs
come to understand this function of UNOCHA
and know to go there to press their needs and
the initiatives they would like to undertake.
Humanitarian INGOs themselves do not prioritise
community relationships, however. They are
there to ‘bind up the wounded, feed the starving
and shelter the homeless’. Once the crisis of the
immediate conflict is gone, they will leave with
little or no notice. It is the development INGOs
which are there for the long term.
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The development INGOs tend overwhelmingly to
operate from strict programmatic priorities,
however. National NGOs come to understand
these priorities and structure their own
programmes accordingly so as to access funding.
But then this means that the NGOs also are
driven programmatically and are internationally
responsive. Communities find it very difficult to
identify and understand donor and INGO
priorities. Thus we found that in the aftermath
of conflict, communities lack networked
relationships with all but a few international
donors. Even with local NGOs, it is the NGOs
that are taking the initiative to establish
priorities (as dictated by the international
donors financing them).
The major exception to the foregoing
generalisation about development INGOs and
NGOs are the churches, which are embedded in
the communities, have an interest in being
responsive to local priorities, often already have
a long-established service infrastructure in the
communities, and are supported by their own
INGOs.13
With the exception of the comparatively modest
assistance received from or through the churches,
communities rely on their elected representatives
(sometimes through the local council) to identify
potential donors to meet local priorities. These
elected positions are held by people with elite
backgrounds (by local standards) who are able to
negotiate the complexities of the world of donor
priorities and bureaucratic procedures. Thus
even very substantial overseas development
assistance (ODA) flows reinforce rather than
undermine the centrality of government in the
delivery of services to the citizens. In fact, even
in relatively strong African states international
donors frequently finance civil servants to deliver
services and programmes (Brass 2012). The
programmatic content and structure of
development programmes are heavily influenced
by donor priorities, philosophies and procedures
(Johnson 2009) but most often communities
experience the services as being provided by the
state and they therefore reinforce, rather than
undermine, the social contract between the central
state and local communities (Brass 2010, 2012). 
Of course where local NGOs rather than civil
servants mediate the international provision of
resources for local services, their leaders may
come to compete with government-based elites
for local political leadership. So the precise
network through which services reach the
community will have political and other
consequences, even if not for the legitimacy of
the state itself. But this is not new, for it was
presaged in the colonial period by the
competition that schoolteachers gave to chiefs
and other traditional authorities (Ita 1972).
Most of these donor-financed NGO leaders have
delimited spheres of influence, so that it matters
in local politics or in narrow policy domains who
they are but not in broader national politics.
Again, the major exception here is the churches,
which most often do have the national
organisations through which to build on their
resurrected role as key service providers. 
7 Conclusions
The classical concept of the social contract leads
us astray in our attempts to provide human
security in conflict-ridden countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. It causes us to think of bonds of
legitimacy between the state and a citizenry of
individuals. Instead the foundational social
contracts in Africa are between families and
their local authorities and between communities
and the larger state. Complicating these two
contracts are implicit bargains the state has with
its military and with the international community.
In addition, the focus of the classical social
contract on individuals leads to a liberal set of
values that steer us away from the core issues
needing attention in African conflicts – the
central role that contested community and
individual land rights have in the local social
contract, the relationship that communities
(rather than individuals) have with the state, and
the impact that the unstable loyalties of
underfunded militaries have directly and
indirectly on community security. Montesquieu’s
‘liberty’ and the checks and balance offered by a
focus on groups offers a more promising path in
state reconstruction (see Leonard, this IDS
Bulletin, last article). 
Post-conflict systems of governance in Africa
have become much more multilevelled and
networked than they were in the era
immediately following independence. Local
systems of governance and the resolution of their
problems are key to the restoration of order.
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Furthermore, the severe resource constraints
created by violent conflict make international
actors central to the imposition of some
semblance of peace – a reality that also makes
international actors prominent in the networks
that provide resources for reconstruction and
development throughout the multiple levels of a
country’s governance system. The presence of
internationals in these networks does mean that
a country’s president does not have the ability to
set priorities and control the distribution of
resources in the way s/he did in the first two
decades of independence. As a result it is
possible for local leaders, professionals, national
NGOs and churches to challenge the president
over matters of policy and politics in ways that they
could not in the early independence era. But we
find that these new or revitalised networks do
not challenge the state as an institution itself.
Ultimately the key links in these networks are
being provided by individuals and organisations
that are embedded in the state and will not
challenge its existence, unity or effectiveness.
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Notes
1 Our project also undertook research on these
issues in Mozambique, under the direction of
Peter Houtzager and Carlos Cuinhane.
Unfortunately that work was not quite
complete as we went to press but where
possible we have drawn on the interim results.
2 For examples of such Hobbesian analysis, see
(Beichman 2008; Winter 2004). 
3 The terms used to describe countries hovering
on the borders of violent internal conflict are
unstable and contested internationally. Some
members of the international community
establish a distinction between a fragile state,
a crisis state and a failed state. Moving from
less to more seriously challenged countries,
fragile states are vulnerable to internal and
external shocks, and domestic and
international conflicts. A crisis state is
characterised by acute stress and the inability
of its governing institutions to manage
conflict and shocks. The state is threatened by
collapse, war and ultimately the formation of
a different state, if no actor succeeds in
imposing a new ruling order over the territory.
The idea of a failed state is more extreme. It
is a condition of state collapse in which the
state can no longer perform its basic security
functions and has no control over its territory
and borders. It can no longer reproduce the
conditions of its own existence.
4 A fuller consideration of the limits of the
classical Western conception of the social
contract when applied to African conflict states
is found in Leonard and Samantar (2011).
5 Of course if we were to consider the functions
of the state beyond security, the number of
contracts might be extended almost to
infinity, depending on our level of analysis.
The classic work of Barnard (1968 [1938]) as
extended by March and Simon (1958) sees all
work in and for organisations as based on a
quasi-contractual balance of inducements and
contributions.
6 Rousseau gives more credence to people as
social creatures whereas Hobbes’ analysis is
narrowly individualist (O’Hagen 1999; Tuck
1989; Wokler 2001). However, even Rousseau
does not give the importance to community
that is necessary in Africa. Ibn Khaldun, the
fourteenth century Arab philosopher, comes
closest (Issawi 1987). 
7 Traditional authorities in late colonial and well-
functioning independent states generally have
been quite active on development matters and
surely this is an important part of their social
contract with their communities. But in
conditions of conflict the terms of exchange in
the local social contract seem to have reverted
to these more basic aspects of governance.
8 Diya groups are made up of about 100 adult
males in a sub-lineage who exact and pay
compensation for torts committed against and
by group members (Lewis 1999 [1961]). Such
use of ascriptive ties for security and advantage
seems common when civil war forces a
breakdown in formal governance structures.
9 Related evidence for Mozambique is found in
Kyed (2009a and b) and Workman (2011).
10 A similar development in Ghana is reported
by Crook et al. (2010).
11 Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência
Nacional Moçambicana).
12 In the DRC fees collected for judgements
belong to a decentralised entity (the chefferie or
collectivité). The Mwami, as the head of the
collectivity, is supposed to receive a wage. Of
course the management of fees and taxes
collected by the collectivity is patrimonial since
the Mwami effectively controls how its revenues
are spent and these are used to pay his salary.
When the Mwami has no more land to sell or
other personal resources and when he no
longer receives gifts from his prominent
subjects, he may end up living like a commoner
if the court revenues are compromised.
13 For example, for the centrality of churches in
Congelese education, see De Herdt (2011).
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